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Abstract 
 
Governments from many countries, specifically developing countries, have sought private 
participation in large-scale infrastructure projects because of their limited resources and 
budgets. Then, many public infrastructure projects have been privatized worldwide, where 
benefits and risks are substantially distributed between the public and private sectors. 
However, the complexity of the project arrangement has constituted a dilemma for 
governments to balance the benefits and risks between the public and private sectors, i.e., 
financial institutions and private companies. Large infrastructure projects typically involve 
various risk factors so that the successful implementation of those projects depends on the 
effective management of those key risk factors.  
 
There is a requirement for a tool to help the government evaluate the delivery of value on the 
infrastructure projects while still sustaining the interests of private investment. This research 
studies the use of the real option methodology as a tool for the valuation of large-scale 
infrastructure projects. A comprehensive literature review of the real option methodology is 
undertaken and an application of the methodology to a large-scale public infrastructure 
project in Thailand is considered. More specifically, this research studies real options and the 
option interactions for a hypothetical toll road concession involving the Second Stage 
Expressway System (SES) in Thailand. Real options for the public and private parties are 
identified and evaluated. The interactions of the options are investigated in the form of 
multiple real options. The aim of the research is to demonstrate how real options can mitigate 
risks to the main stakeholders of the project. 
 
The study provides a practical insight into project risks within transportation system projects 
in Thailand. This research studies options and the option interactions as applied in the SES 
project. Overall, the application of the real option approach in large infrastructure projects is 
promising. The evaluation shows that the value of options and their interactions can be 
significant. The findings of this research would facilitate the risk analysis and mitigation 
process that can be conducted by governments, financial institutions, or project developers 
prior to the development of the infrastructure project.  
 
The real option applied to value an infrastructure project is complicated but the mechanism 
can help for policy design and implementation. The findings from the real option model 
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indicate that governments, financial institutions and private companies play a crucial role in 
the risk allocation in large infrastructure projects.  It is found that projects developed solely by 
government are insufficient and require a high government budget. The government can 
design an appropriate level of guarantee and type of guarantee which attracts private interest 
in the project as well as an affordable government budget. The research finds that many 
option combinations such as i) the combination of the equity guarantee option (government) 
and the deferral option (financial institution); ii) the combination of the deferral option 
(financial institution) and the grant option (private company) iii) the combination of the 
deferral option (financial institution) and the deferral option (private company) and iv) the 
combination of the deferral option (financial institution), the abandonment option (financial 
institution) and the deferral option (private company) are recommended for policy design and 
implementation. With such option combinations, governments can properly evaluate the 
economic viability of such arrangements prior to offering optimal option proposals to the 
project company. With real option application, this research study can critically compare the 
effects of different policy designs in order to design a suitable public financing scheme. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Governments worldwide have turned to private funds to finance large-scale public 
infrastructure projects. Many governments have established Public Private Partnerships (PPP) 
as the arrangement between the public sector and the private sector to produce an asset or 
deliver a service. In PPP contracts, the private sector has to finance, construct, operate and 
maintain the project within the specific period. It has been argued that the private sector, 
involved in the PPP, can perform certain tasks more efficiently than the government, thereby 
providing potentially huge benefits to the public (Zhang and kumaraswamy, 2001). Despite 
the widely acknowledged benefits of privatization, a number of PPP projects suffer a 
significant financial loss because of construction overruns, uncertainty of market demand, and 
reductions in tolls/tariffs (Zhang, 2005).   
 
It is widely known that project financing is an alternative form of raising capital in terms of 
long-term debt for investment purposes (Hainz and Kleimeier, 2001). It is a financial 
arrangement for new investment projects by structuring the financing around the project's own 
operating cash flow and assets. The cash flow generated by the project itself is the main 
source used to repay the debt (Nevitt and Fabozzi, 2000).  The use of project finance for 
funding large infrastructure projects in many countries, including Thailand since 1980, has 
highlighted significant problems. Historical evidence of project financing in Thailand and 
other countries shows that a project‘s profitability is typically uncertain and subject to various 
risks. In infrastructure projects, the risk profile undergoes important changes as the project 
comes to the operation stage, with a relatively stable stream of cash flow that is subject to 
market and regulatory risks (Devapriya and Alfen, 2003). Infrastructure development in 
Thailand has huge potential. Thailand needs billions of dollars from Public Private Participant 
(PPP) schemes to develop infrastructure investments. However, significant problems such as 
demand forecasting, procurement strategy, and the uncertainty of the projects‘ cash flows 
exist.  
 
The general purpose of this DBA thesis is twofold. Firstly, it will identify and analyse the 
characteristics and risks of project finance as well as investigating their effects on a project‘s 
performance level. Secondly, it will apply the real option theory to answer fundamental 
2 
 
questions in the context of project finance. The techniques employed in this DBA thesis 
include project cash flow analysis and risk management tools using the real option.   
  
The development area of project finance is still at the embryonic stage in Thailand. This 
research fills a gap in the academic literature. In fact, the benefit of this study is that it can 
improve the structure and the performance of future project developments by pooling 
database evidence and applying quantitative analysis. The data set was partially constructed 
by the author during studies at the Asian Institute of Technology, School of Engineering and 
Technology. The data include information on large-scale infrastructure development in 
Thailand during the period 1980-2000. This dataset of new transportation project 
developments (from 2000-present) has been updated for the purpose of DBA study.           
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
 
Many large-scale infrastructure projects in Thailand have been initiated in recent years 
because of the government‘s desire to stimulate economic growth. Whilst governments often 
use economic analysis to appraise investment projects, the private sector evaluates the project 
based on its financial feasibility. It can be argued that the economic appraisal differs from the 
financial appraisal in several respects; the appraisal coverage, the life of the project and the 
discount rate applied, etc. It is important to ensure that these differences are understood and 
that each appraisal is properly used by the public and private sectors in the development of the 
project.      
 
The conflicts of interest between the public sector and the private sector in project 
development decrease the efficiency of project performance. Typically, the public sector is 
only interested in the economic appraisal of the project whilst the private sector focuses on the 
financial appraisal. For valuing an infrastructure investment, governments usually focus on 
the economic and social value that would cause the development to be financially infeasible 
(Tanaka et al., 2005). To invest in the public project, the private party is normally looking for 
risk-sharing, incentives and support from the government. On the other hand, the government 
has to ensure that incentives and support are provided at the appropriate level, relative to its 
risks (Tanaka et al., 2005). In general, the government prefers the qualitative approach to 
evaluate risks because it is inexpensive where there is a lack of knowledge, lack of sufficient 
data, and it is difficult to quantify risk (Akintoye et al., 2001). Meanwhile, the private sector 
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requires the quantitative method to ensure that risk factors are taken into account in the 
project evaluation.  
    
Typically, risks inherited on the project may be represented through the amount of the 
discount rate applied to evaluate the project. Public projects may use different methods for 
calculating the discount rate such as the market rate of interest, the government borrowing 
rate, and the social opportunity cost rate. However, these measures have various limitations 
and should be used carefully for evaluating projects.  
 
It is generally known that governments with limited resources and budgets try to motivate the 
private sector to participate in projects through the Public Private Partnership (PPP) program. 
For a typical PPP project, the risks are mostly transferred to the private sector. Private sector 
companies normally evaluate projects using the WACC or the CAPM, which are significantly 
higher than the level of the discount rate used by the government. These approaches may 
yield misleading conclusions by choosing to implement the project from the public sector 
perspective, while in fact it may not provide the optimal benefits. This study is concerned 
with the question of how to incorporate risk and how to effectively allocate risk into the 
project.             
 
Within this framework, the study targets the enhancement of knowledge in the field of project 
evaluation and project risk management. It initially investigates the existing methodology for 
evaluating projects and assessing risk in order to identify the deficiencies, the limitations and 
the areas for improvement. The present situation of large transportation system projects in 
Thailand will be analysed and used to identify the main risks. Next, this research will present 
the real option method to evaluate the risk allocation alternatives or options. Lastly, this 
research will propose the alternative risk sharing frameworks in the context of project finance 
to be applied in the development of future projects.     
 
1.3 Research questions  
 
It is generally known that the development of large infrastructure projects either by using 
traditional procurement methods or the PPP strategy encounters various risks in several 
aspects. In general, the existence of project risk cannot be totally eliminated but alternatively 
the expected risks can be mitigated by allocating them among the project‘s stakeholders. The 
main challenge of this research was to define the best strategy on how the stakeholders 
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manage the risks by using the real option methodology. This challenge was addressed with 
the following research questions:  
  
 Given that the traditional evaluation approach, i.e. NPV, IRR is not a sufficient tool 
for evaluating the project, is the real option methodology effective and efficient for 
valuing projects?  
 How are those risks that are generally identified from the previous studies in the 
literature managed by the real option method?   
 What types of real options are appropriate for the main project stakeholders: the 
government, the private company and the financial institution? Are options valued for 
PPP projects? 
 Is the interaction effect of the option combination significant enough to the project‘s 
value?   
 What is the appropriate level of risk allocation among the government, the private 
company and the financial institution in infrastructure projects? 
 
1.4. Scope of the study  
 
The scope of the study is specific in order to allow the undertaken study to be completed 
within the appropriate time frame and with a reasonable budget. The DBA thesis will be 
classified into two parts to be written within the study period. 
 
1.4.1 Part I (Chapters 2-3): Review of the literature on project appraisal, risk management, 
risk allocation among stakeholders on large-scale transportation system projects, and the real 
option methodology.  
 
PPP projects have been encouraged by the governments in many countries including 
Thailand. There are different types of procurement methods, appraisals, concessions and PPP 
procurements in large-scale infrastructure projects that will be discussed in this study. 
Research will focus on the evidence of major stakeholder involvements and the types of PPP 
that have been designed to support the project.  
 
Infrastructure appraisal is complex and challenging because of some specific risks associated 
with infrastructure projects. The public sector attempts to mitigate risks and transfer these 
risks to the private sector as much as possible. As a result, the risks may be transferred to the 
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party that may not be the best managed. In addition, overall risks of the project may increase 
when the allocation is not appropriate. Therefore, it is essential to study how risks are 
allocated between the public and private sectors.  
 
With this regard, it is important to develop an effective project valuation tool in order to 
resolve these problems and to facilitate the risk allocation process between the public sector 
and the private sector. The proposed project valuation tool also necessitates verification as to 
whether it can be practically used in large infrastructure developments. From the background 
and the earlier described problem statement, this research is highly motivated to study the 
areas of risk management application and risk allocation in large-scale infrastructure projects.    
 
Mun (2006) describes real options as a useful tool for valuing capital investment decisions.  A 
corporate decision to invest in a project is analogous to a call option because the corporation 
has the right rather than the obligation to invest (Luehrman, 1998). Real options also help the 
corporation to assess the impacts of risks on the performance of the project. Therefore, the 
study of the real option method and its applications in project evaluation is important. The 
application of real options in assessing risks of the project will be studied. In summary, the 
following literature will be reviewed: 
 
 The economic and financial appraisals of the project  
 Procurement methods for infrastructure projects, risks in project finance 
 The role of Public Private Partnerships (PPP) in project finance 
 The role of the discount rate used for evaluating large-scale infrastructure and PPP 
projects 
 The role of government, the private sector and the financial institution in the project 
development   
 Risk profile and risk preference of the public and private sectors in the project 
 Risk management techniques and applications in managing projects 
 Risk allocation and mitigation in PPP infrastructure projects 
 Real option theory and its application in project finance 
 Options for the government, the private company and financial institution in the 
project 
 
The literature will be separated into two main chapters as follows:  
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Chapter 2: Chapter 2 comprises three sections: 
 
Section I: Reviewing the appraisal methodology for transportation system projects. This 
chapter will review the project appraisal methods for transportation system projects, including 
the economic and financial appraisals. Public Private Partnerships (PPP) in transportation 
projects will be addressed and discussed in this chapter. In addition, the discount rates used in 
the economic appraisal and the financial appraisal are identified. 
 
Section II: Risk management in large-scale infrastructure projects. Risks in PPP 
transportation projects are identified, analysed and measured. The risk management 
framework is proposed in this section. This chapter also presents risk identification, risk 
analysis and the impact of risk with case studies of PPP infrastructure projects. The study will 
focus on risk assessment of large infrastructure projects in Thailand. The evidence of the 
success and failure of infrastructure projects in Thailand will be identified. This chapter will 
address the typical problems of PPP projects with case studies of Thailand‘s large-scale 
transportation system projects. This part also gives reasons for the unsuccessful large-scale 
transportation projects in Thailand. Risk management practice in transportation system 
projects in Thailand is analysed and criticized. The following case studies in Thailand will be 
used for risk identification and analysis purposes: 
 
 Bangkok Mass Transit System (BTS) 
 Mass Rapid Transit Authority of Thailand (MRTA) Project 
 The Second Stage Expressway System (SES) Project 
 Bang Na – Bang Phli – Bang Pakong Project 
 Don Muang Tollway Project 
 The Airport Rail Link Project 
 
Section III: Risk Allocation in large-scale infrastructure projects. This section will focus 
on the types of risk allocation among the public and the private sectors. The study will discuss 
the different types of risk allocations and risk mitigations in transportation system projects. 
Risk allocations between the public and the private parties are discussed.  
 
Chapter 3: Chapter 3 will present real option theory and its applications. In this chapter, real 
options and financial options are compared. Types of real options and their applications are 
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summarised. This chapter describes methods for pricing real options, the real option process, 
the interaction between options and the limitations of real options. Lastly, this chapter defines 
the approach to explore a suitable research design and methodology in answering the research 
questions proposed in the literature review. 
 
1.4.2 Part II (Chapters 4-6): The real option model for risk allocation among the 
government, the financial institution and the private company. This part explores the theory of 
real options in the context of project finance.  
 
The roles of the main stakeholders involved in the development of large infrastructure 
projects will be discussed. The main project participants are the government, the private 
company, and the financial institution (which this research calls GPF). The level of GPF‘s 
risk allocation will be discussed within this part along with practices in Thailand‘s large-scale 
transportation projects. It will focus on the impact of risk allocation on project performance.  
 
Part two will focus on the application of real options to evaluate the different risk allocations 
among GPF. In theory, the real option analysis extends valuation models of pricing financial 
options to apply them in investments in real assets or real markets (Cobb and Charnes, 2004). 
Real options compensate for the shortcomings of the traditional project evaluation approach 
(NPV, IRR) in that it considers the option associated with the investment project (He, 2007). 
The mathematics of real options will propose the model project‘s cash flow behaviours. The 
real option model will be simulated from a selected hypothetical transportation system 
project. The impact of financial performance of GPF options and their combinations will be 
analysed and investigated. In cash flow analysis, an appropriate discount rate will be selected 
to evaluate Thailand‘s transportation system projects.       
 
The model will examine and propose the financing strategy and GPF modes for new project 
developments in Thailand. Two objectives will be investigated. The first is to provide a theory 
of real options that links risk, leverage, and value and is particularly applicable to GPF. 
Secondly, the research will provide an economic rationale for GPF which organizes a new 
project financing scheme.  
 
Part two will propose the strategies of GPF from real options to improve the project 
performance. The set of real option combinations from the major stakeholder will be 
simulated. The hypothetical project will be used to analyse the impact of real options on the 
8 
 
project performance. A real option model which represents the risk allocations and 
mitigations will be used to evaluate the project. Real options will be used to measure project 
performance.          
 
Infrastructure projects are normally initiated by governments. With limited budgets, 
governments provide concessions to private companies to build, own and operate projects, 
while project financing is normally the responsibility of financial institutions. To develop the 
project, the private company may require support from the government such as revenue 
guarantees and debt or equity guarantees. 
 
The project‘s lenders will attempt to limit their risks by allocating them to other participants 
such as the government and the project‘s sponsor. Project lenders may require support from 
the sponsor. These may include a sponsor completion guarantee, or a debt repayment and 
equity commitment (Khan and Parra, 2003). Lenders may call project sponsors the equity 
commitment when cost overruns exist during construction, or to repay debts. The project 
company, on the other hand, may require support from lenders in the form of equity 
injections, prolonged debt service, or bank guarantees.  
 
The typical problems for large infrastructure projects such as railways and mass transit 
systems are that they cannot generate the revenues from fares to cover the investment cost of 
the infrastructure. Indeed, support from the government and the private sector is required in 
order to make such projects viable. For example, for the London underground project, in order 
to drive project feasibility, the government provided grants for maintenance and capital 
investment for the new expansion line.    
 
For developing large-scale infrastructure projects, governments generally mitigate their own 
risks through private participants. Private sector participation can also help to achieve project 
success. However, lenders and private investors do not attempt to participate in high risk 
projects. They may require higher rates of return to compensate for the higher project risk. 
The public and private sectors have their own interests in such projects. Therefore the risk 
allocation among GPF is important for project success. However, the risk allocation is quite 
subjective. This research tries to provide quantitative and mathematical analysis to explain the 
risk allocation among GPF.  
 
The study will be separately presented into 4 chapters: 
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Chapter 4: SES case study: The Financial institution option. This chapter introduces real 
option applications for policy design and implementation in infrastructure projects. Risks of 
lenders in PPP infrastructure projects are identified. The case of the Second Stage Expressway 
System project (SES) is used as a hypothetical project for valuation. Real options for financial 
institutions are proposed and valued using the binomial lattice model. The sensitivity of the 
outcomes, to differences in key parameters (i.e., volatility and risk-free interest rate), is tested.        
 
Chapter 5: This chapter is divided into two sections: 
 
Section I: SES case study: Government options in infrastructure projects. This chapter 
focuses on the government support in infrastructure projects. Real options of government 
support are valued separately. Furthermore, the options are combined and valued to enhance 
the value of the project. Also, the sensitivity of the outcomes, to differences in key parameters 
(i.e., volatility and risk-free interest rate), is performed.        
 
Section II: SES case study: Private company options in infrastructure projects. The 
specific options of private companies are selected and valued. These options are combined 
and valued to increase the value of the project. Furthermore, sensitivity analyses with respect 
to the two key parameters (i.e., volatility and risk-free interest rate) are performed in this 
section.               
 
Chapter 6: The option combinations. Chapter 6 demonstrates the importance of proper 
option combinations for the government, the financial institution and the private company. 
Bundles of options are selected and valued. The appropriate option combinations are 
recommended to implement the project. Furthermore, sensitivity tests are carried out for key 
parameters such as volatility and risk-free interest rate.        
 
Chapter 7: Conclusions and Recommendations. The last chapter summarises the research 
findings and the policy design and implementation in large-scale infrastructure projects. It 
concludes the DBA thesis and the achievements of the research objectives. Limitations of this 
research and recommendations for future study are presented in this chapter. The theoretical 
contribution to the body of knowledge is presented in this chapter.  
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Chapter 2. Literature Review: Appraisal and Risk Management in Large-
Scale Infrastructure Projects 
 
This chapter provides a review of the existing literature on the traditional methodologies used 
for transportation system project appraisals. This chapter also provides a review of the 
literature on risk management and risk allocation in the context of infrastructure project 
financing and discusses the risks associated with large-scale infrastructure projects in 
Thailand, including the Second Stage Expressway (SES) project, which is the case study for 
this thesis. The SES project is analysed in more detail in chapters 4-6. 
 
Section I: Literature review: appraisal methodologies for transportation system projects 
 
The development of large-scale transportation projects involves massive resources and is a 
highly capital-intensive process. As a consequence, public private partnerships (PPP), which 
pull the public and private sectors together to share risks and rewards, are often required 
(Tánczos and Kong, 2001). To ensure a project‘s success, governments initially carry out a 
project appraisal process to assess the investment options and determine the avenue that will 
provide the best value for money. Appraising the investment options is considered to be an 
important procedure in PPP project development. Similarly, the social-economic and financial 
analyses are major parts of the project appraisal (Tánczos and  Kong, 2001). 
 
It can be argued that the government evaluates PPP procurement as an alternative investment 
option. In general, the government evaluates what PPP option will provide the most efficient 
project development in relation to that implemented with traditional public financing 
(Tánczos and Kong, 2001). The appraisal can be done by both economic and financial 
analysis. In principle, there are some conceptual and methodological differences between 
economic and financial appraisals, which will be discussed in next section. 
 
2.1 Economic appraisal  
 
Economic analysis provides information on the project‘s impact on all entities, including 
society, public, private, and other major stakeholders. The main objective of economic 
analysis is to help the government decide whether the private or public sector should 
undertake projects and to select the project that best contributes to the welfare of a country 
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(Belli et al., 1998). Economic analysis evaluates the project‘s benefit and cost to society as a 
whole as opposed to the more narrow perspective provided by financial analysis. 
 
Though there are various appraisal methods used in economic analysis, cost benefit analysis 
(CBA) is one of the most popular techniques. CBA is favourable for appraising infrastructure, 
environmental, health care, cultural, and sports projects (Brzozowska, 2007). The history of 
CBA in the United States goes back to the 1930s, when a methodology was developed to 
allow the Senate to evaluate dam projects more efficiently. CBA has now become the most 
frequently used appraisal technique in developed countries (Preez, 2004). CBA methodology 
is based on the theory that the objective of a government project is to maximize the welfare of 
society (Bhasin, 2003). The core principal of CBA is to evaluate a project on the basis of i) 
Pareto efficiency, ii) willingness to pay (WTP), and iii) shadow price. 
 
Pareto efficiency: The main concept of the Pareto efficiency in the context of CBA is that a 
project may be selected only if its benefits can compensate for project losses. The project 
should proceed if there is a Pareto improvement in that someone can gain whilst nobody loses 
(Boardman et al., 2006). 
 
Willingness to pay: In the context of CBA, WTP involves measuring the impact of a project 
on a person‘s welfare. It is assumed that people are willing to pay to acquire the benefit or to 
avoid the cost associated with a project. In economic theory, a demand curve for goods 
represents a person‘s willingness to pay for an additional (or marginal) unit of goods on the 
basis of diminishing marginal utility. On a demand curve, WTP comprises two parts: the 
amount actually paid and the amount in excess of what people are willing to pay over what is 
actually paid. This is called the consumer surplus or net benefit to society. 
 
Shadow price: A key concept of economic appraisal is to use shadow price based on the 
social opportunity cost instead of the distortion of market price (European Commission 
Guidelines, 2008). Shadow price in the context of economic appraisal is defined as the prices 
used to reflect the opportunity costs of inputs and/or consumers‘ willingness to pay for 
outputs. It can be argued that monopoly or oligopoly markets such as the power sector, where 
price is distorted from imperfect market or government ruling, may fail to reflect an 
opportunity cost of inputs (European Commission Guidelines, 2008).  
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The general rule in CBA is to select the project that is met by net benefit criteria. The selected 
project should allow the gainers to fully compensate the losers and still be better off 
(Boardman et al., 2006). The decision criteria may be used from three methods: i) the net 
present value (NPV), ii) the internal rate of return (IRR), and iii) the discounted benefit-cost 
ratio (discounted BCR). Though CBA is widely used in economic appraisal, it has two main 
limitations. First, it is difficult to quantify CBA in monetary terms in all relevant impacts. 
Second, efficiency is not the main objective for some projects. As a consequence, CBA may 
not be a good measurement (Boardman et al., 2006). In addition, CBA has been disputed in 
various topics, such as the appropriate discount rate used, externalities, risks, and 
irreversibility (Brzozowska, 2007). 
 
CBA is a popular method in transportation project appraisals. In public transportation 
projects, CBA measures the benefit for users with the actual and forecasted usage of 
transportations (Geurs et al., 2006). The cost and benefits of users are measured in terms of 
WTP. Then, the total economic value is measured by the sum of all individual WTP for any 
change in well-being due to the project (Boardman et al., 2001). The benefits of transport 
projects include saving time, preventing accidents, and providing accessibility, among others. 
The total cost of transportation is primarily derived from construction costs, annual 
maintenance costs, transport user costs in vehicle operation, travel costs, costs transporting 
users due to a better facility condition, and other external costs (Kerali, 2003). External costs 
include social and environmental costs such as emissions, energy consumption, noise, and the 
welfare of the nearby population. In addition, social and environmental effects can be 
incorporated into economic appraisals if they can be quantified in monetary terms (Kerali, 
2003).  
 
The economic appraisal process can be divided into five major steps (European Commission 
Guidelines, 2008): i) conversion of market price to accounting price, ii) monetization of non-
market impacts, iii) inclusion of additional indirect effects, iv) discounting the estimated costs 
and benefits, and v) calculation of the economic performance by indicators. 
 
Though CBA is the core technique for economic appraisals, other quantitative and qualitative 
analyses are frequently used. Those techniques include cost effectiveness analysis (CEA), 
multi-criteria analysis (MCA), risk benefit analysis (RBA), and others. 
 
13 
 
Cost effectiveness analysis: CEA evaluates projects that have benefits that cannot be 
translated into monetary terms or are not able to access market price. CEA is appropriate 
when the evaluated project has a single goal or if the project has multiple goals (Belli et al., 
1998). The decision criterion of CEA is to select a project based on the cost-effectiveness 
ratio, which is the ratio between cost and non-monetary benefit. Thus, CEA can be calculated 
by the following formula: 
 
CEA ratio = total cost in monetary units / units of effectiveness.  
 
CEA has an advantage in that it includes non-monetary benefits into the project efficiency 
measure. The project with the lowest CEA ratio is the most favourable. Although CEA is also 
used in economic appraisals, it is not guaranteed that the project with the lowest CEA ratio 
should be selected if CEA cannot monetize the unit of effectiveness (Boardman et al., 2001). 
CEA requires all outcomes of the project to be in monetary terms, which is difficult to find 
(Touminen et al., 2015). Therefore, CEA is considered to be a supplementary method rather 
than the main appraisal method, with monetary appraisals such as CBA being used by many 
evaluators. 
 
Multi-criteria analysis: One of the most common techniques used in economic appraisals is 
MCA. In project evaluation, economic efficiency is not the only objective of project 
development. Other objectives, such as an equal distribution of income, may be included as a 
goal in the project development. MCA evaluates a project based on the objectives led. The 
objective of MCA is to maximize with respect to a set of socially based objectives rather than 
market values (Grant-Muller et al., 2001). MCA often incorporates various objectives and 
multiple indicators of project effectiveness (SOAS, 2009).  
 
The MCA technique is based on the impact matrix, which includes criterions for project 
selection and the weight of each criterion. MCA assigns weight and score to each criterion. 
The project impact is obtained by multiplying the score for each criterion by the weighting 
(SOAS, 2009). MCA has an advantage over CBA in that it provides various criterions that 
cover qualitative factors opposed to the lone quantitative factors in CBA. Though MCA has 
many advantages, it is rather subjective and therefore dependent on the judgment from 
decision makers. Decision team members give their own judgment and may not agree on the 
scoring and ranking of criterions. 
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Risk benefit analysis: RBA is an analysis in the context of risk events (Tánczos and Kong, 
2001). It assesses the costs and benefits of a selected project activity, which involves risks. 
Factors such as construction, operation, and market risks are used for the analysis. In RBA, 
risks can be compared similarly with benefits in CBA.  
 
Other methods: There are also other techniques that have been used in project evaluation, 
such as environmental impact assessment (EIA), social impact assessment (SIA), and 
environmental and social impact assessment (ESIA). These methods are encouraged by many 
governments and international organizations, such as the World Bank and the Asian 
Development Banks (ADB), to be used as the formal tool for evaluating large-scale 
infrastructure projects. These techniques focus on the long-term sustainability of projects that 
include social, cultural, economic, and environmental issues (SOAS, 2009). EIA and SIA 
have similar objectives and approaches that analyse, monitor, and manage biophysical and 
social consequences. Because of the close objective and process between EIA and SIA, there 
is a trend towards the integrated ESIA, which appraises both the project‘s social and 
biophysical issues (SOAS, 2009). 
 
2.2 Financial appraisal 
 
Financial appraisal is also frequently used for valuing a project. Financial analysis is the 
method used to evaluate the viability of the investment project by assessing its net cash flow. 
The first step of financial appraisal is to assess the cost and benefit. The benefit of a 
transportation project is measured by the market price that the project‘s user is expected to 
pay for the service (Belli et al., 1998) whilst the financial cost is mainly the construction and 
operation costs, including material, equipment, and labour. The project is financially feasible 
if the project benefit exceeds the project cost. In the case of mutually exclusive projects, the 
investment criterion is to select the most profitable project. The key measurements of 
financial appraisals are net present value, internal rate of return, payback period, and benefit 
to cost ratio.  
 
Financial appraisal is necessary for the private sector to use as a main technique for evaluating 
project investment. Financial appraisal is frequently used to value large-scale infrastructure 
projects, which are typically funded using a project finance arrangement. Project finance is 
long-term funding method for large-scale infrastructure projects that are financed by the 
project‘s own operating cash flow and assets (Chege and Rwelamila , 2001). In project 
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finance, the project investors rely mainly on the expected cash flow from the project to repay 
loans and to earn a return on their investments. 
 
2.2.1 Measurements of financial appraisal 
 
There are several methods used for financial appraisal:  the net present value (NPV), the 
internal rate of return (IRR), and the benefit-cost ratio (B/C Ratio). The following table 
summarises the definition, the shortcoming, and the key decisions for each method. 
 
Key 
Measurement 
Definition, shortcoming, and key decisions 
NPV Definition: NPV is an analysis technique used to decide whether or 
not to invest in the capital asset. The NPV is calculated as the sum 
of the present value of the project's cash inflows minus the present 
value of the project's cash outflows.  
Shortcoming: NPV is a simple tool for calculating the value of the 
project with limitations being the following: 
i) NPV does not provide safety margin information. 
ii) It is difficult to calculate the appropriate discount rate of NPV. 
NPV assumes a constant discount rate over the investment period, 
and interest rates may not stay at the same level throughout the 
entire time period.  
Criteria to accept project: NPV > 0 
IRR Definition: IRR is an internal rate of return used in capital 
budgeting to measure and compare the profitability of investments. 
IRR is defined as the discount rate that equalizes the NPV of the 
investment‘s costs and benefits. 
Shortcoming: IRR is a valuable means to calculate and compare 
the value of investment projects. However, it also has some 
limitations: 
i) The IRR of a project may have multiple values if the project‘s 
cash flow is not a traditional pattern. 
ii) When comparing projects with different life spans, IRR tends to 
favour short-time horizontal projects more than long-time horizontal 
projects.  
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Key 
Measurement 
Definition, shortcoming, and key decisions 
iii) Though NPV and IRR are closely related, NPV and IRR may 
provide conflicting results in some circumstances when projects are 
mutually exclusive or when projects have unfair even distributions 
of benefits over time.  
iv) IRR cannot handle a multiple discount rate, so IRR is not 
appropriate for long-term projects in which discount rates are 
expected to vary. 
Criteria to accept project: IRR > the cost of capital (the required 
rate of return) 
B/C Ratio Definition: B/C ratio attempts to identify the relationship between 
the benefit and cost of a project. The B/C ratio is defined as the 
present value of project benefits divided by the present value of 
project costs. 
Shortcoming: Though B/C ratio is useful for ranking projects, it 
has some limitations as well: 
i) B/C tends to select a project with the lower cost.  
ii) B/C does not consider the actual amount of net benefits. 
Criteria to accept project: B/C ratio >1 
Table 2.1: Key measurements of financial appraisal  
Sources: European Commission Guidelines (2008), SOAS (2009) 
 
2.3 Comparison between economic and financial appraisals 
  
In practice, the decision criterions to select investment projects are different between the 
public and private sectors. The public sector or policymaker selects projects based on the 
outcomes of the social and economic analysis, whereas a private company (or project owner) 
and lender consider a project based only on the financial viability (Tánczos and Kong, 2001). 
The financial appraisal of a project is normally limited to an analysis of commercial 
profitability and the return on investment capital for the private investment. On the other 
hand, economic appraisal extends the analysis of the benefits and costs broader, including 
those incurred outside the project. The economic appraisal expands the scope of the analysis 
beyond the project to cover the economic welfare of the region or country (European 
Commission Guidelines, 2008). It evaluates the infrastructure project, covering all impacts to 
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the entire society, not just the investors (as in financial appraisals). In principle, the economic 
appraisal differs from the financial appraisal in the following three factors (SOAS, 2009): 
 
i) The scope of evaluation: The economic appraisal captures a wider range of impacts than 
in financial appraisals. The scope of economic appraisal extends to cover externalities, 
such as a third party‘s impact. 
ii) Market Price: The market price in the economic appraisal is difficult to find or it may not 
reflect the marginal benefit and cost that project may receive. 
iii)  The discount rate: The discount rate used in the economic appraisal may differ from the 
financial appraisal. 
   
Economic and financial appraisals are used by practitioners to evaluate large-scale transport 
projects. There are many studies in the field of transport appraisals. Among those studies are 
Grant-Muller et al. (2001), Kerali (2003), Shaoul (2002), and Tánczos and Kong (2001). It 
should be noted from these studies that there are some important differences between 
economic and financial appraisals, which are summarised in the following table: 
 
Topic Economic appraisal Financial appraisal 
Focus National wealth Project feasibility  
Objective Maximize public benefit Maximize shareholder or 
owner wealth 
Viewpoint Public, society Private, PPP 
Perspective Evaluates from a national 
perspective, which takes a broad 
view of the benefits and costs. 
Evaluates from a project-
specific perspective, which 
takes a more detailed view 
of the benefits and costs. 
Appraisal coverage Financial, social-economic, 
environmental, and policy  
Focus on financial analysis 
Technique CBA, MCA, qualitative 
assessment  
NPV, IRR, cash flow 
model, return on equity 
(ROE), return on investment 
(ROI) 
Project variables Tries to define variables in 
monetary terms with market price. 
However, shadow price and 
Uses the actual market price 
and the actual cost in 
monetary terms. 
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Topic Economic appraisal Financial appraisal 
opportunity cost may be used 
instead of the market price if:  
 
- The market price did not provide 
a good measure of the social 
opportunity cost of inputs and 
outputs. This is because the 
market price may be distorted 
from an inefficient market.  
- It is difficult to find an observed 
price for environmental, social, or 
health effects. 
Timeline Lifetime or longer than the 
expected life of the project 
Project or concession life, 
usually between 15-30 years 
Discount rate The discount rate should take into 
account the opportunity cost, 
risks, externalities, and taxes. 
 
The discount rate used should 
reflect how the future economic 
benefits and costs are to be valued 
against the present values of the 
benefits and costs.  
The discount rate uses the 
interest rate quoted in the 
financial market. 
 
The discount rate uses the 
private discount rate that 
ignores externalities (impact 
to third parties). 
 
Market failure or 
inefficiency may cause 
differences between the 
economic discount rate and 
the financial discount rate. 
Project alternatives Minimal project alternatives, 
without project alternatives,  
or select one or more project 
alternatives 
Select among project 
alternatives 
Taxes, subsidies Excluded Included 
Important issues Choices of the discount rate used  Choices of the discount rate 
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Topic Economic appraisal Financial appraisal 
 
The sensitivity analysis of the 
impact of the discount rate on the 
project‘s NPV  
 
The difficulty of finding monetary 
value or a market price that 
reflects the true benefits and costs 
of the project  
used 
 
The sensitivity analysis of 
the impact of the discount 
rate on the project‘s NPV  
 
The sensitivity of the impact 
of other factors, such as 
traffic growth and 
construction costs, on the 
project‘s NPV  
Table 2.2: The differences between economic and financial appraisals 
Sources: European Commission Guidelines (2008), Grant-Muller et al. (2001), Kerali (2003), 
Shaoul (2002), Tánczos and Kong (2001) 
 
In summary, the economic (or social and economic) appraisal is mainly measured by the 
public sector whereas the financial appraisal evaluates the financial viability of the project by 
the private sector. The economic appraisal of an infrastructure project is proposed to 
determine the types of project investments (alternatives), investment sizes, and the expected 
economic return (Kerali, 2003). For a publicly funded project, the evaluation should be 
conducted by an economic appraisal that represents the true impact of the project on the 
economy system. With limited budgets and resources, governments have encouraged private 
investments in projects through PPP methodology. The private sector normally evaluates the 
feasibility of a project via analysing the project‘s cash flow in which the return on investment 
is a significant criteria.  
 
The appraisal methods that are used differently by the public and private sectors have created 
a gap. The gap between economic and financial appraisals increases when the project 
investment is economically feasible but financially non-viable. To close the gap, support from 
the public and private sectors in the project is necessary, though such support is subjective 
and non-quantifiable. Concerning the aim of this research, an attempt to quantify the value of 
support from both the public sector and the private sector, including the financial institution, 
was made. The main objective of this study was to apply financial tools, such as real option, 
to quantify the value of government and private sector support. The main focus of this study 
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is financial appraisal, which is mainly used by private companies and financial institutions to 
evaluate the financial viability of a project.    
 
2.4 Economic and financial appraisals of transportation system projects 
 
The aim of an economic appraisal of a transportation project is to select the project that 
provides the best economic return. In general, the methods used for appraising transportation 
projects can be classified into two groups; single criterion (monetary approach) and multi-
criteria analysis (Tsamboulas et al, 1999). A monetary approach such as CBA is traditionally 
used for evaluating projects. However, this method has limitations in that it cannot capture all 
the relevant impacts of a project, such as the environmental and social factors, into monetary 
terms. Specifically, its limitations include ironing individual risk, a low level of objectivity, 
and transparency (Brzozowska, 2007). The appraisal of transportation projects has been 
extending wider in scope to cover not only time, cost, and safety impacts, but environmental, 
social, cultural, and economic impacts as well (Grant-Muller et al., 2001). With CBA‘s 
limitations, additional appraisal methods are required to compensate.  
 
Many researchers, such as Tsamboulas et al. (1999), Grant-Muller et al. (2001), and Feng and 
Wang (2005), have aimed to improve the appraisal process of transportation projects. Those 
studies attempted to achieve a comprehensive methodology for transport appraisals and 
overcome the shortcomings of CBA. The multi-modal transport was initiated by the U.K. 
government in 1999 and covers all aspects of sustainable transport development in the broader 
strategies at the regional or sub-regional level (Rayner, 2004). The multi-modal focuses on 
five wider topics: i) environmental, ii) safety, iii) economy, iv) accessibility, and v) 
integration. The benefit of the multi-modal is that it includes both the monetary term and the 
assessment scale, which cannot be quantified in units (Bhasin, 2003). Multi-modal can be 
used with CBA to provide a more comprehensive appraisal framework for a transportation 
project. Whilst CBA may be used to monetize impacts, the multi-modal can help assess 
impacts that are difficult to measure in monetary terms.  
 
In practice, the appraisal of a transportation project is framed by the multi-modal and the 
multi-agency including CBA. CBA is commonly used by policymakers to justify the 
transportation project investment. The CBA framework may include other techniques, such as 
multi-criteria analysis (MCA) and qualitative techniques.  
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It can be argued that a quantitative appraisal alone is insufficient. Most EU countries have 
applied both quantitative and qualitative methods to evaluate transportation projects. The 
appraisal framework is used by practitioners to rank and compare project alternatives. The 
appraisal framework of EU members can be classified into three groups: i) the direct transport 
impact ii), the environmental impact, and iii) the social and economic impact. Direct transport 
impacts are expressed in monetary terms, for which CBA is frequently used, whilst the 
environmental, social, and economic impacts take into account both qualitative and 
quantitative appraisals in their analyses. 
 
CBA is mainly used by the U.S. government for economic appraisals of public projects. To 
enhance the practical usefulness of CBA, other tools such as CEA can be used to supplement. 
Procedural Guidelines for Highway Feasibility Studies, published in 1998 by the U.S. 
Department of Transportation‘s Federal Highway Administration, provides a guideline for the 
economic appraisal of highway projects. The guideline consists of three general components: 
i) a benefit-cost analysis, ii) non-monetary but quantifiable, and iii) non-quantifiable (U.S. 
Department of Transportation, 1998). In addition to CBA, the National Environmental Policy 
Act (1969) imposed requirements regarding the analysis of social, economic, and 
environmental impacts to federally funded projects, including transportation projects.  
 
Time-saving is a crucial factor in transport appraisals, and its value in transport projects has 
been studied since the 1950s. Many research studies have found that time savings account for 
about 60% to 80% of the quantified benefits of transport projects (Grant-Muller et al., 2001). 
The estimation of time-saving benefits is dependent on a set of assumptions and parameters, 
which are the ratio of non-working time to working time, the variation of value of time (VOT) 
with income, the VOT by mode of travel, and relative values placed on various aspects of 
travel, including walking, waiting, and traveling in a vehicle (Grant-Muller et al., 2001). In 
addition to the time-saving benefit, saving vehicle operating costs (VOC) is also an important 
benefit gained from transportation projects. VOC benefits are lower fuel costs and 
maintenance cost savings, which usually include lubricants, tires, and vehicle wear and tear 
(Belli et al., 1998). Other benefits of transport projects include lower transport costs, reduced 
accidents, travel comfort, convenience, and reliability of service, stimulating economic and 
environmental improvement (Belli et al., 1998).  
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2.5 Public private partnership (PPP) project appraisals 
 
PPP projects are driven by the government to encompass limitations in public funding as well 
as expectations to improve the quality and efficiency of public services (European 
Commission Guidelines, 2003). PPPs can be defined as contractual agreements between 
public and private parties to deliver assets and services that have traditionally been provided 
by the public sector (Bettignies and Ross, 2004). In PPP, the public sector incorporates with 
the private sector to build, operate, and provide public responsibility, investment of resources, 
risk-taking, and mutual benefit (Allan, 1999). Public projects can gain more efficiency and 
reduce overall project costs by adopting PPPs. To understand the mechanism of the PPP 
concept, table 2.3 summarises the characteristics of PPP project appraisals, which have been 
studied by many researchers.     
 
Topic PPP appraisal 
Focus National economic impacts from a PPP project 
 
Trade–off between the private sector profit and 
economic and social benefits 
Objective To maximize the project‘s economic and financial value 
with the government budget constraint and to optimize 
the total project lifecycle cost 
Viewpoint Risk-sharing among the public sector and the private 
sector, and other related parties 
Perspective Evaluates from a national perspective, which takes a 
broad view of alternative costs (such as private offer), 
compared with the traditional cost. 
Appraisal coverage Both the economic and financial appraisals 
Technique Value for money (VFM), financial cost comparator, and 
qualitative techniques 
 
The assessment method is dependent on the project 
financing source, such that: 
- Main source from public sector: the cost and benefit 
analysis (both in monetary and non-monetary terms) of 
PPP options is applied.  
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Topic PPP appraisal 
- Partial source from public grant or support: the cost 
and benefit gained from different PPP project 
alternatives are compared with various types of support. 
The assessment should ensure that the grant is optimally 
allocated in that the project is financially viable and 
sustainable, and the project can generate the maximal 
social and economic benefits but also control the private 
sector profits at a reasonable level.  
- Financial self-support: The private party has the main 
responsibility to appraise whether or not the project is 
commercially successful and if the project provides a 
suitable return on investment. VFM is used by the public 
sector to evaluate whether or not a PPP project is 
preferred over the alternatives.  
Timeline Lifetime or longer than the expected project life  
Discount rate It can be argued as to whether or not the discount rate 
should be used equally between the publicly funded 
project and the privately funded project. Many project 
evaluators still apply a higher discount rate for private 
projects. However, there is a tendency to use the same 
discount rate for both public and private projects (Grout, 
2002). This issue will be discussed in detail in the next 
section.  
Project alternatives The decision maker selects the alternative that 
maximizes the VFM.  
Alternatives range from: 
-The main source of financial support from the public 
sector 
- Management and lease contract 
- Greenfield 
- Concession contract with public grant  
- Full concession grant/ financial freestanding project 
- Divestitures 
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Topic PPP appraisal 
Taxes, subsidies - Included if no tax exemption 
Crucial points - Risk-sharing between the public and private sectors 
- The value of discount rate used for evaluating the 
project  
- The quantitative and qualitative factors used to 
evaluate VFM 
- The level of government support or subsidies; it should 
be carefully reviewed to ensure that the support is 
matched with actual needs.  
Table 2.3: Characteristics of PPP project appraisal 
Sources: European Commission Guidelines (2003), Grout (2002), Tanaka et al (2005) 
Lastly, European Commission Guidelines (2003) suggest focus points in the economic and 
financial appraisal of PPP projects: 
 
i. The project appraisal should address the translation of risks between parties and 
whether the optimal risk allocations among them are determined. Risks should be 
transferred to the appropriate private parties that can manage them with cost 
effectiveness. 
ii. The project should ensure the VFM for the entire development process.  
iii. Grant or support from the public sector should be optimized.    
     
2.6 Project discount rate  
 
Determining the discount rate for PPP projects is one of the more crucial tasks in project 
appraisal. The discount rate used in economic appraisals is significant for the investment 
decision because the outcomes of the CBA are significantly influenced by the choice of the 
discount rate applied in the decision-making. There are two main discount rates used in 
economic appraisal: the social opportunity cost of capital and the time preference for 
consumption (Preez, 2004). The social opportunity cost is the rate of return that is required by 
the private sectors in order for them to invest. The time preference for consumption is the rate 
of return in which people are prepared to trade consumption today for consumption in the 
future. In an efficient market with perfect market information, the discount rate used in the 
economic appraisal is the rate that the social opportunity cost equals the time preference for 
consumption.  
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To assess the investment opportunities, the project‘s expected future cash flow needs to be 
calculated, in which the estimated future cash flow is under uncertainty. The future cash flow 
is then discounted by the discount rate to give the present value. The discount rate can be 
defined as the expected rate of return required to compensate risks. The selection of the 
discount rate impacts the investment decision as to select or discard the project. Many 
research studies have performed analysis to find the appropriate discount rate used in project 
appraisal. These studies include Evans and Sezer (2004), Evans (2008), Caplin and Leahy 
(2004), Mendelsohn (1983), and Grout (2002). It can be found from these studies that there is 
a range of discount rates used for evaluating a project, which affect the investment decision.  
 
It can be concluded from many research studies that appropriate discount rates should be used 
in the project appraisal, otherwise it may lead to selecting a project that is not the best among 
alternatives. In practice, the discount rate is the best yield of all possible investment 
alternatives (Benes and Stary, 2009). In financial theory, the discount rate is comprised of two 
components: the risk-free rate and the risk premium. The government treasury yield rate can 
be a proxy for the risk-free rate. The risk premium of the project is measured by project risk 
combinations, such as credit, liquidity, and market risks. Theoretically, the value of the 
discount rate differs from project to project. For infrastructure projects, the discount rate 
should represent the opportunity cost of public expenses and risks associated with investment. 
 
Many researchers have argued about the value of discount rates used in project appraisal. 
Whether or not the discount rate used for valuing a public project should be the same as the 
discount rate used in a PPP project is a particularly contentious issue. Grout (2002) argued for 
using the same discount rate for both public and PPP projects. He concluded that the lower 
discount rate for public finance should be applied. 
 
The discount rate used in project appraisals has been applied differently in many countries. 
European Commission Guidelines (2008) suggest using 5% for a real financial discount rate 
and 3.5% for a real economic discount rate in project appraisals whereas the formal discount 
rate used in the U.K. has been reduced in recent years from 6% to 3.5%. Table 2.4 
summarises the discount rate applied in project appraisals for selected countries. It can be 
seen in the table that the economic discount rate differs considerably between countries 
depending on their economic condition, the credit rating of the country, and their capacity to 
repay foreign borrowing.    
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Country Credit rating 
by Moody’s 
/S&P (as of 
March 2017) 
Economic 
condition 
(GDP in 
2010-16 
:%) 
Foreign 
reserve to 
import 
(month) in 
2015 
Discount rate  
(% of real term) 
Method of 
discount 
rate 
EU members 
Source: 
European 
Commission 
Guidelines 
(2008) 
N/A N/A N/A - 5% (financial 
appraisal) 
- 3.5% (social and 
economic 
appraisal) 
- The 
opportunity 
cost of 
capital 
- The social 
time 
preference 
rate (STPR) 
United Kingdom 
Source:The HM 
Treasury Green 
Book of 2003 
Aa1/AA 0.7-2.7% 1.01 3.5% (social and 
economic 
appraisal) 
STPR 
France 
Source: 
European 
Commission  
Guidelines 
(2008) 
Aa2/AA 0.2-2.1% 2.1 4% (social and 
economic 
appraisal) 
STPR 
Germany 
Source: 
European 
Commission 
Guidelines 
(2008) 
Aaa/AAA 0.4-3.9% 1.6 3% (social and 
economic 
appraisal) 
STPR 
United States 
Source: 
CircularA-94 
(1992) 
Aaa/AA+ 1.6-2.4% 0.2 7% (public 
investment 
displaces both 
private investment 
and consumption) 
The social 
opportunity 
cost rate 
 
United States 
Source: 
Circular A-94 
Aa1/AA+ 1.6-2.4% 0.2 For cost 
effectiveness, 
lease purchase, 
The 
government 
borrowing 
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Country Credit rating 
by Moody’s 
/S&P (as of 
March 2017) 
Economic 
condition 
(GDP in 
2010-16 
:%) 
Foreign 
reserve to 
import 
(month) in 
2015 
Discount rate  
(% of real term) 
Method of 
discount 
rate 
(revised 2009) internal 
government 
investment, and 
asset sales 
analyses 
 
3-year project: 
0.9% 
5-year project: 
1.6% 
7-year project: 
1.9% 
10-year project: 
2.2% 
20-year and up: 
2.7% 
rate  
Japan 
Source: ADB 
(2007)  
A1/A+ (-0.5)-1.7% N/A 4.5% STPR 
Australia 
Source: 
Partnerships 
Victoria (2003b) 
Aaa/AAA 2.1-3.6% 1.9 6.5% - Capital 
asset pricing 
model 
- Discount 
rate 
comprised of 
the risk-free 
rate and the 
risk 
premium.  
Thailand 
Source: PPP 
guidelines 
Baa1/BBB+ 0.8-7.5% 10.1 - Not specific rate  
- Discount rate is 
calculated by the 
The risk-free 
rate plus the 
project‘s 
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Country Credit rating 
by Moody’s 
/S&P (as of 
March 2017) 
Economic 
condition 
(GDP in 
2010-16 
:%) 
Foreign 
reserve to 
import 
(month) in 
2015 
Discount rate  
(% of real term) 
Method of 
discount 
rate 
(draft) by Public 
Debt 
Management 
Office (2013) 
government‘s 
bond interest rate 
adjusted by the 
project‘s specific 
risks. 
specific risk 
(risk 
premium) 
 Table 2.4: Summary of indicative discount rates used in selected countries 
 
Table 2.4 summarises the discount rates applied in project appraisals for selected countries. It 
can be seen in the table that the economic discount rates differ considerably between countries 
depending on their economic conditions, the credit rating of the country, and their capacities 
to repay foreign borrowing (foreign reserve to import). There is a tendency to use a lower 
discount rate for developed countries (a high credit rating and a higher debt capacity) that 
anticipate smaller economic growth rates. In addition, economic stability in developed 
countries has attached a low risk premium therefore lower discount rate to investment. It can 
also be seen that STPR is the most widely used model in many counties (i.e., Germany, 
France, UK and Japan) because it attempts to cover all aspects of an appraisal (i.e., the public 
policy, social ethics and future economic conditions).  The table also shows that in most 
developed economies STPR is around 3.5%–4.0% in real terms. 
 
It can be seen that the discount rate used in the economic appraisal of the project is measured 
differently for different countries. Furthermore, many organizations have provided practical 
guidelines for choosing the discount rate as shown in table 2.5. Table 2.5 also provides a brief 
discussion on the use of discount rate in Thailand.    
Organization Guideline for estimating discount rate  
ADB (1997) 
 
The discount rate can be estimated by four methods: 
i) The economic rate of return on alternative marginal projects or 
the economic opportunity cost of capital: Project investments can be 
selected only if they show a minimum rate of return that is not 
exceeded by other possible investments.  
  
ii) The real cost of foreign borrowing: This method is used to ensure 
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Organization Guideline for estimating discount rate  
that projects are committed to meeting the country's debt obligations, 
especially where investments are highly dependent on the inflow of 
foreign capitals. 
 
iii) The real rate of return in the capital market: This method 
determines the return that the projects must earn before investors will 
forego to more liquid types of investments.  
 
iv) The overall demand and supply of investment funds: Demand 
and supply of investment funds is a good indicator for estimating the 
economic price of the capital. 
European 
Commission 
Guidelines (2008) 
The European Commission specifies the choices of discount rates used 
in financial and economic appraisals as follows:  
Financial appraisal: 
i) The weight average cost of capital (WACC): The project‘s weight 
concerning the average cost of capital of loans, bonds, and equity is 
used as the discount rate, for which the benchmark of WACC is:  
 public project: the real return on government bonds (the 
marginal direct cost of public funds),  
 private finance: the long-term real interest rate on commercial 
loans,  
 or a weighted average of both.  
ii) The return lost from the best investment alternative (opportunity 
cost)  
iii) The cut-off rate, such as the interest rate or the rate of return from 
a listed issuer of securities 
 
Economic appraisal (social –economic appraisal):  
i) Traditional approach: The marginal return on the public 
investment should equal the marginal rate of return on the private 
investment in that the public project can displace the private 
investment. 
ii) The social time preference (STPR) approach (consumption rate 
of interest):  
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Organization Guideline for estimating discount rate  
STPR represents two major components: 
 People‘s incomes grow at diminishing marginal utility.  
 People have a pure time preference in that they prefer current 
utility rather than consuming in the future. 
This approach considers the rate of growth in economic (g) and the 
preference for current benefits over time. The formula for calculation 
is:  
r = μg + ρ  
where: 
r = the social discount rate  
g = the growth rate of the public expenditure 
μ = the elasticity of the diminishing marginal utility of 
 consumption 
p = a rate of pure time preference 
iii) Multiple rates of return: This method is applied to multiple 
discount rates that decline overtime.  
The Green Book  
appraisal and 
evaluation in 
central 
government 
(U.K.) 
The Green Book suggests the calculation for determining the discount 
rate as:  
i) The social time preference approach 
ii) Long-term discount rate: This approach uses the declining long-
term discount rate as: 
Period of years: 0–30, 31–75, 76–125, 126–200, 201–300, and 301–
more 
Discount rate: 3.5%, 3.0%, 2.5%, 2.0%, 1.5 %, and 1.0% 
Circular A-94 
(United States) 
Circular A-94 suggests the calculation for determining the discount 
rate as: 
i) The social opportunity cost rate by approximating the marginal 
pre-tax rate of return on an average investment in the private sector in 
recent years 
ii) Government borrowing rate by using treasury notes and bonds on 
specified maturities 
The World Bank Uses 10 to 12% of the discount rate (the opportunity cost of capital 
method) for World Bank project financing. 
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Organization Guideline for estimating discount rate  
Thailand context There is no precise and commonly accepted method of determining the 
discount rate for PPP project in Thailand. STPR is not easy to quantify 
accurately and STPR entails concepts that many people are unfamiliar 
with. WACC and government borrowing rate are the appropriate 
measures in Thailand context as they are available in the market and 
they reflect true borrowing cost.  
 
It is evident that there is no specific method when calculating the 
discount rate for economic appraisal, as every country, based on 
different assumptions, has its own policy and discount rate approach. 
Table 2.5: Methods for estimating discount rates  
 
Again, it can be seen that different organizations use different discount rates for evaluating 
investment projects. The discount rate used for calculating the discount cash flow in the 
economic appraisal of infrastructure projects should be used consistently by practitioners with 
an understanding of its limitations. It can be argued by many literatures that estimating 
discount rates for an investment project is one of the most challenging tasks, focusing 
especially on the disadvantages of each (see table 2.6). Table 2.6 presents the shortfall of each 
methodology when applied to the SES project which is a case study in this research. 
 
Method for calculating 
discount rate  
Shortcoming 
WACC It can be argued that there exists the theoretical 
difficulty for calculating the cost of equity in WACC. 
There are different methods for estimating the cost of 
equity, and each method uses different data sets. 
Practitioners introduce bias in their value estimates by 
making subjective adjustments. Therefore, it may lead 
to discrepancies between the different calculating 
methods.  
 
Though WACC is often used to estimate a project‘s 
discount rate, it is more problematic. There are various 
factors that may affect the calculation of WACC:  
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Method for calculating 
discount rate  
Shortcoming 
i) Using WACC as the discount rate in the project may 
not be adequate because the risks of the project and 
firm are normally not the same. 
ii) WACC is calculated assuming a constant variable 
that may not reflect reality. For example, the cost of 
debt (interest rate) may change over time due to 
economic change. 
 
Sources: Eschenbach and Cohen (2006), Mun (2006) 
 
The traditional approach adopted to evaluate the SES 
project (a case study in this research) regularly uses the 
WACC to estimate the discount rate. However, 
infrastructure projects including SES project are not 
actively traded in the secondary market, so estimating 
a discount rate, using WACC, for such projects is 
more difficult. However, determining variables in 
WACC such as the beta of the return on equity are not 
so difficult. An alternative approach is to identify 
proxies (i.e., beta of the similar company in stock 
market) for each variable used in calculating WACC.    
STPR STPR does not contain risk factors for calculating 
discount rate. STPR neglects potentially important risk 
factors such as uncertainty of future benefits and costs. 
For example, the uncertainty of traffic demand of the 
SES project may be neglected by STPR. 
 
Sources: Price and Nair (1985), Evans and Sezer 
(2002)  
The government borrowing 
rate 
In this method, the discount rate does not reflect the 
true cost of a project because most projects are 
financed by other sources, such as debt financing, not 
only government funding. Most projects including the 
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Method for calculating 
discount rate  
Shortcoming 
SES project use a combination of debt and equity 
financing. Therefore, using the government borrowing 
rate may not reflect the true cost of project‘s fund.  
Source: SOAS (2009) 
The market rate (the real rate 
of return in the capital 
market) 
There are at least three major disadvantages of using 
the market rate as the discount rate:  
i) The market rate is highly volatile, which may lead to 
a wrong investment decision.  
ii) The market rate may be misled by market 
inefficiencies such as oligopolistic structures. 
iii) The market rate may not be appropriate for the 
public borrowing because it includes the risk premium 
of the private borrower. 
Source: SOAS (2009) 
As the market rate is quite volatile, it may not be 
appropriate for evaluating the long term project such 
as the SES project.   
The economic opportunity 
cost of capital (social 
opportunity cost rate) 
The return on private equity investment may be 
influenced by market imperfections, such as 
monopolies. Moreover, the use of alternative private 
investments may ignore externalities. 
Source: SOAS (2009) 
Table 2.6: The shortfall of each discount rate methodology 
 
Selecting the appropriate discount rate for project appraisal remains the subject of much 
debate for evaluators. Among the choices of discount rates are the opportunity costs of 
capital, STPR, the market rate, and the government borrowing rate. 
 
2.7 Summary of Section I 
 
There are two main methods to evaluate large-scale infrastructure projects: (i) economic 
appraisal, and (ii) financial appraisal. Economic appraisal is mainly used by governments to 
evaluate an infrastructure project in terms of the benefits and costs for society as a whole, 
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while financial appraisal is mainly applied by the private sector to determine the financial 
viability and sustainability of an infrastructure project.  
 
The main technique in economic appraisal is CBA, which estimates the benefit and cost of a 
project to determine whether or not the project is worthwhile for the community. While many 
techniques, such as NPV, IRR, and payback period, are used in financial appraisals, they have 
limitations for which a more careful analysis is required.  
 
The economic appraisal of a transportation project was reviewed and addressed regarding its 
general framework and treatment, including the appraisal techniques of the major project 
impacts. This research attempted to consider key elements, such as appraisal techniques and 
the discount rate of the transport assessment. Comparative analysis was used with respect to 
effectiveness, simplicity, and accountability. The use of each technique may prove to be 
useful in transport project appraisals, subject to precaution. 
 
Section II: Literature review: risk management in large-scale infrastructure projects 
 
This section starts with a review of risk management in project finance. This section proposes 
the risk management framework used in this thesis. It also focuses on risk identification, risk 
analysis, and risk allocation in large-scale infrastructure projects. 
 
2.8 Risk management in project finance  
 
There are numerous possible definitions of project risk that could be used. The definition used 
in this thesis is that project risk refers to the probability of an event occurring that would 
make a project‘s circumstances different to those expected from forecasts (Partnerships 
Victoria, 2001). Risks always exist in infrastructure projects, and extreme risk can ultimately 
lead to the complete failure of a project. Risk is typically measured by the product of the 
probability and the size of the loss. To handle risks properly, it is essential to identify and 
properly manage them. Risk management can be defined as a process composed of three 
major components: (i) identifying risk, (ii) analysing risk, and (iii) responding to risk (Burke, 
1999).  
 
The risk management process for a project starts with risk identification. Risk identification 
should identify all the sources of risk and uncertainty that may impact a project. The purpose 
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of risk identification is to identify a list of risk factors and then to rank their importance 
(Shen, 1997). Common methods used to identify risks are questionnaires, checklists, 
interviews, brainstorming sessions, and risk registers (Tanaka et al., 2005). The identification 
of risks prior to project development is critical in project evaluation for both public and 
private sectors (Roumboutsos  and Anagnostopoulos, 2008).  
 
The second task of risk management is to analyse and assess the risks. Risk analysis is the 
process that determines the possibility and impact of the various risks identified in the 
identification stage. Risk assessment can be done by quantitative and qualitative techniques, 
or the combination of both. In the qualitative approach, the likelihood (probability) and 
impact of the identified risks are focused to determine their magnitudes. The most popular 
qualitative techniques include probability impact matrices, top risk item tracking, 
interviewing, and the use of expert judgment. In contrast, under the quantitative approach, the 
assessment of risk is done by numerical measures. The most popular quantitative risk 
techniques include sensitivity analysis, probability analysis, decision trees, and Monte Carlo 
simulation.  
 
Lastly, risk response is the process of mitigating or eliminating the potential impact of risks. 
Risk should be controlled in order to efficiently and effectively achieve a project‘s objectives 
(Merna and Njiru, 2002). Risk response can be classified into risk reduction, risk avoidance, 
risk elimination, risk transfer and allocation, and risk retention. The main focus of this 
research is risk response in order to determine the optimal risk allocations within the project. 
Real option is proposed in this research to allocate and mitigate the risks in the infrastructure 
project. 
 
2.9 Risk management framework 
 
Risk management is defined as a dynamic process rather than a static process in that it can 
identify feedback between the different processes of risk management (El-Amm, 2003). 
Though many research papers have proposed risk management frameworks, such as Turner 
(1993), Flanagan (2002), and El-Amm (2003), this thesis proposes the integrated risk 
management system and framework as shown in table 2.7.  
 
The proposed risk management framework has been slightly modified from the original 
source by reorganizing the risk process into four parts: i) identification, ii) classification, iii) 
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analysis, and iv) risk response and mitigation strategy. This framework was aimed to identify 
and classify the potential risks of the project, which can be assessed and quantified. The most 
common way to manage risk is risk transfer, reduction, retaining, and avoidance, respectively 
or in combination, in that risks should belong to the party best able to manage. In addition to 
these methods, many strategic tools, such as financial structures, diversifications, financial 
instruments, and support from the government or global multi-lateral institutions, are used to 
reduce and allocate the risks of a project. The selection criteria among these tools is 
dependent on the type of risks, the magnitude and severity of risk, the stakeholders‘ objective, 
and the strength and attitude toward risk (El-Amm, 2003). 
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The proposed risk management framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Identify the potential 
sources and types of risks. 
- Design and construction risk 
- Procurement risk 
- Operation and maintenance 
risk 
- Economic risk 
- Environmental risk 
- Financial risk 
- Market risk 
- Technology risk 
- Force majeure risk 
- Others 
 
 
 
 
 
Classify the types of risks 
that have affected the 
project, organization, and 
people. 
- Project risk 
- Market risk 
- Country risk 
or 
- Systematic risk 
- Specific risk 
or  
- High-control risk 
- Low-control risk 
 
 
 
 
Assess the impact of risk 
using various risk 
measurements, both the 
quantitative and qualitative 
approach.  
 
 
Evaluate the impacts of a 
single risk or the 
combination of risks by 
using analytical techniques.  
 
Quantitative approach 
- The expected value theory 
- The expected utility Theory 
- Sensitivity analysis, scenario 
analysis, and simulation 
- The decision tree analysis 
- the real option and valuation 
 
Qualitative approach 
- The risk factor analysis 
- The probability/impact 
matrix 
- Interview and expert 
judgment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Consider different methods 
to manage risks (i.e., 
transferring to another party, 
avoiding, or retaining).  
 
Allocate risks to the 
appropriate parties. 
- Financial structure 
- Diversification 
- Financial instruments 
- Incentive and contractual 
arrangement 
- Support from the government 
- Support from global multi-
lateral institutions 
- Joint venture and unbundling 
- Option and flexibility 
Table 2.7: The integrated risk management framework 
Sources: adapted from Flanagan (2002) and El-Amm (2003) 
 
2.10 Risk identification and classification in the large-scale infrastructure project  
 
The first step in the process of risk management is to identify potential risks that may have a 
significant impact on the project. It is important to understand what risk characteristic is and 
Risk 
identification  
Risk 
classification 
Risk analysis 
Risk response/ 
Risk mitigation 
strategy  
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what causes project failure. Shen (1997) suggested that risk identification is purposed not only 
to identify a list of risk factors but also to analyse the impacts of those risk factors. In general, 
risks in a project can be classified as completion, procurement, financial, operational, market, 
credit, political, legal, and environmental risks. Risk factors related to project finance are 
listed in table 2.8. 
 
Major risks Sub-category risks Mitigation strategy 
Completion risk    
 - Construction risk - Payment and performance bond 
- Liquidated damage 
- Contractual arrangement and 
associated guarantees, such as fixed 
price and turnkey contract  
- Private insurance 
- Experienced and qualified contractors  
 - Design risk  - Risk transferred from the government 
to the private sector by the design of an 
economically rational financing 
structure 
- Transferring risks to a subcontractor 
- A detailed architecture and 
engineering plan 
- Technical advisor 
 - Commission risk - An inspection and commissioning 
program backed by clauses in contracts 
- Appoint a high-quality project 
manager to manage the project. 
Financial risk   
 - Foreign exchange risk - Matching revenue and cost in the same 
currency 
- Adjustment provisions in contracts, 
such as foreign exchange index and 
revenue collection 
- Foreign exchange hedging  
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Major risks Sub-category risks Mitigation strategy 
- Government support and a guarantee 
for foreign exchange fluctuation  
- Use a derivative contract for hedging 
risk in the financial market. 
- Provide a contingent credit facility to 
cover higher than expected costs. 
 - Inflation risk - Provide an inflation index. 
- Long-term supply contract with a 
fixed price 
 -Interest rate risk due to 
a limit to an existing 
financing source  
-Volatility risk of an 
interest rate 
- Seek a low interest rate loan from an 
international financial institution or 
supranational bank. 
- Use a syndicated loan to finance large-
scale infrastructure projects. 
Market risk   
 - Demand risk such as 
the risk from lower than 
expected toll revenue, 
imprecise traffic 
forecasts, and others  
- Price risk such as price 
control by the 
government 
- Contractual arrangement, such as a 
take or pay contract 
- Revenue guarantees from the 
government and price adjustment 
provision in a contract, such as toll 
adjustment 
- Early stage equity financing and 
refinancing debt at a lower interest rate 
- Set a lending structure by the front-
end loading of debt payment and heavy 
repayment during fixed interest rates. 
- Provide the contingent credit facility 
to cover lower than expected revenue. 
- Cash trap to ensure that the lender 
continues to receive timely payment 
(e.g., no dividend payment would be 
permitted if DSCR cannot maintain) 
- Use tracking accounts (e.g., if the 
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Major risks Sub-category risks Mitigation strategy 
contract price exceeds spot market 
prices, the difference between the two 
would be tracked). 
- Set a debt service reserve fund. 
Operating risk - Higher than expected 
operating costs 
- Performance below 
project specifications 
- Establish clear service standards.  
- Operating guarantees or performance 
bonds from the private company 
- Seek for the experienced operators.  
- Training program for the workforce 
- Employee participation program 
Credit risk - Counterparties‘ risks 
from suppliers, 
contractors, customers, 
or other parties that 
commit to meet a certain 
obligation in the future 
- Risk associated with 
the project‘s ability to 
repay debts  
- Due diligence and credit rating process 
- Performance bond issued from 
counterparties 
- Counter guarantee/ standby LC issued 
by financial institution 
Procurement risk - Shortage of raw 
material 
- Increasing raw material 
cost 
- Long-term fixed price or quantity 
supply contract 
- Contractual arrangement through put-
or-pay or pass through structure 
Political risk   
 - Political event (e.g., 
war, revolution)  
- Government support and guarantee 
- Government participation in project 
- Seek participants from an international 
investor or international organization.  
- Government discloses policy as much 
as possible. 
 - Changes in 
government policy, such 
as currency devaluation, 
- Contract provision to pass the cost of 
any change to the customer in the form 
of a tariff increase  
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Major risks Sub-category risks Mitigation strategy 
taxes, foreign exchange 
control, export 
restriction, and fund 
transfer restriction 
- Government 
intervention on tariff 
structure  
- Political change and 
instability in the 
government 
- Government support and guarantee for 
adverse change  
Macro-economic 
risk 
- Instability of economic 
and government policy 
- Country credit rating 
downgrade 
- Provide a new mechanism to structure 
repayments under the economic 
downturn or crisis 
Legal and 
environmental 
risk 
- Change in 
environmental 
regulations 
- Change in regulatory 
framework  
- Property right clarity 
 
- Put the consequence of adverse change 
in the initial pricing structure. 
- Pricing indexation adjusted for 
adverse change 
- Contract negotiation with the 
government to adjust tariffs in the event 
of adverse change 
Force majeure  - Superior force such as 
earthquake and natural 
disaster 
- Political, such as civil 
riots and war 
- Take insurance for business 
interruption and property damage.  
Table 2.8: Risk factors of project finance 
Sources: Kong et al. (2008), Leviakangas (2007), National Treasury/PPP Manual (2001), 
Obeng and Mokgohiwa (2002), Partnerships Victoria (2001), Ruster (1996), Schaufelberger 
and Wipadapisut (2003), Wibowo and Kochendorfer (2005). 
 
There are various risk factors that may jeopardize the success of a project by causing cost 
overruns, schedule delays, and under specifications (Ghosh and Jintanapakanont, 2004). Due 
to the unique characteristics of a project, risk factors will be different between projects, and 
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such different risks have different levels of impact. Successful project implementation is 
dependent on the effective management of critical risk factors. 
 
Given the complexity, size and the time horizon of project finance, there are enormous ranges 
of potential risks that can affect the performance of the project. However, in general, risks can 
be classified into two main groups: systematic risk and non-systematic risk.  Systematic risks, 
also known as market risk, are the risks that affect all projects within the economy. The 
factors that determine systematic risk include inflation, interest rate changes and recession 
which affect the whole market and cannot be avoided through diversification. The Capital 
asset pricing model (CAPM) developed by William Sharpe (noble laureate in economics) is 
commonly used model to calculate risk and return on investment.  According to this model, 
project required returns should be determined based only on its systematic risk. The following 
is presented below: 
 
E(Ri) = Rf + β (Rm- Rf)  where  
E(Ri) =expected return on asset,  Rf = risk-free interest rate, β= beta of  the security, Rm =the 
expected market return and (Rm- Rf) = market risk premium 
 
In CAPM model, beta is a measure of the volatility, or systematic risk, of an asset or a 
portfolio in comparison to the market. Beta is an important component of CAPM which is 
used to calculate the expected return.  
 
Risks that are specific to a particular type of investment, company, business or projects are 
named as non-systematic risks. Examples of non-systematic risks in projects are construction 
completion, design change, and operational risks. Non-systematic risks can be mitigated 
through diversification, which consists of making investments in a variety of companies and 
projects.  
 
In addition, long-term financing of infrastructure is subject to risks associated with debt 
financing. For project valuation using DCF method, it is common to use the weighted average 
cost of capital (WACC) as the discount rate.  To calculate the debt capital cost (Rd) in WACC 
(see WACC‘s formula in page 76), it is normally assumed that cost of debt is not volatile. 
Hence, the WACC‘s assumption has been made that beta of debt is zero which is not 
necessarily the case for long term projects. Therefore, sensitivity analysis of the beta should 
be done on the discount rate (WACC) used in project evaluation.  
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2.10.1 Specific risks in PPP large-scale infrastructure projects 
 
Due to the limitation on the use of public funds, governments are moving towards the private 
sector to invest in large-scale transportation projects. Investment amounts in transportation 
system projects, such as mass transit, are large-scale and long-term so that the success or 
failure of the project will have a large impact on its stakeholders. According to Ng and 
Loosemore (2007), large transport projects are generally long-term investments that typically 
involve various stakeholders and risks throughout the project lifecycle. The existence of a 
particular risk may adversely affect the success of the project.  
 
Risk identification and risk analysis in large-scale infrastructure projects have been studied in 
many journals, scholarly works, country case studies, and reports. Wibowo and Kochendorfer 
(2005) performed a risk analysis of Indonesian toll road projects using a Latin hypercube 
simulation technique. The study concluded that the private investor and lender were exposed 
to cash flow uncertainty resulting from lower traffic volume and a delay in toll price 
adjustment. The study also found that some government support, such as a land acquisition 
process, can help mitigate land price risk and project completion risk.  
 
Schaufelberger and Wipadapisut (2003) performed an analysis of 13 case studies on build 
operation transfer (BOT) projects, nine of which were transportation projects. The study 
found that political, financial, and market risks influenced the selection of a financial strategy. 
The result of the case study showed that to mitigate these risks, the project required strong 
government support and guarantees lent from strong financial institutions and flexible 
contract provisions, such as price escalation and a mechanism for foreign exchange and 
interest rate adjustment.  
 
EL-Amm (2003) classified the risks of toll road projects into project risk, country risk, and 
market risk. Among the risk factors mentioned, project risk is a specific risk that is limited to 
the project itself. Project risk is found at all stages of the project life and impacts the 
profitability of the project. The market risk of the project is the risk that is subjected to 
demand and price volatilities, and the country risk is the risk occurred from government 
action, including political risk, economic risk, exchange rate risk, sovereign risk, and transfer 
risk. 
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2.11 Risk analysis and measurement 
 
The second step of risk management is risk analysis and assessment. Risk analysis is a 
technique used to evaluate the project in terms of cash flow and the expected return on 
investment, with an assessment of the risks and uncertainties that threaten the project (El-
Amm, 2003). The traditional approaches for evaluating project success are the expected NPV, 
the IRR, the project payback period, and the B/C ratio. The expected NPV is the most 
favourable method for evaluating a project because it can provide a fairly accurate assessment 
of the impact of risks on the investment project, taking into account the time value of money 
and the scale of investment. NPV is a method calculated to determine the present value of an 
investment by the discounted sum of net cash flow over the whole project life. The cash flow 
is discounted by the interest rate equal to the opportunity cost of capital, which is composed 
of the risk-free rate, the risk premium, and inflation (El-Amm, 2003). Though NPV is widely 
used for evaluating projects, the disadvantage of this method is the uncertainties of the cash 
flow prediction and the discount rate. One should be aware by the appraisers that the NPV can 
undervalue many projects (Lewis et al., 2004). There are other measures, such as the IRR, the 
real option, and simulation that can help overcome this weakness. Table 2.9 presents the risk 
assessment tool used for evaluating a project. 
 
Risk analysis tools Criticize  
The expected NPV - The discount rate is a critical component in the 
calculation of the expected NPV. In theory, the discount 
rate represents the expected return that is required to 
compensate investors for their exposure to risk factors. In 
reality, different investors have different attitudes towards 
risk (e.g., risk aversion, risk seeking, and risk-neutral), and 
attitudes towards risk change over time. Therefore, the use 
of a constant discount rate throughout the project lifecycle 
does not adequately reflect risks. For example, the use of a 
constant discount rate throughout the project lifecycle may 
not be appropriate, as a project is normally subjected to 
higher risks in earlier years of operation and lower risks 
when it reaches a steady stage of operation. 
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Risk analysis tools Criticize  
- The NPV approach can capture the risks by doing a 
sensitivity and scenario analysis of the critical variables. A 
sensitivity analysis indicates the effect on NPV by 
changing one variable at a time whereas a scenario 
analysis considers the alternative possible outcomes. These 
two methods have a limitation in that they capture risks on 
the cash flow basis rather than adjust risks by using the 
different discount rates.  
The expected utility 
theory 
The expected utility theory explains the project investment 
decision by the investors‘ attitude to risk. For example, 
risk-averse investors will require a higher project NPV for 
the risky project to compensate for their risk-taking. Many 
empirical studies have revealed that most people express 
risk-averse behaviour when making investment decisions, 
especially people with low income (ADB, 2002). The 
drawback of the expected utility theory is the difficulties of 
estimating utility functions and quantifying the risk.  
The decision tree analysis The decision tree analysis is a path representation of the 
expected NPV. This method allows the project investors to 
factor in both the probability and the impact for each path 
of every decision under consideration. The major 
shortcoming of the decision tree analysis is the same as the 
NPV method in that it applies a constant discount rate for 
the whole path of the decision tree.  
The simulation method The simulation method is used to capture the uncertainty 
of the project cash flow. The Monte Carlo simulation 
method is one of the most widely used methods for project 
evaluation. It overcomes the traditional NPV by i) 
providing various risk factors in the simulation, ii) 
providing the probability function with repeated sampling, 
iii) simulating interrelation among variables, and iv) 
providing flexibility for simulating random events.  
 
46 
 
Risk analysis tools Criticize  
There have been many criticisms of the simulation method 
from practitioners: 
- It is too complicated and contains too many variables.  
- It relies on a probability distribution. 
- It neglects managerial flexibility to embark on the 
investment decision.  
Real option  Real option analysis is a useful tool for evaluating a 
project by including managerial flexibility in the 
investment decision. Real option applies the theory of 
financial option to evaluate investment options of real 
physical asset (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). Real option 
exceeds the limitation of traditional project valuation by 
providing flexibility embedded into the investment 
decision (El-Amm, 2003). Real option has been used for 
evaluating projects in a variety of contexts, such as 
infrastructure, power generation, energy, and others. The 
nature of the real option approach, including its 
methodology, application, and limitation, will be treated in 
greater detail in the next chapter.  
Table 2.9: The risk assessment tools 
Sources: ADB (2002), Dixit and Pindyck (1994), El-Amm (2003) 
 
2.12 Risks in a large-scale transportation system project in Thailand 
 
Many transportation projects in Thailand have been traditionally financed by conventional 
procurements. In practice, transportation projects in Thailand are publicly funded and 
operated by a state-owned enterprise or the Department of Highway. Although investment in 
infrastructure projects is a core function of the government, it requires a lot from the 
government budget. As there is a limitation for the government investment budget and a high 
initial investment cost, the government tries to increase the role of the private sector in 
infrastructure investments by structuring a public procurement system to promote private 
investment. In the early 1990s, transportation system projects in Thailand were granted a 
concession by a government agency or state-owned enterprise under the Ministry of 
Transport.  
47 
 
PPP projects in Thailand are ruled under the framework of the Act on Private Participation in 
State Undertaking B.E. 2545 (1992). The act focused on the internal process of government‘s 
selection, approval, supervision, and monitoring to ensure that projects are properly executed. 
The act does not identify a method of project evaluation and procurement. In addition, the act 
does not provide the methodology for risk allocation between the public and private sectors 
when projects are not commercially viable (Susanggarn , 2007). The lack of a clear 
framework for project appraisal and risk allocation has been the issue and challenge for 
developing Thailand‘s large-scale infrastructure. Susanggarn (2007) suggested an 
improvement to the framework for PPP projects in the areas of PPP concept, rules for risk 
allocation and mitigation, and a guideline for project development and financial evaluation.  
  
In Thailand, PPP concessions can be awarded in the form of either semi-public type or private 
type. For the semi-public type, the government may award the concession to a private 
company with public authority holding the majority of the shares in the project company or a 
special purpose vehicle (SPV). For the private type, the government may invite a short list of 
private companies to submit a bid, and the government authority may engage in the 
negotiation process to award a contract. The government can award a particular concession 
contract to a private company without a formal competition. Many of Thailand‘s large-scale 
transportation projects have been developed since the 1990s. A list of the major infrastructure 
projects in Thailand, including the identification of the project risks and mitigations, is 
provided in appendix B.  
 
This thesis investigated the risk factors in large-scale transportation system projects in 
Thailand. It was found from the study that there are some common risk factors. The most 
common risks in Thailand infrastructure projects are lower than expected revenue and project 
delay leading to construction cost overrun. There is a considerable need to incorporate these 
risks into infrastructure development practices in order to mitigate or eliminate the risk 
consequences and to enhance the performance of projects. 
 
2.13 Summary of Section II 
 
Risk management is a key issue in transportation projects. The first step is to identify and 
classify risks. This includes recognizing potential risks and then classifying the risks. This 
section extended to propose a risk management framework and assessed the impacts of risks 
by various techniques. To assess risks in large-scale transportation projects, the case studies in 
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Thailand were presented. Numerous case studies were provided to assess impacts and the 
mitigations of project risks. The case studies showed that the infrastructure projects are 
dealing with many risk sources. 
 
Section III: Risk allocation in large-scale infrastructure projects 
 
The purpose of this section is to provide the background of effective risk allocation between 
the public and private sectors. Risk allocation is the process in which major risks are 
identified, and then each risk is appropriately allocated to one of the project‘s participants, 
such as the government, financers, or the project‘s sponsor (Hoffman, 1998). This section 
begins with the concept of risk allocation under different modes of PPP, and follows with past 
research studies on risk allocation and risk allocation strategies for key project stakeholders. 
 
As mentioned in the previous section, the risk management process can be classified into four 
major components:  
 Identification: identifying the potential sources and types of risks  
 Classification: classifying the types of risks that have affected to the project, 
organization and people  
 Analysis: assessing the impact of a risk using various risk measurements regarding 
both quantitative and qualitative approaches 
 Risk response: considering different methods to manage risks, such as transferring 
to another party, avoiding or retaining 
 
Risk response is the process that identifies, evaluates, selects, and implements strategies in 
order to reduce the likelihood risk events and to lower the impact of those risks to an 
acceptable level (Fan et al., 2008). In order to reduce risk events, a number of alternative 
actions are available under risk response strategies: 
 
 Risk reduction: seeking to reduce the impacts of risks to below the acceptable 
threshold  
 Risk avoidance: seeking to remove uncertainty 
 Risk transfer: seeking the opportunity to transfer risks to a third party 
 Risk allocation: seeking to allocate risks to the best party to manage it 
 Risk retention: taking a risk as it is difficult to respond to the risk with other actions 
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Risk transfer and allocation are the main focuses in this thesis in that risks may be transferred 
from one party to a party that is able and willing to bear the risk. Obeng and Mokgohiwa 
(2002) suggested that risk allocation among the main stakeholders is a key factor of success in 
PPP infrastructure development. Finding an optimal risk allocation among the project‘s key 
stakeholders is essential. The next section will illustrate how risks are allocated among 
different modes of PPP. 
 
2.14 Risk allocation between the public and private sectors in infrastructure projects  
  
The purpose of this section is to address the literature gap and the knowledge base of risk 
allocation in PPP projects. This subsection begins with a discussion on the broad range of PPP 
models and later presents different strategies to allocate risks in PPP projects.  
  
A broad range of infrastructure projects has been successfully implemented through the PPP, 
which encourages private sector participation. The objective of private participation in PPP 
projects is to obtain a good return on investment and to ensure that the future cash flow 
generated by a project can repay both capital expenditures and financial costs. Whilst the 
private sector focuses on the return generated from a project, the public sector‘s objective is to 
ensure a guarantee of service to a community, cost efficiency, an appropriate price charge, 
and a fair treatment of public service. The public sector invites the private sector to participate 
in the public project with the expectation that the PPP procurement can provide high-quality 
service to the community, lower cost, and less risk exposure. Therefore, it is important for the 
public and private sectors to balance the benefits and risks in order to ensure the viability and 
sustainability of PPP projects.  
 
The challenge in the implementation of PPP projects is the misperception by the public sector 
that all the risks of a project should be transferred to the private sector. In fact, an efficient 
financing arrangement for PPP projects may require a certain degree of government support 
(Vega, 1997). Governments need to carefully assess the type of support provided to PPP 
projects. Instead of allocating all the risks to the private sector, the risks of PPP projects 
should be allocated optimally between the public and private sectors. Risk allocation in the 
project is proposed to minimise the project costs and risks by assigning a particular risk to the 
party which is best able to manage (Partnerships Victoria, 2001). By applying the risk 
allocation process in PPP projects, the government can determine whether risks should be: i) 
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transferred to the private sector, ii) retained or taken back, or iii) shared with the private 
sector.  
 
The broad range of PPP models in terms of the degree of public-private sector involvement is 
classified into outsourcing, management contract, leases, franchise, concession, build-own-
operate (BOO), and divestiture (Shaw et al., 1996). These models range from the relatively 
short-term outsourcing contract through concession and BOO, which is a long-term 
agreement between the public and private sector.  
 
It can also be argued that there are some common risks among PPP projects, which can be 
assigned to the responsible party. The key criteria in assigning risks are operational efficiency, 
capital investment, and asset ownership, which are parameters based on the concept of PPP. 
Table 2.10 shows how these key parameters are allocated between the public and private 
sectors for the different types of PPP procurement. 
 
Key 
parameter/PPP 
type 
Service 
contract/ 
management 
contract 
Lease  Concession 
(BOT, ROT, 
BOOT) 
BOO Divestiture 
Capital 
investment 
Public Public Private Private Private 
Operational 
efficiency 
Shared Private Private Private Private 
Asset ownership Public Public Shared Private Private 
Major risk      
Project risk
1
 Public  Public Private   Private Private 
Operational 
risk 
Shared Private Private Private Private 
Market and 
financial risk
2 
Public Shared Shared Shared Private 
Country risk
3 
Public Public Shared Shared Private 
Table 2.10: Risk-sharing matrix for the different PPP procurements  
Sources: Obeng  and Mokgohiwa (2002) 
1
Project risk includes development, environmental, and construction risks. 
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2
Market and financial risk includes demand, commercial, foreign exchange, interest rate, and 
inflation risks. 
3
Country risk includes social, political, legal, regulatory, economic, and force majeure risks. 
 
According to the risk-sharing matrix in table 2.10, the private sector bears less risk in a 
service contract or a management contract. In a management contract, the government pays 
the management fee to the private company for the performance of project operation whilst 
both commercial, marketing, and investment decisions belong to the government. The private 
company takes over the responsibility for the operation and maintenance of a government-
owned project for a specific period, whilst the government retains the ultimate ownership of 
the project. Also, risks such as demand and financial risks are retained by the government.  
 
Another example of risk allocation in PPP procurement is a lease contract, which the private 
company, as the project‘s operator, uses to collect fees from customers. Then, in this PPP 
model, the financial risk is mainly allocated to the private company. In the lease contract, 
private companies pay a lease fee to the government. The private sector manages, operates, 
and maintains a public service, and they have to take some commercial risks and make 
important marketing decisions. The ownership of the asset belongs to the government.  
 
A concession is a long-term type of collaboration between the government and the private 
sector for the development of large-scale infrastructure projects. In a concession, the public 
assets are managed by the private sector. There are various forms of concession commonly 
used in PPP procurements, which are franchising, the build-operate-and transfer (BOT), the 
build-own-operate (BOO), the rehabilitate-operate-and-transfer (ROT), and the build-own-
operate-and-transfer (BOOT).  
 
BOT and BOO are the most popular PPP methods in Thailand. Four large infrastructure 
projects (out of six) in Thailand used these schemes while the other two projects were 
operated by the government. BOT is normally used for the development of a green field 
project. In BOT, the private sector invests capital in the project and has the responsibility for 
providing a service at its own risk. Government grants the private sector the right for revenue 
collection to cover construction and operational costs for a certain period of time. Later, the 
ownership of assets is transferred to the government at the end of the concession period. 
Moreover, government is usually the purchaser of the services generated from the asset. The 
BOT contract normally specifies the minimum purchase quantity whether or not the quantity 
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is consumed. Therefore, the demand risk is shared between the government and the private 
sector because the government provides a certain revenue guarantee. The other type of 
concession is the rehabilitate-operate-and-transfer (ROT), in which the private sector takes 
over responsibility for the operation, rehabilitation, and upgrading of an existing 
infrastructure. 
 
BOO is quite similar to a concession in that the private sector has a responsibility to develop, 
finance, and operate a revenue-generating asset. The concession is very similar to the BOO 
contract, except that the government still retains the ownership of the project whereas for 
BOO, the government relinquishes all risks and ownership to the private sector. 
 
On the other hand, divestiture may occur because the private company buys an equity share in 
a public project in the form of a direct asset sale, public offering, or mass privatization 
program. In divestiture, the private companies may either totally or partially own the assets. In 
the case of a totally owned asset, risk is fully transferred to the private sector.  
  
From the above PPP models, it should be noticed that there could be a trend that governments 
have preferred to award concession to the private sector, in which risks are inappropriately 
allocated. This is because governments gain benefit as they can reduce their expenditures as 
well as receive the concession fee paid by the private company while all commercial risks are 
totally transferred to the private sector. This implies that the project may not provide good 
outcomes for the economic benefits, as the facility temporarily belongs (within the concession 
period) to the private sector whose objective is to maximize the shareholder‘s benefit. 
Furthermore, in the scenario of unexpected demand weakness, the government may take the 
risk of a project‘s default to operate, incurred by the private sector, whilst the private sector 
may refuse to participate in the risky projects. Therefore, in terms of creating economic 
efficiency, this research proposes to include option flexibility into the project development 
scheme in order to effectively allocate financial risks between the public sector and private 
sector. How financial risks are effectively allocated through real option will be presented in 
the next chapters of this thesis.  
 
Risk allocation is the process wherein the major project risks are identified and allocated to 
the appropriate participants (Hoffman, 1998). The principle of risk allocation is to transfer 
risks to the party who manages them best. The suitable and effective allocation of risks among 
the parties is very essential. It can be seen that the levels of risks that are allocated among the 
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public and private sectors, in any project, vary across the choice of procurement methods. 
Figure 2.1 describes the degree of risk allocation between the public and private sectors for 
the different types of procurement methods. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: The degree of risk allocations for the different types of procurement methods  
Source: Chege and Rwelamila (2001) 
 
This figure was developed by Chege and Rwelamila (2001) based on a case study research of 
five Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries to review the relationship 
between risk management and the choice of procurement systems. The authors emphasized 
that risk allocation should be considered by the project developer before choosing the 
procurement model. However, it can be argued that their studies were based on the qualitative 
approach, in which the degree of risk is not quantified.  
 
It can be seen in figure 2.1 that the level of risk allocation in the project is related to the types 
of the procurements. Figure 2.1 shows that when selecting the procurement method as it 
moves towards fully private participation, such as with build-own-operate (BOO), risk is 
mostly transferred from the public sector to the private sector (and vice versa for the operation 
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and maintenance of facilities). However, the public sector has to ensure that risk is 
appropriately transferred. For example, in BOO, risks such as commercial risk and 
construction risk are passed to the private sector. If too much risk is transferred to the private 
sector, the project may become unaffordable. Chege and Rwelamila (2001) suggested for 
further study that a risk-sharing model of the project should be developed in order to optimize 
between the affordability and the value for money. The authors suggested that a quantitative 
model should be used to quantify the risk sharing.  
 
There are other researches that have studied the risk identification and allocation in PPP 
projects. Obeng and Mokgohiwa (2002) provided the risk allocation matrix that defines the 
typical risks and allocation of each risk between the public and private sectors. They 
suggested for the risk type matching as follow: equity investor/project company—suited for 
economic risk and market risk; lenders/financial institution—suited for financial risks, such as 
interest rate risk and exchange rate risk; and government—suited for social political risk, 
regulatory risk, and legal risk. However, it can be argued that by assigning all commercial and 
financial risks to the private sector, the project may not always be financially viable. 
Governments should take or share some commercial risks of the PPP project with the private 
sector.  
 
Ghosh and Jintanapakanont (2004) applied factor analysis to identify and assess the critical 
risk factors in an underground rail project in Thailand. It was shown that each project had 
different crucial risks because of the unique characteristics that made one project differs from 
another. However, the authors came to the same conclusion that the risks involved in 
infrastructure projects were significant and required a thorough analysis. Therefore, it can be 
argued that each individual project has its own unique set of risks. It is also noticeable from 
this study that support from the key stakeholders in the infrastructure development is 
essential. 
 
2.15 Literature related to risk allocation in PPP projects 
 
Numerous studies have been published on risk identifications, risk analysis, and risk 
allocation in infrastructure and transportation system projects. Songer et al. (1997) applied the 
Monte Carlo simulation to assess risks for toll road projects. Six risk factors were tested in the 
simulation: i) the number of toll transactions, ii) an average annual toll rate, iii) an annual 
operating expense, iv) the construction costs, v) a construction duration, and vi) interest rate. 
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The results of the simulation provided a flexible decision-making tool for assessing the 
feasibility of projects. Further exploration of risk allocation was required.  
 
Malini (1999) applied the Monte Carlo simulation technique to analyse risks in the BOT 
transportation project. The author identified three types of risk parameters as the inputs for the 
simulation model: i) policy parameters, ii) macroeconomic indicators, and iii) stochastic input 
variables. The simulation model was performed to analyse the financial feasibility of the 
project. The main outputs from the simulation were the values of the key financial indicators, 
such as NPV, IRR, and payback period. A risk profile and risk allocation scheme between the 
government and the private sector can be constructed from the simulation results. However, 
risk was performed from the project owner‘s perspective in that it did not address the risks to 
the other stakeholders, such as the lender. 
 
Ghosh and Jintanapakanont (2004) started research by applying factor analysis to assess the 
critical risks of a mass rapid-transit underground rail project, named the Chaloem 
Ratchamongkhon Line, in Thailand. The authors identified nine critical risk factors and 
ranked the selected risk factors in terms of an important index. The critical factors were 
confirmed by conducting interviews with senior management teams to assess their perceptions 
of the critical risk factors. The authors focused on identifying risks during the construction 
period. The top three risks were i) the delay risk, ii) financial and economic risks, and iii) the 
subcontractors‘ related risk. However, it can be argued that the method used for ranking risks 
was rather subjective. The authors did not provide suggestions on how to mitigate those 
critical risks, which were necessary.  
 
Wibowo and Kochendorfer (2005) employed the Latin hypercube simulation approach to 
analyse risks of a toll road project in Indonesia. The authors evaluated three major financial 
risks associated with Indonesian toll projects from the perspectives of the sponsor and 
creditor: i) a delay in toll adjustment risk, ii) a new tariff regulation risk, and iii) a transfer of 
land acquisition risk. The results of the simulation showed that the project sponsor faced the 
highest risk because he or she had the lowest priority of all the claims. It has been argued that 
the project sponsors may reduce their risks, such as revenue risks, in the project by sharing 
such risks with other stakeholders, such as the government or lender. It can be also argued 
that the government as the project promoter may be exposed to the highest financial risk as 
the project has been discontinued. The authors did not address the issues of the risk 
allocations among the government, the private sector, and the financial institution.  
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Ng and Loosemore (2007) employed a descriptive case study for the New Southern Railway 
project in Sydney, Australia. The authors conducted semi-structured interviews with key 
stakeholders from the public and private sectors. Data was collected from contracts, reports, 
newspapers, articles, journals, and conference reports. This study explored the importance of 
effective risk allocation between the public and private sectors. The authors employed a case 
study to demonstrate the problem of an inappropriate risk allocation between the public and 
private sectors. The authors suggested that the criteria for the development of PPP projects 
should be considered in regard to the community needs for the service rather than solely 
considering the commercial viability. However, the optimal risk allocation was not employed 
in this research. 
 
Leviakangas (2007) developed a project model and framework for the private finance of road 
infrastructure. The author demonstrated the model by using the case study of the Finnish 
shadow toll road project. The project model comprised of the cash flow model and the risk 
structure model. The project employed a multi-equation simulation technique in the empirical 
case. The author ranked the investor‘s risks by using the full project model, in which the most 
critical risks impacting project insolvency were:  
 
 Risks in the capital structure: introducing debt capital increased the risk of 
insolvency situations.  
 Inflation risk 
 Interest rate risk 
 Operating risk: the profitability of the project was impacted if the operating costs 
such as maintenance costs were more than the initial expectation. 
 Traffic demand risk: demand risk occurred if the traffic volume was below the 
initial projection.  
 
The risk mitigation strategies, such as i) a back end load debt finance strategy, ii) a minimum 
demand guarantee from the government, iii) the transfer of operating and construction cost to 
a subcontract or to the private sector, and iv) using inflation protective clauses, were 
recommended based on the result of the simulation. Also, the author focused on the transfer of 
risk from the public sector to the private company or investor, but did not provide the 
magnitude of risk or the degree of risk allocation.  
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Roumboutsos and Anagnostopoulos (2008) presented risk ranking and preferred risk 
allocation from the view of key project stakeholders in the Greek PPP market. The authors 
conducted a research survey in which the respondents were decision makers of public 
authorities, construction companies, and financial institutions. Respondents were requested to 
rank risk factors based on the probability of occurrences and impacts as well as to allocate 
their risk estimations to the public and private sectors or to be shared between both. The 
authors found that political, legal, and archaeological risks should be allocated to the public 
sector, while construction and operational risks were better belonging to the private sector. 
Lastly, macroeconomic risks, such as a poor financial market and influential economic events, 
were better shared between the public and private sector. However, it can be argued that the 
method used for ranking risks was highly subjective based on the risk perceptions of 
respondents. Another argument against this research finding was that their perceptions 
towards risks may change over time, depending on project phrases. Though this research 
focused on risk allocation, a quantitative approach, such as real option, would have helped 
determine the optimal risk allocation. 
 
Yongjian et al. (2010) employed a survey research using a two-round Delphi method, which 
was done with experienced practitioners to identify the preference of risk allocation in 
China‘s PPP projects. A list of 34 potential risks was identified, and the authors used these 
risks to explore the perceptions of PPP participants towards risk allocation for construction 
projects in China. According to the study, the majority risks (14 risks) were allocated equally 
between the public and private sectors. Twelve risks were mostly allocated to the public 
sector. Though this research focused on risk allocation, the quantitative approach would have 
helped to determine the optimal risk allocation. 
 
Ameyaw and Chan (2015) identified risk factors and evaluated the risk level of PPP water 
supply projects using a fuzzy synthetic evaluation approach. From the initial statistical 
analysis, 22 out of 40 risk factors were critical risks and were classified into three main 
factors: i) financial and commercial, ii) legal and socio-political, and iii) technical. It showed 
that the financial and commercial risk category was the most critical risk, followed by the 
legal and socio-political risk category and the technical risk category. The authors focused on 
the risk identification stage, which for PPP projects, risk allocation is essential for further 
study. In addition, financial and commercial risks are critical and should be allocated properly 
between the public sector and the private sector.  
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Though various authors have performed research studies on risk identification and analysis, 
the empirical research of risk allocations for transportation system projects has been scarce. 
Also, some authors have discussed the allocation of risk between the public and the private 
sector but have focused primarily on qualitative research. Few quantitative techniques have 
been presented. In addition, there has been relatively little empirical research on the real 
option theory and its application in the field of risk allocation in projects. The application of 
real options for allocating risk between the public and private sectors is rarely scarce. 
 
2.16 Summary of Section III 
 
The allocation of risk is one of the crucial factors for risk management and PPP projects. The 
essence of risk allocation in projects is that it helps the public and private sectors achieve a 
balanced distribution of responsibility and risk. However, the development of large 
infrastructure projects involves many stakeholders with their own interests and risk attitudes 
towards the project. In order to succeed and reconcile their objectives, a full risk analysis, 
including a risk management tool, is necessary.  
 
Financing infrastructure projects, specifically in developing countries, entails a variety of 
crucial risks. It is the role of the government, the project sponsor, the lenders, and other 
participants to structure the financing in such a manner that mitigates these risks. 
Lenders and the private company are always initially concerned about financing physical 
assets in distant, politically-risky areas in addition to construction cost overrun and lower than 
expected revenue collection. The government‘s role is to carve out the risks and assign them 
to the party best able to take responsibility. Therefore, the allocation of risks in a project is the 
main issue for its successful development and operation.  
 
From the literature review, risk allocation between the public and private sectors can be 
implemented through the selection of different PPP models and options for key stakeholders. 
Different PPP models deliver different levels of risk allocated to the public and private 
sectors. The BOT scheme is frequently applied to allocate risks in PPP projects. The 
advantage of BOT is that it benefits the government to partially allocate risk to the private 
sector. However, it has been argued that the degree of risks allocated to private parties in BOT 
should be carefully determined. Lastly, it was found from the literature that real option was 
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rarely proposed as the tool for risk allocation in PPP projects. The next chapter will propose 
and discuss the real option as a tool for managing the risks of a project. 
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Chapter 3. Real Option Methodology 
 
This chapter provides a comprehensive review of the literature on real options, especially in 
the field of project finance. The chapter begins with an overview of real options theory, the 
types of real options and real option methodology. It then describes the roles and 
responsibility of the key project stakeholders, including the government, the private sector 
and financial institutions. The government support and options for the private company and 
financial institutions in the PPP project are also discussed. This chapter discusses the 
application of real options in the context of the project finance. 
 
3.1 Options, real option theory and real option applications 
 
This section introduces real options, including the commonalities and differences between 
real options and financial options. This section starts with the basic concepts of financial 
options. An option gives its holder the right, not the obligation, to buy or sell an asset at a pre-
specified price on or before a given date. Financial markets have two basic types of options: 
call options and put options. The call option provides its holder the right to buy an asset at a 
specified price and date. A put option provides its holder the right to sell an asset at a 
specified price and date. There are two types of options regarding the allowable exercise dates 
before expiration. The option can be either American or European. The American option 
provides the option‘s holder the right to exercise the option at any time until the expiration 
date, whereas the European option can be exercised only at the expiration date. The value of 
an American option is normally higher or at least equal to that of an equivalent European 
option due to the greater number of opportunities to exercise the option (Cobb and Charnes, 
2007).          
 
The theory of financial options has been applied extensively in various areas, including 
applying option theory to value real physical assets. This application is called ―real option‖ 
valuation. Examples of real options in practise are i) to value infrastructure investment (Zhao 
and Tseng, 2003; Pichayapan et al, 2003; Garvin and Cheah, 2004; Mathews, 2009), ii) to 
delay or abandon a project (Huang and Chou, 2006; He, 2007, Blank et al. (2009), iii) to 
expand and acquire (Kogut, 1991; Luehrman, 1998), iv) and to value growth opportunities 
(Kester, 1984; Tong et al, 2005). Details of each option type will be provided in the next 
section. In principle, real options are defined as the options embedded in real operational 
processes, activities or investment opportunities (Trigeorgis, 1996). Myers (1984) was among 
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the pioneering researchers in applying financial options to real assets. His work illustrated the 
relationship established between financing and investment decisions in a contingent claim 
framework. Over the years, many academic papers have contributed significantly to explore 
the applications of real option theory. The application of real options has also been extended 
to infrastructure development. Examples of transportation projects with real options are given 
in a later section. 
 
Real options apply financial option theory to value a real or physical asset. Although a real 
option, like a financial option, provides an owner the right, but not the obligation, to exercise 
an action, a real option is unlike a financial option in various ways. This research highlights 
the main differences between financial and real options. First, it is generally seen that real 
option valuation procedures may not necessarily follow the assumptions of financial option 
valuation. For example, the underlying asset values of financial options may not be negative, 
while real options may have negative values. In addition, information about real options is 
sometimes not available in the market, as opposed to information on financial options, which 
is easily obtained in the markets. Secondly, the maturity of real options is usually long 
(years), while financial options have short maturities, e.g., months (Mun, 2006; Triantis, 
2005; and Brach, 2003). As a result of real options‘ long maturity, Brach (2003) argued that 
the volatility of real option is time-varying, usually with diminishing volatility, whilst the 
volatility of financial options is assumed to be stable. Researchers have also argued that the 
volatility of real options is not observable in the financial market. However, in infrastructure 
projects, the volatility of cash flows with constant value can be determined from the volatility 
of traffic volume, as historical traffic volumes can be observed in the market 
(Charoenpornpattana et al., 2003; Pichayapan et al, 2003; Blank et al., 2009). 
 
Third, financial option valuation is usually simple, with single options, while real option 
valuation is more complex, with multiple options and their interactions (Trigeorgis, 1996; 
Rose, 1998; Copeland and Vladimir, 2001). Triantis (2005) argued that real option valuation 
is complicated to use and to explain in real practise. We argue against Triantis; although real 
option valuation is complex, real options can be used as a complement to the traditional 
discounted cash flow method. Understanding how options can be used to enhance a project‘s 
value is more important than its numerical accuracy. Lastly, questions have been raised 
regarding the precision of real option valuation, compared to financial option valuation 
(Haahtela, 2012). Haahtela (2012) argued that the precision of real option valuation depends 
62 
 
on the quality of its input parameter. Table 3.1 provides an overview of the analogy between 
real and financial options. 
 
 Financial options Real options 
Option price A price is paid to acquire/sell 
stock or financial assets.  
The underlying value is the 
equity price or the other 
financial asset prices that 
reflect the firm‘s future cash 
flows. 
A price is paid to acquire/sell a 
real or physical asset. The 
underlying value is the free cash 
flow, generated from the real 
asset. Therefore, in applying real 
option methodology to value 
physical assets, the underlying 
asset has to be known. 
Underlying Financial instruments such as 
stocks, bonds and FX 
Real assets such as project cash 
flows and commodity prices 
Exercise price  A fixed value defined in a 
contract. Note that this price is 
what the market (grantor) 
expects the future price to be 
(i.e., an expected value). The 
option pricing model assumes 
that the exercise of an option 
is instantaneous.  
Actual cost of buying/selling the 
underlying real asset. This implies 
that the strike price may be 
stochastic. The exercise of a real 
option does not happen in an 
instant, i.e., the exercise may 
require a facility to be 
constructed. 
Expiration time - Clearly known in the 
contract 
- Short maturity, usually in 
months or within one year  
- Due to the short-term 
maturity of the financial 
option, the variance is known 
and constant.  
-Clearly known in some cases, 
such as the period during which 
an investment opportunity is 
available. 
-Long maturity, usually in years; 
therefore, the variance is less 
likely to remain constant.  
Timing of 
payoff 
Immediately after the option is 
exercised. The option holder‘s 
decision to hold the asset is 
done to maximise the value of 
the option.  
Over a long period of time after 
the option is exercised. Real 
projects are composed of 
sequenced investments that take 
time to build and to generate 
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 Financial options Real options 
returns. For example, projects do 
not generate cash returns until 
they are completed.  
Controllable  The option owner cannot 
control the option‘s value. Due 
to insider trading regulations, 
the option holder-in theory-
cannot manipulate the stock 
price.  
The option owner can control a 
real option‘s value through 
management decisions and 
flexibility. Management flexibility 
increases the option‘s value.  
 
Option value 
over time, 
horizontal  
The value increases over time. 
It is assumed that competition 
does not affect an option‘s 
valuation. The option value is 
known at exercise.  
The value may or may not 
increase over time. For example, 
an option value will decrease 
when new competitors enter the 
market.  
Option value as 
the function of 
asset‘s volatility  
The value increases as the 
volatility increases. The option 
value would change as new 
information arrives on the 
market.  
 
-The value increases as the 
volatility increases. 
-Time-varying maturity, but 
normally diminishing volatility. 
The volatility of long-term real 
options is unlikely to remain 
constant. New information such as 
market information may change 
the volatility. 
Liquidity Very liquid and tradable in 
financial markets  
Neither liquid nor tradable. 
Normally, the underlying asset is 
not tradable and is not highly 
liquid.  
Table 3.1: The comparison between the real option and the financial option 
Source: Kodukula and Papudeso (2006), Majd and Pindyck (1987), Trigeorgis (1996) 
 
3.1.1 The key parameters used in financial and real options 
 
The basis inputs used to value any type of option and real option include the underlying asset 
value, option type, exercise price, volatility factor and others. Table 3.2 defines the 
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similarities and differences between the parameters used in financial options versus typical 
real options. The similarities make it easier to understand and to implement option methods 
for real assets. 
Variable Financial options Real options  Symbol  
Underlying 
asset 
Stock price Net present value of the 
potential investment  
S 
Option Type To buy (call) or sell (put) Opportunity to invest 
(call) or divest (put) 
c, p 
Exercise date Continuous right exists up 
to maturity (American) or 
right at the maturity date 
(European) 
The same as financial 
options 
C, P 
Exercise price Fixed price at which the 
option holder can buy 
(call) or sell (put) a unit of 
stock 
Fixed price at which the 
option holder can invest 
or sell the asset  
X 
Expiry date The last date of exercise 
(American) or the only 
date of exercise 
(European) 
The last date for possible 
investment (American) 
or the only date for 
possible investment 
(European) 
T 
Volatility  Stock price volatility Volatility of the 
underlying cash flow. 
Volatility may be time-
varying, usually with 
diminishing volatility. 
However, if the 
underlying cash flow 
follows geometric 
Brownian motion 
(GBM), then the 
volatility can be 
estimated as constant. 
  
 
Dividend Stock dividend Project cash inflows or D 
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Variable Financial options Real options  Symbol  
outflows. Dividends are 
considered to be leakages 
that can affect the 
project‘s cash flow, such 
as royalty income, 
royalty fees, storage 
costs and lost market 
share to competitors. 
Dividend yield is 
difficult to estimate with 
real options. Practitioners 
assume it to be zero. 
Delta  The change in the option‘s 
value, corresponding to the 
change of price in the 
underlying asset 
The change in the 
option‘s value with a unit 
change in the present 
value of underlying cash 
flow series. Delta is 
defined mathematically 
as the partial differential 
of ∂π/∂S.  
Δ  
  
  
  
Theta The change in value of the 
option corresponding to 
the passage of time 
The same definition as in 
the financial option. In 
projects, the time 
horizontal may involve 
years. Theta is defined 
mathematically by the 
partial differential ∂π/∂t. 
Θ  
  
  
  
Gamma The change in delta with 
respect to the price of an 
underlying asset 
The change in delta with 
a unit change in the 
present value of the 
underlying cash flows 
series. It is defined 
mathematically by the 
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Variable Financial options Real options  Symbol  
partial differential        
(∂2 π)/∂S. 
Vega The change in the value of 
an option corresponding to 
changes in the asset‘s 
volatility 
The change in an 
option‘s value with a unit 
change in the volatility of 
the present value of the 
underlying cash flow 
series. It is defined 
mathematically by the 
partial differential ∂π/∂v.  
v 
  
  
  
Rho The change in the option‘s 
value corresponding to 
changes in interest rates 
The change in the 
option‘s value of option 
corresponding to changes 
in the discount rate. It is 
defined mathematically 
by the partial differential 
∂π/∂r.  
Rho  
  
  
  
Xi The change in the value of 
option with corresponding 
to the change in the value 
of strike price  
The change in the value 
of option with 
corresponding to the 
change in the value of 
cost. It is defined by 
mathematical of partial 
differential ∂π/∂X. 
Xi  
  
  
  
Table 3.2: The key parameters of financial and real options  
Source: Howell et al. (2001) 
 
Understanding the parameters in the model can help to understand real option problems and 
implement option methods on the real assets. The changes in option value relative to the 
changes in each parameter are defined by partial differential equations based on the Black–
Scholes model. For example, delta is defined as the change in an option‘s value relative to 
each incremental change in the value of the underlying asset (S). However, although this 
sensitivity analysis is used extensively in financial options, it is rarely used in real option 
analysis.  
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In order to apply the method initially developed for financial options to real options, an 
appropriate underlying asset must first be identified. Most financial options refer to the 
underlying stock price, whereas the underlying asset of a real option can be an asset, the 
project cash flow and the commodity price. The fundamentals of both financial and real 
options are similar in that both are rights (explicit for one because there are two parties and 
implicit for the other) but not obligations. If we can find a financial option, such as a call 
option, that provides sufficiently similar characteristics to an investment opportunity of a real 
asset, the value of this option would tell us the value of the real asset. In fact, it is difficult to 
obtain such options because of the unique characteristics of any project. The other method for 
us to find an option is that we instead have to construct a real option. In real practise, one 
party can construct an option and give another party the right to do something. Real options, 
unlike financial options, are usually not bought or sold at capital markets. In the next section, 
this research will illustrate the concept of real options, including the methodology for 
constructing the real option.    
 
3.2 Real option: performance and risk assessment methodology  
 
In this section, this research describes in detail the real option methodology that can be 
applied to value the project. Real options provide the analysis framework with which to 
evaluate management flexibility in addressing the strategic aspects of a project‘s investment 
opportunities. Project evaluation practitioners can argue that traditional project evaluation 
(discount cash flow techniques; DCF), when applied improperly, often undervalues projects 
(Trigeorgis, 1993a). This method may undervalue projects with actual growth rates higher 
than the growth rate used in DCF. In practise, many project managers rely on net present 
value analysis, associated with their own adjustments, in an attempt to value managerial 
flexibility—which is subjective. Howell (2001) and Trigeorgis (1996) suggested using the 
real option technique to evaluate the managerial flexibility implicit in an investment 
opportunity. Trigeorgis (1993b) defined managerial flexibility as incorporating a set of real 
options, while real options offer a framework that can link value to risks. The risk concept of 
real options can be presented through the framework of financial theory. 
 
According to Mun (2006), the real option methodology is a systematic approach that provides 
an integrated solution, using financial theories, economic analysis, management science, 
decision science, statistics and economic modelling to valuate real physical assets, as opposed 
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to the narrower financial option, which is specifically used to value financial assets such as 
equity, bonds, futures and commodities. Real options are popularly used in the valuation of 
investment projects because this method is especially useful in dynamic and uncertain 
business environments (Mun, 2006). The real option process can be classified into 4 steps: 
 
(i) Identifying different types of corporate and project investment decisions  
(ii) Valuing each strategic decision in terms of financial viability and feasibility  
(iii) Prioritising projects based on both qualitative and quantitative methods 
(iv) Optimising the value of strategic investment decisions  
 
Many researchers use real options to complement traditional analysis in determining the value 
of a project. Real options can help to improve the decision-making process under uncertain 
conditions. Traditionally, projects are evaluated using the NPV technique. Though NPV 
provides better decisions than other methods, the decision is often made under the assumption 
that management decisions to make any possible changes are limited during the whole life of 
the project. The NPV method often views a project as a set of decisions made once at the 
beginning that is unchanged for the whole life of the project. This perspective contrasts with 
the view of the real option approach, which frames the valuation process differently from the 
traditional approach regarding how managers can continually change their decisions in light 
of new information. By contrast, in NPV analysis, project cash flows are often adjusted and 
are usually subjective among decision makers. Real options analysis tries to estimate the 
value of the options that the managers may have and adds these values to the passive NPV. 
NPV analysis is a suitable starting point for project evaluation, while other methods such as 
real options, IRR and payback period are complementary. By applying a real option approach, 
the project can be managed to avoid bad outcomes or to take advantage of the appearance of a 
good outcome. Real options practically lead to higher expected value for the same project 
than the traditional method (passive method), which Neely and Neufville (2003) called the 
―expanded traditional net present value‖ (ENPV). Real options help to improve the NPV 
analysis by valuing the alternatives inherent in a project. Therefore, the expanded NPV is 
applied to consider the real option‘s value. The expanded NPV (ENPV) is calculated by: 
 
ENPV  = traditional NPV (passive/static NPV) + value of managerial flexibility 
 
The expanded NPV (ENPV) can be decomposed into two parts: the traditional NPV and the 
value of managerial flexibility which can be either i) the sum of all strategic options' values or 
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ii) the maximum value of each strategic option for the mutually exclusive options (e.g. option 
to build or option to delay project).  For mutually exclusive options, it means that exercising 
of one option does not depend on the other options. If all the strategic options embedded in 
the project are mutually exclusive, one may select the option that produces the highest value 
(Shil and Allada, 2007). The problems of choosing between mutually exclusive options have 
been addressed in the literatures; in particular by Rodrigues and Armada (2006) who use the 
Least Squares Monte Carlo Simulation method to value a mutually exclusive option between 
the expansions and abandon options and by (M.A.G) Dias et.al (2004) who examine mutually 
exclusive alternatives to develop an oilfield using numerical simulation. 
 
The option‘s value is the value of the managers‘ flexibility to decide, but not the obligation, to 
employ the option. Options can enhance the expected value of passive NPV by introducing 
asymmetry or skewness in the probability distribution of the NPV. The asymmetry in the 
probability distribution increases the value of the passive NPV by defining the profit potential 
with the limitation of the downside risk (Trigeorgis, 1993a). This asymmetry feature in real 
options is the case with financial options, which have a buyer and a grantor. This relationship 
is absent in some real option situations, e.g., the option to explore or shut down. 
 
The options may include managerial flexibility, which can take the form of either a single 
option or a set of multiple options. With a set of multiple options, the interactions among 
those multiple options exist and the interaction effects should be properly analysed. This is 
because the exercise of a prior option may affect the value of the underlying itself as well as 
the value of the subsequent options. Trigeorgis (1993a) identified four factors that may have 
effects on the level of option interactions: i) whether options are of the same type or different 
types, e.g., two puts, two calls or a put and a call; ii) the separation of their exercise times, 
such as a combination of European and American options; iii) whether options are in or out of 
the money; and iv) their orders or sequences, as the presence of the subsequent options will 
affect the value of the underlying asset of the former options. For example, at an extreme, the 
exercise of a prior abandon option (put option) on the asset may eliminate the value of the 
subsequent options. 
 
The methodology of the real option approach is separated into two steps. The first step is a 
valuation approach that decomposes a complex real option problem into a sequence of simple 
options such as call or put options. In this step, a numerical method can be employed for 
valuing individual options. The second step is to combine the value of the individual option to 
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construct option bundling. The value of the options and their combinations can be determined. 
Figure 3.1 presents the real option valuation model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: The real option valuation model 
 
The next step is policy design and implementation. Policy design is the procedure to establish 
policies that can be implemented to improve a project‘s performance. The results of the real 
option valuation can be used to establish a project‘s development policy or guidelines for a 
large-scale infrastructure project. This research will propose strategies and options for 
allocating risks among the government, financial institutions and private companies to 
enhance the value of large-scale project development in Thailand. 
 
3.3 The common types of real options 
 
This section describes the most common types of real options. Various types of real options 
can be used to determine a project‘s financial viability. The most common forms of real 
Project cash flow of a hypothetical transportation project  
Project discount rate,  
PPP‘s risk factor  Risk allocation option  
Option G1 
Government Lender Private Co. 
Option G2 
Option G3 
Option F1 
Option F2 
Option F3 
Option P1 
Option P2 
Option P3 
Option combinations  
Project NPV with real option value 
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options are presented in table 3.3, in addition to a list of relevant publications on real option 
valuation. 
 
Option  Definition 
Deferral option  The option to delay a decision until additional information is 
provided. For example, an investor may defer the decision to 
implement or execute a project. The deferral option is similar to the 
―European or American call option‖ on the project, except that, 
unlike ―financial options‖, deferring an investment may create an 
additional risk that competition may not delay.  
 
Academic works: Bjerksund and Ekern (1990), Trigeorgis (1993b), 
Rose (1998), Casassus and Cortazar (1999), Garvin and Cheah 
C.(2004), Lewis et al. (2004), He (2007), Stout (2008) 
Expansion option The option to expand into different markets, products and strategies, 
or to increase current capacity. The expansion option is similar to 
the ―European or American call option‖ as part of the project.  
 
Academic works: Kogut (1991), Trigeorgis (1993b), Luehrman 
(1998), Zhao and Tseng (2003), Zhao et al. (2004), Mayer and 
Kazakidis (2007), Guma (2008) 
Contract option The option to contract the existing operation. The contract option is 
similar to the ―European or American put option‖ as part of a 
production project. 
Academic works: Trigeorgis (1993b) 
Investment or time 
to invest option 
The option to decide the timing of an investment in a project or 
product during the option‘s life. The investment option is similar to 
the ―European call option‖ as part of the project.  
 
Academic works: Han and Park (2008) 
Abandonment 
option 
The option to terminate the existing project or product. The 
abandonment option can be constructed as the ―American put 
option‖ on the existing project.  
 
72 
 
Option  Definition 
Academic works: Brennan and Schwartz (1985), Ross (1998), 
Bjerksund and Ekern (1990), Trigeorgis (1993b), Vandoros and 
Pantouvakis (2006), Huang and Chou (2006) 
A switching 
option 
The option to switch between different products, markets and 
technologies. The switching option is similar to the ―American put 
option‖ on the project.  
 
Academic works: Carr (1988), Trigeorgis (1993b), Neely and 
Neufville (2003) 
An option to 
choose 
The option to choose between different strategies. For example, the 
company may decide whether to expand, contract or abandon in 
business operation. The option to choose can be either the 
―American call or put‖ option. 
 
Academic works: Neely and Neufville (2003) 
A barrier option The option to execute the strategy whether or not the underlying 
asset reached or exceeded a predetermined price. The underlying 
asset may be a commodity i.e., oil, gold or a cash flow of the project. 
A barrier option can be either the ―American call or put‖ option.  
 
Academic works: Duong and Morel (2003), Buchen et al. (2009) 
Simultaneous 
compound option 
The value of the simultaneous compound option depends on the 
value of the other options. The compound option can be composed 
of a set of the ―American call or put‖ option. 
 
Academic works: Trigeorgis (1993b) 
Sequence 
compound (Multi-
stage) option 
Executing the sequence compound option is dependent on the 
previous option. The sequence compound option can be composed 
of a set of the ―American call or put‖ options. 
 
Academic works: Panayi and Trigeorgis (1998), Casassus and 
Cortazar (1999), Perlitz et al. (1999), Neely and Neufville (2003), 
Mayer and Kazakidis (2007) 
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Option  Definition 
Interaction among 
options 
Managerial flexibility is a set of real options and option may interact 
with the other options. A project may have a collection of options 
and those options may interact.  
Academic works: Trigeorgis (1993a), Trigeorgis (1993b), Rose 
(1998), Huang and Chou (2006) 
Table 3.3: Common types of real options, including a list of publications on real option 
valuation 
 
3.4 The approaches to solving real option problems 
 
In this section, this research presents a method for valuing real options. In principle, real 
option models can be classified into two categories: a continuous time model and a discrete 
time model. The continuous time model is the stochastic process in which the variables 
change continuously over time. The continuous time model assumes an infinitesimally short 
time with high-frequency transactions. The continuous time model is represented by the 
mathematics of a partial differential equation. The most popular application of the continuous 
time model is the Black–Scholes model, which is a specific-form analytical formula using a 
partial differential equation to solve for the value of an option, which is subject to a set of 
boundary conditions. This method is useful when the solution to a partial differential equation 
exists. If a partial differential equation does not exist, the modeller can move to the other 
continuous time model, i.e., a finite difference method and a Monte Carlo simulation  
 
The other form of real option model is the discrete time model, which is an approximation of 
the continuous time model. The discrete time model assumes that transactions occur at any 
point in time. This method is powerful and flexible for valuing real options. The most discrete 
model frequently used in academic works to value options is a binomial model. This method 
sets an underlying asset path in a small time interval, in which the underlying asset may either 
move up or down. The underlying assumptions of both the discrete time model and the 
continuous time model are fundamentally the same, as they model variables that evolve over 
time, except they solve problems by applying different mathematical approaches.  
 
Several methods are employed for valuing real options. The most well-known methods used 
to value real options are the binomial approach; a closed-form equation, e.g., the Black–
Scholes model; a simulation; and a partial differential equation. Though some real option 
problems may initially be solved by the closed-form analytical method, other real option 
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problems may not. Most real option problems cannot find a closed-form analytical solution, 
but the Black–Scholes model is not widely used to value real options. Instead of using an 
analytical approach to value real options, numerical methods such as the binomial lattice, 
simulation and finite difference methods can be applied. Figure 3.2 shows a summary of the 
real option models. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Summary of the real option models 
 
3.4.1 The binomial lattice and the binomial decision tree 
 
Cox‘s (1979) binomial lattice is a well-known discrete-time model representation of the 
behaviour of asset prices. A binomial model is used to approximate the continuous time 
model of a stochastic differential equation, i.e., the geometric Brownian motion (GBM). The 
binomial model assumes that the value of the underlying asset, e.g., the project‘s cash flow, 
follows a binomial distribution. The binomial distribution is the diagram of a different 
possible path that the stock (underlying asset) price might follow over the life of the option 
(Hull, 2009). The binomial model is a useful technique for pricing an option with simply 
discrete mathematics and a discrete formula (Cox et al., 1979). The method is accurate, 
remarkably robust and frequently used for valuing financial and real options (Hahn, 2005). 
This model involves constructing a path, which is called a binomial tree. The asset price (s) 
can move up (u) or down (d) by a certain amount and probability. Figure 3.3 shows a 
binomial lattice with three time steps. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Example of the binomial lattice with three time steps 
Real option 
model 
Continuous 
time model 
Analytical (example: the Black-Scholes model) 
Numerical (examples: simulation, finite difference) 
S0ud 
 
S0 
S0u 
S0u
2 
S0u
3 
S0u
2
d 
S0d 
S0d
2 
S0ud
2 
S0d
3 
Discrete time 
model 
(examples: lattice, the binomial lattice model) 
75 
 
In a binomial lattice, the value of an option is computed under a risk-neutral probability 
equation. In a risk-neutral world, investors are indifferent about risk, so they do not require 
compensation for risk. The expected return on all securities is a risk-free interest rate, which is 
based on the assumption that one can construct a risk-free hedged portfolio. For example, a 
risk-free hedged portfolio could be constructed with the option to invest and a short position 
in a project. Also, the binomial lattice uses the notion of arbitrage in which the risk-adjusted 
probabilities can be computed if there is no arbitrage opportunity. This method adjusts the 
probability that leads to pay-outs and then discounts the cash flows by the risk-free interest 
rate, as risk is already adjusted at the cash flow. Using risk-neutral valuation and a no-
arbitrage argument makes it more convenient to value options. It can be argued that this 
approach is beneficially grounded for valuing derivatives but it is highly susceptible to 
estimating the future value of derivatives. The probability ―p‖ is used in the risk-neutral 
condition, in which risks have been accounted for. This method is very useful as it does not 
need to estimate project-specific discount rates at different nodes along the binomial. The 
neutral probability ―p‖ is calculated by the following equation (Mun, 2006): 
  
    
         
   
 = a risk-neutral probability   
where 
 rf = the risk-free interest rate (%) 
 Δt = the time step interval 
u = the up factor 
  =   √   
d = the down factor 
  =    √   
 
In the binomial lattice, the stock price changes in a small time interval (Δt), either by an 
uptick or a downtick. The observation time (t) starts from t0 and increases with multiples of 
Δt. The changes in stock prices are independent of each other. When the time step (Δt) is 
small, the binomial lattice provides a good approximation of an option‘s value. The procedure 
starts with a forward movement of an underlying value (St) and determines an option‘s value 
at its expiration date. Then, using risk-adjusted probability, the option value can be 
determined by working backward with the lattice. The binomial model computes option 
values by assuming risk-neutral probability, so that we can discount project cash flows at the 
risk-free interest rate of return.  
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The binomial lattice is preferred for a real option analysis because it provides more flexibility 
for computing various option types, especially for exotic options, which are difficult to 
calculate using the closed-form analytical model, as it is quite a complex mathematical 
equation. The model is simple for implementing and easy for explanation. The advantage of 
the binomial model is its flexibility in analysing complex options such as American options or 
dividend-paying European options (Scaramozzino, 2010). Those option values can also be 
determined by solving the numerical method.  The main advantage of binomial lattice over 
other methods (e.g., Black-Scholes model) is that it can be used to accurately price the 
American options. The Black-Scholes model cannot be used to accurately price American-
style options as it only calculates the option price at one point while it is possible to check at 
every point in an option path for the possibility of early exercise in the binomial model. It also 
has an advantage because the mathematical formula is relatively easy compared to other 
methods. Moreover, the calculation is more accurate as the real market development can be 
inserted in the binomial model; therefore, the calculation can link with the actual market 
development.   
 
The traditional valuation method normally uses WACC as a discount rate for an individual 
project without options. WACC is the hurdle rate or discount rate for evaluating projects, 
which is calculated using the following formula: 
 
WACC = (E/V) * Re) + [((D/V) * Rd)*(1-T)] where 
 
E = Market value of the company‘s equity 
D = Market value of the company‘s debt 
V = Total market value of the company (E + D) 
Re = Cost of equity 
Rd = Cost of debt  
T= Tax Rate 
 
The disadvantage of WACC is its rigid assumptions without flexibility in the method of 
evaluation of new projects. The impractical assumption of an unchanged capital structure does 
not happen all the time. However, the existence of managerial flexibility of real options 
changes the risk of the project if the manager chooses to exercise real options to increase 
project value. Then WACC would not be the appropriate discount rate for the project with 
options. The binomial lattice overcomes the shortcoming of WACC by using the risk-free 
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interest rate as the discount rate to calculate the option payoff. However, the main limitation 
of the binomial model is its relatively slow speed. The higher accuracy of the lattice model 
however comes at a cost. This method is more time-consuming than the other closed-form 
methods such as the Black-Scholes model. 
 
Traditional option pricing methods require certain assumptions such as the complete market, 
which implies that there are marketable securities or portfolios of securities whose payoffs 
replicate the project‘s payoff in all states and periods (Brandao and Dyer, 2005). This 
assumption is important in the field of continuous-time real option valuation. Although this 
assumption is required for options on financial assets, for most of the real asset projects, no 
such replicating portfolio of securities exists and markets are said to be incomplete (Brandao 
and Dyer, 2005). With this limitation of the continuous-time real option, Copeland and 
Vladimir (2001) proposed an alternative discrete-time method (i.e., the binomial lattice 
model) based on the assumption that the present value of the project without options is the 
best unbiased estimator of the market value of the project. With this assumption, this option 
can be valued with traditional option pricing methods including the binomial lattice method.  
 
The main assumptions of the binomial model (Cox et al., 1979) are that i) the constant risk-
free interest rate is applied; ii) investors can borrow or lend as much as they want, and short 
selling is allowed; iii) there are no taxes, transaction costs or margin requirements, and no 
cash dividends are paid during the life of the option; iv) there are no arbitrage opportunities; 
v) stocks and options are traded in the perfect market with the same underlying uncertainties; 
and vi) the evaluation process is stationary over time.  
 
The binomial model is the cornerstone of the option theory and it is the most widely used 
method for pricing the option and the real option. Although it can be argued that many 
assumptions seem restrictive, the binomial lattice has proven to be a solid and rigorous 
method for pricing both financial options and real options.  
 
Table 3.4 lists previous research studies that apply the binomial lattice to real options. 
 
Authors Title Conclusion  
Brandao and Dyer 
(2005) 
Decision Analysis and Real 
Options: A Discrete Time 
The authors demonstrated that a 
binomial tree based on a binomial 
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Authors Title Conclusion  
Approach to Real Valuation lattice can be used to evaluate real 
options. The authors used a 
hypothetical project to demonstrate 
that a binomial tree can be used to 
value real options, e.g., to abandon 
options. The authors conclude that 
the binomial tree method is 
computationally simpler and more 
intuitive than the traditional method. 
However, the authors argued that 
the use of the binomial tree for 
valuing projects with real options 
was not applicable for all situations. 
Trigeorgis (1993a) The Nature of Option 
Interactions and the 
Valuation of Investments 
with Multiple Real Options 
This paper uses the binomial lattice 
to illustrate the interaction among 
multiple options (the option to 
defer, abandon, contract or expand, 
invest and switch use). The results 
show the incremental value of 
multiple options on individual 
options. Furthermore, multiple 
options tend to preserve a number of 
the familiar option‘s properties. The 
results of the study show that when 
adding an option to the other option, 
the incremental value is generally 
less than its value in isolation, and 
this value decreases if more options 
are added. 
Trigeorgis (1993b) Real Options and 
Interactions with Financial 
Flexibility 
The author applied the binomial 
lattice to value several real options 
and to illustrate how option 
valuation can be extended to capture 
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Authors Title Conclusion  
interaction among options. The 
author illustrated how to value the 
various types of real options—e.g., 
option to defer, option to expand 
and option to abandon—in the 
investment capital. The author then 
extended real option analysis to the 
context of venture capital. The mix 
of the equity holders‘ option to 
default and the debtor‘s option to 
abandon the project was examined. 
The author concluded that option 
flexibility allows better financing 
terms in later stages of project 
financing and is therefore clearly 
more valuable than a passive 
alternative of financing terms that 
were irrevocably committed at the 
beginning of a project.     
Table 3.4: Previous research studies using the binomial model on real option problems 
 
Cox et al (1979) were the first researchers who applied the binomial lattice to approximate the 
underlying stochastic process and then calculate the option value through the use of risk-
neutral pricing techniques. Their approximations to the underlying stochastic processes relied 
only on simple algebra and are therefore more transparent and computationally efficient. The 
binomial model has advantages over the Black-Scholes model in that it can be used to 
accurately price American options. With the binomial model it is possible to calculate the 
option value at every point in an option‘s life.  
 
Although this method is widely used in pricing options, it has been argued that the binomial 
model is more cumbersome as the number of time periods increases. The increase in time 
periods requires intensive labour, especially handling problems involving multiple 
uncertainties, ―path-dependent‖ uncertainties, and complex options (Tsui, 2005). The 
binomial model has the same limitations as those of the option pricing model. The method 
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makes it difficult to find a replicating portfolio and consequently hinders the risk-neutral 
valuation. It also has practical problems with risk-neutral valuation when the inferred option 
pricing parameters are not applicable to the real world. For example, the probability of the 
real project‘s success or failure is different in the real and the risk-neutral world.  
 
Emmanuel et al (2014) argued that the binomial model sometimes fails to value the 
managerial flexibility in many types of projects. The model is also difficult to adapt to more 
complex situations. In summary, Emmanuel et al (2014) argued that the binomial model is 
suitable and more accurate for pricing options with early exercise opportunities and that it is 
relatively easy to implement. However it can be quite difficult to adapt to more complex 
situations. Emmanuel et al (2014) argued that the model is much more capable of pricing 
early exercise because it considers the cash flow at each time period rather than just the cash 
flows at expiration. 
 
Copeland and Vladimir (2001) were among the pioneers to apply the binomial lattice model 
to evaluate the real option problem. Their method assumed that the present value of the cash 
flows of the project without flexibility (traditional NPV) is the best unbiased estimator of the 
market value of the project. The traditional NPV is used as the value of the underlying asset 
for an option pricing model called the marketed asset disclaimer (MAD). In this method, the 
value of the project with flexibility is the value of the project without flexibility plus the value 
of the embedded options. Therefore, in the MAD approach, it requires an additivity argument, 
which can be proven in Williams (1938) or Schall (1972). The MAD approach proposes an 
alternative method to solve real option valuation problems based on the no arbitrage principle 
when the underlying asset is not traded in the capital market. Copeland and Vladimir (2001) 
proposed to build a binomial lattice model, with a binomial approximation to a geometric 
Brownian motion (gBm), to estimate the project value and real option value. However, it has 
been argued by Brandao and Dyer (2005) that the use of the MAD assumption to create a 
complete market for an asset that is usually not traded in the market may lead to significant 
errors. Moreover, it has been argued that the present value of the project is not readily 
observable but only approximated. Therefore, different analysts may receive various values of 
the underlying asset and recommend different exercise strategies.    
 
For many researchers in infrastructure evaluations, the binomial model is the simplest method 
for real option pricing. The mathematics of the model is relatively easy to understand and it is 
not difficult to implement. The binomial model was recommended by Pichayapan et al (2003) 
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for practical use in real option analysis. Compared with other methods, the binomial lattice is 
found to be most suitable for practitioners due to its lower complexity and efficiency in 
calculation (Pichayapan et al, 2003). The binomial model is used by many researchers i.e., 
Pichayapan et al (2003) and Charoenpornpattana et al (2003), in expressway evaluation for 
illustration to practitioners in real application. Infrastructure projects gain benefit from the use 
of the binomial model method for option valuation instead of traditional analysis, as the 
model can deal with projects with high risk and great uncertainty.  
 
3.4.2 The Black-Scholes-Merton model 
 
The Black–Scholes model was developed by Fischer Black, Myron Scholes and Robert 
Merton in the early 1970s for pricing stock options. The model was the pioneer in option 
pricing and was fundamental to many subsequent academic studies. The Black–Scholes 
model was initially used to price the European option with the following assumptions (Black 
and Scholes, 1973): 
 
a) The short-term interest rate is known and constant. 
b) The stock price follows a continuous random work with a mean equal μ and constant 
variance (ζ). A variance rate is proportional to the square of the stock price. The 
distribution of the stock price is lognormal. 
c) There are no dividends or other distributions.  
d) The option is a European option. 
e) There are no transactions cost or taxes for buying or selling the stock or option. 
f) Security trading is continuous. It is possible to borrow a fraction of a security at a short- 
term interest rate.  
g) The short selling of a security is allowed.  
 
The Black–Scholes model assumes that pricing a derivative is dependent on a non-dividend-
paying underlying asset. The model assumes that the underlying asset price follows the 
geometric Brownian motion. The option value satisfies the Black–Scholes partial different 
equation subjected to a boundary condition. The Black–Scholes formulas for pricing a 
European call and put options on a non-dividend-paying stock are as follows: 
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N(x)  = the cumulative probability distribution function for a standardised normal        
               distribution  
S0 = the initial stock price  
K = the strike price 
r = the continuously compounded risk-free rate 
σ = the volatility of the stock price 
T = the time to maturity of the option 
  
The Black–Scholes model can be adjusted to include a fixed dividend payment rate into the 
equation so that: 
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where, q = the dividend payment rate  
   
The Black–Scholes model is a continuous function, whilst the binomial lattice model is a 
discrete function. The Black–Scholes model is an extension of the binomial model. The 
Black–Scholes model assumes a normal distribution, while the binomial model assumes a 
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binomial probability distribution. Initially, the Black–Scholes model was limited to 
computing European options while the binomial lattice had more flexibility for computing 
both the European and American options. The strength of the Black–Scholes model is its 
closed-form solution, which provides computational simplicity. Later, the Black–Scholes 
model was also easily adapted to value American options. Also, the model can be used to 
perform a sensitivity analysis by using a partial derivative.  
 
Although the Black–Scholes model is simple to use, the analysis should be done carefully 
when estimating the model‘s input variables, especially when estimating volatility. The 
disadvantage of the Black–Scholes model is that it is a very specific model, which limits the 
model‘s flexibility, as it is used to calculate the option price at a specific point of time. Some 
have argued that it is not adequate to price the American-type option (Nwozo and Fadugba, 
2014). Furthermore, some of the Black–Scholes model‘s assumptions, e.g., the tradability of 
the underlying project asset, fail to hold in real assets, making the calculated number from the 
model less reliable. Previous studies using the Black–Scholes model are shown in table 3.5. 
 
Authors Title Conclusion  
Luehrman (1998) Investment Opportunities as 
Real Options: Getting Started 
on the Number 
The work is a good illustration of 
using the Black–Scholes model to 
value real options. The author 
illustrated the use of fundamental 
option-pricing variables to value a 
European-type real option. A 
hypothetical project involving a 
phrased expansion of 
manufacturing facilities was 
provided as an example for valuing 
real options. Then, the value 
associated with the option to 
expand the plant was calculated 
using the Black–Scholes formula. 
The author argued that real option 
pricing should complement, not be 
a substitute for, traditional capital 
budgeting analysis. Finally, the 
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Authors Title Conclusion  
author also argued that, although 
the assumptions of Black–Scholes 
fail to hold, its calculation provides 
qualitative insights. This study 
provides a good framework and 
steps for evaluating real options. 
Benaroch and 
Kauffman (1999) 
A Case for Using Real 
Options Pricing Analysis to 
Evaluate Information 
Technology Project 
Investment 
The authors employed Black–
Scholes option pricing for an 
information technology project. 
The case of ―Yankee 24‖, an 
electronic banking network on 
New England, was used as an 
example for valuing American-
style options using the Black–
Scholes model. The authors found 
that the option of deferring entry 
into the point-of-sale (POS) debit 
market for a certain number of 
years supported the decision of 
Yankee‘s senior executive. The 
authors illustrated the use of the 
Black–Scholes model in a realistic 
and practical IT project. The 
authors concluded that the 
traditional financial option pricing 
models can be applied to capital 
budgeting decisions for non-traded 
information technology assets. 
He (2007) Real Options Application in 
Project Evaluation Practise 
The author used the Black–Scholes 
model for valuing the ―option to 
delay a project‖. This approach is a 
powerful tool to evaluate projects 
that have multiple investment 
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Authors Title Conclusion  
choices, such as a large multi-stage 
oil project. The author emphasised 
the key considerations when real 
options are applied to real projects: 
i) the project‘s cash flows over 
time may not follow the price path 
assumed by the option pricing 
models; ii) the values of the key 
variables, e.g., the variance, may 
not be obtained easily because the 
project is not publicly traded; and 
iii) the expiration of the real option 
may not be during a specific 
period, as long as the company still 
has a right to the project. 
Table 3.5: Previous studies using the Black–Scholes model on real option problems 
 
3.4.3. The Monte Carlo simulation  
 
A Monte Carlo simulation is simply defined as a method that generates a random number to 
determine the impact of an identified risk in a project (Mun, 2006). This method repeatedly 
selects random values from a pre-determined probability distribution to obtain numerous 
results. The Monte Carlo simulation is often used for analysing real options through 
simulating a path-dependent model that can simulate multiple future pathways using 
geometric Brownian motion. In general, the simulation provides more accurate results when 
the number of simulations and the number of steps in the simulation are increased. Also, the 
results depend on the accuracy of the assumed distribution functions of the input factors and 
their quality.  
 
Boyle (1977) was among the pioneers who applied Monte Carlo simulation methods to 
valuing options on financial assets. His method was based on simulating future returns on 
asset price that could approximate the probability distributions of a terminal value of an 
underlying asset. Then, the simulation process generates a number of terminal stock values, 
which could be used to calculate the option‘s value. The option cash flows are computed for 
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each simulation, and then those cash flows are averaged. The average cash flow is discounted 
by the risk-free interest rate.  
 
In recent years, several works have extended Monte Carlo simulations to option valuation. 
These include Charnes (2000) in valuing exotic options; Barraquand and Martineau (1995) in 
pricing American options with multiple sources of uncertainty; and Longstaff and Schwartz 
(2001) in valuing American options using the least squares regression technique. These efforts 
to improve the valuation of financial assets are also applicable in valuing real assets. Many 
studies have used Monte Carlo simulations to evaluate projects, as presented in table 3.6. 
 
Authors Title Conclusion  
Rose (1998) Valuation of Interacting Real 
Options in a Tollroad 
Infrastructure Project 
The author was the pioneer in 
using Monte Carlo simulation to 
value complex option interactions. 
The paper examines the value of 
two real options (the abandonment 
and deferral options) and their 
interactions in the Transurban City 
Link project, in Melbourne, 
Australia. The author illustrated 
the use of Monte Carlo simulation 
to value the abandonment and 
deferral options. Rose argued that 
ignoring embedded options and 
their interactions may 
underestimate the value of a 
project. 
Cortazar (2001)  Simulation and Numerical 
Methods in Real Options 
Valuation, in Real Options 
and Investment under 
Uncertainty 
This paper provides an overview 
of simulation and numerical 
methods, and their applicability for 
solving real option problems. The 
author discussed alternative 
approaches and presented that both 
forward- and backward-induction 
procedures have a place in real 
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Authors Title Conclusion  
option valuation. This research 
provides case studies. 
Deng and Xia 
(2006) 
A Real Options Approach for 
Pricing Electricity Tolling 
Agreements   
This research was based on Monte 
Carlo simulation and used least 
squares regression to value an 
electricity tolling agreement. The 
real option model provided a fairly 
accurate approximation of a tolling 
agreement‘s market value. 
Mayer and 
Kazakidis (2007) 
Decision Making in Flexible 
Mine Production System 
Design Using Real Options 
Real option valuation provided a 
strategic decision-making tool for 
mine managers to measure the 
value of managerial flexibility in a 
mine plan. Author presented 
flexibilities in mine production 
system design by using real option. 
Samis and Davis 
(2014) 
Using Monte Carlo 
Simulation with DCF and 
Real Options Risk Pricing 
Techniques to Analyse a 
Mine Financing Proposal 
The authors applied the Monte 
Carlo simulation with DCF and the 
real option technique to evaluate 
an actual project-financing 
proposal for a small gold mine. 
Table 3.6: Previous studies using Monte Carlo simulation for real option problems 
 
The advantages of the Monte Carlo simulation are its ability to solve complex stochastic 
processes and find a complex option‘s payoff (Hull, 2009). This method is particularly useful 
when the underlying asset follows a path characterised by complex differential equations, 
which are difficult to solve analytically (Cobb and Charnes, 2007). Monte Carlo simulation 
may be used to simulate key inputs to obtain the full range of possible option values, as well 
as to solve real option problems (Mun, 2006). The drawback of this method is that its 
computation is more time-consuming. 
 
3.4.4 The finite difference method 
 
Schwartz (1997) first proposed the finite differences methodology (FDM) for solving 
valuation equations. The finite difference transforms the partial derivative into the form of the 
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differential equations over a small interval. The finite difference assumes no arbitrage 
condition. The methodology can derive a partial differential equation for valuing real options.  
 
With finite difference methods, the option price is obtained by approximating the differential 
equation that describes the option price evolving over time using a set of discrete-time 
difference equations. Then, such discrete difference equations are solved iteratively to 
calculate a price for the option. This method arises as the evolution by which option pricing 
can be computed by a partial differential equation (PDE) i.e., the Black–Scholes model. The 
Black–Scholes formula is obtained by the partial differential equation as a function of time 
and price of the underlying asset, with some assumptions regarding the variables (please see 
subsection 3.4.2), with which the option‘s value can be computed.  
 
The limitation of the finite difference method is that it is difficult to implement when a project 
has many interacting options (Gamba, 2002). The applications of the finite difference method 
for solving real option problems are shown in the following table: 
 
Authors Title Conclusion  
Casassus and 
Cortazar (1999) 
 
A Compound Option Model 
for Evaluating Multistage 
Natural Resource 
Investments 
 
The implicit finite difference 
method was used to value a 
compound option of a commodity in 
a two-stage production and 
inventory problem. The critical first-
and second-stage commodity prices 
were determined from this model, 
and the optimal operating policy 
could be defined as a function of 
state variables (the commodity spot 
price, available resources and 
intermediate inventory of the work 
in process). The output of the first 
stage was an intermediate inventory 
of a work in process, while the 
output of the second stage was the 
commodity spot price. The finite 
different model with boundary 
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conditions could be formulated. The 
author illustrated a numerical 
implementation of the two-stage 
inventory and production model 
using a copper mine‘s production as 
an example. The value of a storage 
option as a function of commodity 
prices and reserves was obtained by 
the finite different model. With the 
authors‘ model, the optimal 
operating policy—which presents 
the optimal level of resources and 
the intermediate inventory—could 
be obtained, which was the main 
contribution of this research. 
However, the extension of the 
model to n-stages production could 
add more complexity to the model. 
Cortazar (2001)  Simulation and Numerical 
Methods in Real Options 
Valuation, in Real Options 
and Investment under 
Uncertainty 
The author provides an overview of 
simulation and numerical methods, 
and their applicability for solving 
real option problems. This study 
used various methods including the 
binomial lattice, the Black–Scholes 
model, the finite difference method 
and simulation to value a European 
real option. The results of the study 
showed that the four methods 
provided the same results when 
valuing a project‘s investment 
opportunities. The author also 
addressed the drawback of the 
standard simulation method: it is a 
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forward induction procedure that is 
not adequate for valuing American-
style options. 
Cortazar and 
Schwartz (1997) 
Implementing a Real Option 
Model for Valuing an 
Undeveloped Oil Field 
The authors presented the real 
option model using the finite 
difference method to evaluate an 
undeveloped oil field. The model 
presented the oil field as having a 
contingent claim on the oil price, for 
which the spot price was uncertain. 
The oil field was modelled with a 
three-stage model involving the 
investment decision, investment 
time and extraction. The three-stage 
model was then formulated with a 
partial differential equation with 
boundary conditions. Finally, the 
values of the undeveloped oil field 
were obtained. With the numerical 
calculation, the model defined the 
critical price that was optimal to 
develop the oil field, which was the 
main contribution of this research.  
Also, the results of the study showed 
that real options provided the 
managerial flexibility to delay 
investment. However such a 
sophisticated real model of an 
undeveloped oil field may provide 
little practical relevance.   
Table 3.7: Previous studies using the finite difference method for real option problems 
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3.4.5 The interaction between real options 
 
The flexibility of real options is seldom in the form of a single option but is instead presented 
as a combination of options that are likely to interact.  This is shown by Trigeorgis (1996), 
who argued that the presence of subsequent options on the same project can increase the 
underlying value of the effect for earlier options, while the exercise of prior real options may 
alter the underlying asset itself. Thereby, the value of the subsequent option depends on the 
exercise of prior options and therefore, the combined value of a collection of real options may 
differ from the sum of the separately analysed real option values. 
 
For a pair of two options combined, in theory, the exercise of the first option may alter the 
underlying asset itself and hence the value of the second option on the same underlying, thus 
causing a second order interaction. For example the option to expand would increase while 
the option to contract would decrease the underlying project‘s value and therefore affect the 
value of subsequent options on it. In theory, the conditional probability of exercising a second 
option in the presence of the first option would be higher or lower than the marginal 
probability of its exercise as a separate option depending on whether the first option is the 
same type (same call or put) or a different type. The degrees of the interaction may vary 
depending on the probability of their joint exercise during the investment life.     
 
The principle of real option interaction is that the value of an option in the presence of option 
combination may differ from its value in isolation. In theory, the degree of interaction and the 
probability of joint exercise between two options are dependent on (Trigeogis, 1993a): 
 whether the two options are the same type or are opposites  
 the separation of their exercise times   
 whether the options are in or out of the money 
 their order or sequence 
For two options combined, the value of the first option would be changed if followed by the 
subsequent option because the presence of the second option increases the value of the 
effective underlying asset for the first option.  The value of the prior option is affected by the 
sign of the interaction as well as its magnitude. In addition, the degree of interaction between 
two options may be proportional to the probability of a joint exercise. For a combination of 
two options, there are three possible outcomes of the option interaction: 
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 Whether the two options are call options (with different maturities): The interaction 
may be positive if the first option and the second option are a call option (e.g., option 
to expand the project scale). Thus, the value of the combination of two options would 
be greater than their separate values. In this case, the conditional probability of 
exercising the second option given prior exercise of the first option (PS/F) may be high. 
Therefore, the degree of the interaction may be large.  
 The two options are put options (with different maturities): the value of the first option 
would be lower relative to its value as a separate option. The effective underlying asset 
for a second option may be lower conditional on prior exercise of the first put option 
(e.g., to contract the project scale) than if the first option was not exercised (e.g., to 
maintain the project scale). As the options would be the same type, which is the case 
for case both puts, their exercise region may overlap significantly and then the 
conditional probability of exercising second put, given earlier exercise of the first put 
(PS/F), would be high. Therefore, there is a sign of negative interaction.  
 The two options are of opposite types; for instance, a pair of a put (first option) and a 
call option (second option) with different maturities. With this combination, the 
options are optimally exercisable under opposite circumstances. The conditional 
probability of exercising the second option given prior exercise of the first option 
(PS/F) may be smaller than the marginal probability of exercising the second option 
alone. The degree of the interaction may be small which the options are approximately 
additive. The value of option combination is purely additive in the case that both 
options are mature at the same time. Their interactions would be zero.  
In principle, the lower (higher) the conditional joint probability of exercise, the lower (higher) 
the degree of interaction between two options. The interaction between two options may be 
approximate as shown in the following table: 
 
Interactions between two 
options with different maturities 
Second option 
Call Put 
First option Call High Small 
 Put Small high 
Table 3.8: Value of interactions between two options 
Source: Trigeorgis (1993a) 
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The value of two options will be approximately additive when there is small or no interaction 
between them. Thus, the conditional probability of exercising both options would be low or 
zero. In contrast, the interaction may be high if it is very likely that both options will be 
exercised jointly, and then the conditional probability of a joint exercise (PS/F) is 1. The 
interaction may be positive if the first option is a call and negative if it is a put. For negative 
interaction, the combined option value is the higher of the separate individual values.  
 
The mathematical equation of option interaction is provided and proven by Trigeorgis (1996). 
If the underlying asset follows a continuous-time diffusion process, as in the following 
equation, the joint cumulative probability of a pair of real options will be exercised 
(Trigeorgis, 1996). 
 
  
 
             , 
Where: V= the project‘s value, α = instantaneous actual expected return on the project, ζ = 
the instantaneous standard deviation of the project value, dz = a standard wiener process, and 
δ= the rate of return shortfall between the equilibrium and total expected return required of an 
equivalent-risk traded asset (Trigeorgis, 1996). 
 
Trigeorgis (1996) expressed the degree of option interaction as a mathematical function of the 
bivariate cumulative probability of a joint option exercise as follows: 
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The bivariate cumulative standard normal distribution is in the form of B(a,b;ρ), evaluated at 
―a‖ and ―b‖ (as upper and lower integral limits) with ρ, a correlation coefficient, = √     
 
 
(where η1 and η2 are the times to maturity of the two options).  
 
 For a pair of the opposite type options (a put option and a call option), the conditional 
probability of a joint exercise (P) takes the form B(-d*,d;-ρ) with ρ =√       . If the 
separation between the exercising times of the pair of options is as large as        ~∞, 
then ρ ~ 0 with B(-d*,d;0) = N(-d*) N(d), where N(d) is the (univariate) cumulative 
standard normal distribution function with d as the upper integral limit, establishing 
the stochastic independent condition (PF/S = PFPS). When the finite separation between 
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opposite types is a low (negative or zero) correlation, B(-d*,d;-ρ) ≤ N(-d*) N(d), this 
verifies that PF,S ≤ PFPS or PS/F ≤ PS then the interaction effect is relatively small.  
 
For the case of two options that have fully overlapped (      , ρ =  √           
with B(-d*,d;-1), since PF,S = PS/F =0, the interaction effect is zero leading to a pure 
option value additive. In this case, the option exercise is mutually exclusive. 
 
 For a pair of options of the same type (two calls or two puts), PS/F is relatively high 
and the interaction effect is large. In this case, the conditional probability of a joint 
exercise (P) takes the form of B(-d*,d; ρ) with ρ =√       . If the separation between 
the exercising times of the pair of options is as large as         ~∞, then ρ ~ 0 with 
B(-d*,d;0) = N(-d*) N(d). With finite separation, ρ>0 and then B(-d*,d;ρ) ≥ N(-d*) 
N(d), thus verifying that PF,S≥ PFPS leads to a large value for the bivariate probability 
and to a large value, for the interaction effect.  In the case of ρ=1 and B(d*,d;1) = N(d) 
with PF,S = PF or PS/F =1, the interaction effect is highest.  
 
The mathematical proof of real option interactions is given by Rossella‘s work (2007). His 
paper attempts to provide a mathematical proof of real option interactions in multiple 
investment projects, focussing on the combination of the option to expand and the option to 
contract. The detail of the mathematical proof can be found in Rossella‘s paper (2007). The 
result of his study confirmed the interaction effect found in Trigeorgis (1993a) based on a 
different mathematical methodology. Rossella (2007) confirmed the Trigeorgis study by 
numerical valuation. The result of his study shows that the combined value of two real options 
may differ greatly from the sum of their individual values. In other words, option interactions 
are generally nonadditive.  
 
The value of interaction ―Interaction effect‖ (IE) will be used extensively to develop the 
findings in chapter 4, 5 and 6. Trigeorgis (1993a) and Ross (1998) defined the mathematical 
formula for the value of interaction effect simply as the option value with the interaction 
effect, less the option value without the effect (the formula is also referred to in chapter 4 and 
5). Their studies assume that in each small time interval, the interactions may be linear. The 
value of option (equation in section 3.2) and option combination (OC) in their studies are 
defined as the difference between the Expanded NPV and the Passive NPV (Traditional 
NPV). Although a mathematical proof of the interaction effect was rarely addressed in the 
literature, Trigeorgis (1993a) investigated the nature of option interactions. Trigeorgis (1993a) 
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presented the numerical valuation results for the generic project‘s multiple real options, in 
which he concludes that the interaction between real options does maintain a number of the 
usual option properties. In addition, the mathematic formula of IE and OC (in subsection 4.5.6 
page 148 and subsection 5.2.4 page 166) is a simple additive function that can be proven as 
shown by Williams (1938) or Schall (1972). In the Trigeorgis study, the properties of the 
interaction effect have been analysed and proven in the following cases:   
 The interaction effect would be large and positive if a call follows another call option  
 The interaction effect would be large and negative if a put precedes another put option 
and there are extensively overlapping exercise regions.  
 The interaction would be zero and two options are purely additive if the options are of 
opposite types, are exercisable at exactly the same time and are out of the money.  
  
Ross (1998) used a straightforward formula to value the interaction effect. In order to test the 
validity of the interacting embedded model (interaction effect formula), Ross conducted a 
sensitivity analysis of the model for each input parameter. The outcome of his study showed 
that the sensitivity of the input did not pose any threats to the model‘s validity and reliability.     
 
Blank et al (2009) applied Trigeorgis and Ross‘s formula to value the interaction effect for the 
combination of a minimum traffic guarantee and an abandon option in a toll road highway 
concession in Brazil. Different scenarios were proposed to analyse and validate how options 
interact. When two options were combined the guarantee option had a strategic importance 
and it is possible to design a level of guarantee that minimises the probability of 
abandonment. Trigeorgis and Ross‘s formula has also been used by Huang and Chou (2006). 
In their studies, the High-Speed Rail Project in Taiwan was selected as a numerical case to 
apply the formulas. The study confirmed Blank‘s  result in that increasing the minimum 
guaranteed level would decrease the value of the option to abandon, and, at a certain 
guaranteed level, the option to abandon was worthless.     
 
3.4.6 A comparison of alternative option valuation techniques 
 
This subsection aims to compare various models used for pricing options. The methods used 
to price options can be divided into two groups. The first group is the analytical approaches 
that use formulas to obtain risk-neutral prices with some assumptions. An example of this 
approach is the Black–Scholes model. The second group is numerical approaches, which 
provide numerical processes for pricing options. The members of this group include the 
binomial lattice, simulation and finite difference methods. In theory, various option-pricing 
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models are based on the same mathematical foundations and assumptions e.g., geometric 
Brownian motion, the theory of underlying asset movement and risk-neutral valuation.  
 
The two most common models for pricing options are the Black–Scholes model and the 
binomial lattice model. Both are based on the same theoretical backgrounds and assumptions 
i.e., risk-neutral valuation and geometric Brownian motion. The binomial model converges to 
the Black–Scholes formula when the number of binomial steps is infinitesimal. Both methods 
assume different processes: the Black–Scholes model assumes a normal distribution while the 
binomial assumes a binomial probability distribution. Also, the Black–Scholes model is a 
specific case of the binomial model. It has been argued that the binomial model can be used to 
accurately price American options, compared with using the Black–Scholes model. This is 
because in the binomial model, it is possible to check along the binomial tree at every point of 
the early exercise. The main disadvantage of the binomial model is its relatively slow speed, 
as it requires a number of time steps for computing, while an advantage of the Black–Scholes 
model is its speed. It can calculate a large number of the option prices in a short time.  
 
Tsui (2005) argued that the Black-Scholes model is too simple and is not efficient to reflect 
the complexity involved in the real project. However, a more complex model might require 
many assumptions and computation effort to reflect reality. The computation could become 
cumbersome for the modelers. Compared to Black-Scholes model and to other methods (i.e., 
finite difference), the binomial lattice is more intuitive and requires less mathematics and 
complexity background to develop and use. This quality is considered suitable for 
practitioners.  However, it also shares the same limitations as those of the Black-Sholes 
model. Practitioners should, therefore, understand those limitations and indeed tradeoff when 
choosing a valuation method.   
 
Monte Carlo simulation uses a numerical method to price an option‘s value, which is different 
from the analytical approach of the Black–Scholes model. Monte Carlo simulation is a 
mathematical process with a large number of asset paths. The underlying asset paths are 
evolved with respect to stochastic differential equations. The option price using Monte Carlo 
simulation converges to the value obtained from the Black–Scholes model as the number of 
simulations increases. The Monte Carlo simulation is more reliable when enough sample 
paths are taken. Therefore, the accuracy of Monte Carlo simulation comes at a large 
computational cost. The other disadvantage of Monte Carlo simulation the difficulty of 
valuing American-style options, as the binomial lattice and finite differential methods are 
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more accurate to price these types of contracts. The general simulation process uses forward 
algorithms, whereas American-style options require backward algorithms. This creates the 
inconsistent process of applying an inherently forward-based mechanism to a problem that 
requires a backwards procedure to solve (Fu et al., 2001).  
 
Finite difference methods are also classified in the numerical class, as they are used to 
approximate solutions using certain ordinary and partial differential equations. With finite 
difference methods, options would satisfy the Black–Scholes PDE, which differs from the 
Black–Scholes model in determining the different boundary conditions. When using the 
Black–Scholes model, an analytical closed-form solution exists under certain assumptions 
that may not easy to obtain from more advanced and complex options. Therefore, it is better 
to adopt numerical approaches in some cases e.g., for American-style and exotic options. 
Table 3.9 summarises the advantages and disadvantages of the option models.  
 
Methodology Advantages Disadvantages 
Black and Scholes 
Model 
- The model has simplicity 
and speed for computing. 
- It is easy to use through 
a closed-form solution.  
- The model uses risk-free 
interest rate and it does 
not require estimating the 
risk adjusted discount rate.  
 
-It has limited accuracy in pricing 
American-style options. 
-Analytical solutions may not exist 
in many real situations. For 
example, it is difficult to derive an 
analytical formula for pricing stock 
follow a jump process or multiple 
interacting options.   
- The method is simple and it is not 
sufficient to reflect the complexity 
involved in real projects. For 
example, the method may not 
accurately price the complex real 
options and their interactions.   
Binomial Lattice -The binomial model 
offers simplicity and 
flexibility that allows for a 
broader range of 
applications. The method 
is more suitable for 
-The binomial lattice model is 
fundamentally based on a discrete 
process rather than a continuous 
process.  
-This method consumes time when 
many paths are set.  
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Methodology Advantages Disadvantages 
approximating values of 
options when Black -
Scholes model is not 
applicable.  
-It is used to price both 
European and American 
options with a high degree 
of accuracy. With the 
binomial model, it is 
possible to check 
American-style options for 
early exercise 
opportunities at every step 
in the binomial tree. The 
binomial lattice model 
gives greater flexibility in 
modelling real, complex 
problems, e.g., options 
with complex payoff 
characteristics.  
-This method is useful 
when the stochastic 
process of the underlying 
asset cannot be 
represented or when it is 
difficult to derive a 
closed-form analytical 
formula using the partial 
differential equation.  
- The model uses risk-free 
interest rate and it does 
not need to estimate risk 
adjusted discount rate.  
- It is more appropriate for 
- It is difficult to find a replicating 
portfolio.  
- Another weakness is whether or 
not the assumptions of binomial 
model are likely to be true in a real 
project. 
- The model is sometimes hard to 
adapt to more complex project.  
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Methodology Advantages Disadvantages 
valuing complex projects 
with a set of sequential 
options and multiple 
embedded real options and 
option interactions. 
- The model is good for 
path dependent options. 
Monte Carlo 
Simulation 
- The implementation of 
this method is simple 
when price uncertainty is 
computed with a multi-
factor model.  
- This method can be used 
to value path-dependent 
options. 
-This method presents problems in 
valuing American-type options.  
-This method has a high 
computation cost. The method 
requires a lot of modelling effort.  
- It is difficult to verify and validate 
complex models.  
Finite Difference - It is suitable for valuing 
both European and 
American options. 
-This method is time consuming. 
Table 3.9: A comparison of option pricing models 
Sources: Perlitz et al. (1999), Cortazar (2000), Wang (2003), Garvin and Cheah (2004), 
Trigeorgis (1993a,b), Buchen et al. (2009), Tsui (2005), Emmanuel et al (2014) 
 
Each option-pricing method has its advantages and disadvantages. The main challenge 
regarding the option-pricing method is whether the standard option method, e.g., the binomial 
lattice or the Black–Scholes model, or the complex method, e.g., the numerical method should 
be applied (Perlitz et al., 1999). Perlitz et al. (1999) suggested that a standard method such as 
the binomial lattice is suited to valuing general investment decisions using real options. The 
binomial lattice is more flexible and can be applied to a broader range of option categories. It 
is frequently used because the model makes it easy to solve the problem. However, Copeland 
and Tufano (2004) argued that such standard methods are ideally suited to real option 
analysis, as they assume more simplicity than options in the real world presents. 
 
3.5 Limitations of the real option methodology 
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This section aims to provide the limitations of real options. It is essential to understand the 
limitations of real options in evaluating projects to correctly analyse the results of a study. 
The following are the main limitations of the real option methodology:    
 
 The traditional options, such as calls or puts, contain too few variables, which makes 
modelling all of a project's circumstances too difficult to be efficient. The model may 
oversimplify by using the simple call or put options. Several types of real options can 
be embedded in the projects. However, compound options involving call and put 
options play a pivotal role in valuing investment decisions within projects. 
 Although real options perform well under uncertain conditions (Lewis et al., 2004), 
this approach is difficult to apply because of no justifiable volatility (Wang, 2003). An 
option's value relies on estimated variables, such as the volatility of project's return, 
which is difficult to forecast. Real options are similar to financial options, in that the 
parameters required in pricing real options, e.g., volatility, are often difficult to 
estimate. Often, the volatility of a real asset cannot be found in the financial market 
due to a lack of historical data. Parameter estimations may be more challenging for 
projects that require sufficient and adequate data.  
 It is important for real option practitioners to understand the limitation of applying 
assumptions used for valuing financial options to real assets (El-Amm, 2003). Tallon 
et al (2002) argued that some assumptions of financial options, such as their tradability 
and liquidity, are inappropriate for the valuing real options.  
 This thesis argues that real options have no added value for irreversible investments. If 
the management has to commit to the original investment plan, then adding 
management flexibility is not necessary. This means that option flexibility adds no 
value if the future is certain.  
 The mathematical complexity of real option models, e.g., the Black-Scholes and finite 
difference models, gives them limited accessibility to investment decision makers. 
However, their complexity provides qualitative insights into each option strategy.  
 
3.6. The real option process 
 
This part presents a real option process framework for evaluating an option. Various research 
papers have identified the real option process. For example, Copeland and Vladimir (2001) 
identified four steps to carrying out a real option analysis: i) calculate the present value under 
certain conditions using a standard discount cash-flow method; ii) define the uncertainty using 
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an event tree; iii) identify and incorporate managerial flexibility, and identify possible 
options; and iv) perform the real option analysis. After reviewing many studies on the real 
option process, i.e., Mun (2006), El-Amm (2003), Wang (2003) and Copeland and Vladimir 
(2001), this research proposes a simple real option process framework that can be classified 
into three phases, as shown in figure 3.4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4: The real option process framework 
 
The real option process starts with a problem formulation stage, during which a set of critical 
risks and options is identified. Defining alternatives for a risky project is more difficult than 
for financial options, for which flexibility is identified up front by a contract (Neely and 
Neufville, 2003). Before going forward to the analysis phase, relevant data such as costs and 
benefits must be collected to formulate the base-cash-flow model. The base-cash-flow is 
defined as the cash flow before the flexibilities are embedded. Sensitivity analysis is 
sometimes necessary because cash flow value is calculated based on many assumptions and 
approximations. The appropriate option valuation method among the binomial model, the 
Black and Scholes model and Monte Carlo simulation must be selected and applied to 
compute the option‘s value in the second step.  
 
I. Problem formulation 
- Formulate the problem framework. 
- Identify key risks and options. 
- Perform historical data analysis and forecasting. 
- Formulate the cash flow model.  
- Evaluate: NPV (base case).  
- Perform a sensitivity analysis 
II. Modeling and analysis 
- Identify and determine the key variables: S, X, 
σ, T, ΔT, and r. 
- Select the option valuation method (For example 
e.g., the binomial, the Black and Scholes, the 
Monte Carlo simulation). 
- Value the options and option bundling. 
III. Strategic decision   
- Select the real option solution. 
- Design the optimum strategic decision. 
- Report, monitor and redesign.  
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Lastly, after comparing the options, those with the highest estimated net NPV are selected and 
a set of optimal strategies and decisions can be designed. Reporting, monitoring and redesign 
are necessary because real options always exist throughout the project life.  
 
The real option methodology is proposed in this study as a more effective approach to 
evaluating a project‘s risk. The most appropriate method among the analytical methods—e.g., 
the Black–Scholes model—and the numerical methods—e.g., the binomial model and 
simulation—is selected and will be applied to obtain the value of the options. This thesis uses 
the binomial lattice method, as it is more flexible and can be applied to a broader range of 
option categories. Then, the options among the main project‘s stakeholders will be obtained. 
Such options are presented through the selected case of a large transportation project (the SES 
project) in Bangkok, Thailand. 
 
3.7 The application of real options for valuing infrastructure projects 
 
This section provides the background of real option theory and applies it to value managerial 
flexibility in a large-scale infrastructure project. Also, this section presents the relevant 
literature involving the application of real options for valuing projects. The selected literature 
focuses more on the application of the valuation methodology than its theory. 
 
Infrastructure projects with real options can be modelled using a continuous time model or a 
discrete time model. A continuous time model can be computed for valuing real options in 
which the variables behave randomly. Discount cash flow analysis is widely used in 
traditional project evaluation. In general, if a project‘s cash flows are stochastic, then they are 
assumed to follow geometric Brownian motion. 
 
Valuing options in a project requires the mathematics of a partial differential equation (PDE) 
with boundary conditions. The Black–Scholes model is one of the most famous partial 
differential equations and was initially used to value financial options. Later, many academic 
researchers applied the Black–Scholes model to value option flexibility in real assets, 
especially for investment projects. Among them were Benaroch and Kauffman (1999), in 
evaluating information technology project investment; He (2007), in valuing the option to 
delay a project; and Vandoros and Pantouvakis (2006), in using real options to evaluate a toll 
road project. Table 3.10 provides the findings of their studies. Although the Black–Scholes 
model is useful, its limitations have been clearly stated. It provides an industry-standard 
103 
 
methodology to assess the value of a financial derivative, for which a specific equation of the 
model may not exist in many realistic situations. Many researchers, i.e., Rose (1998), Lewis et 
al. (2004), Charles and Liu (2006), and Zhao et al. (2004), have moved to using numerical 
methods—including the binomial lattice method, the finite difference method and Monte 
Carlo simulation—for option pricing. 
 
One of the most popular discrete time models is the binomial lattice model, which creates two 
sets of cash flows: one up and one down. It is generally used to price the value of an option 
assuming a risk-neutral probability. The main assumption of risk neutrality is that the market 
is complete, and therefore, a replicating portfolio can be found (Garvin and Cheah, 2004). 
When a risk-neutral probability outcome is defined, the project‘s cash flows can be 
discounted at the risk-free rate. In this research, the binomial lattice method was selected for 
valuing real options because of its flexibility, matched with the characteristics of the project‘s 
cash flows.  
 
The assumption of geometric Brownian motion (GBM) with constant volatility is common 
when valuing real options. If the changes in the value of a project‘s cash flows follow GBM, 
then the real option can be valued by the traditional option pricing method (Brandao and 
Dyer, 2005). Then, the binomial lattice method in a risk-neutral world can be applied to the 
option‘s valuation. However, when the project‘s cash flows are discounted by a risk-adjusted 
discount rate to value the base NPV, the option payoff is discounted by a risk-free rate, 
assuming risk-neutral valuation. 
 
Many practitioners including Myers (1987) and Trigeorgis (1993a) have suggested 
implementing real options in practise by trying to value the inherent managerial flexibility in 
an investment project. Trigeorgis (1993a) defined the meaning of managerial flexibility as a 
set of real options, i.e., the option to defer, abandon, contract or invest in the project. In 
addition, the managerial flexibility embedded in an investment project traditionally takes the 
form of the collection of real options, in that the combined values of these operating options 
can have a large impact on the project‘s value (Trigeorgis, 1993a).  
 
Real options theory has specifically been applied to deal with the uncertainty and flexibility 
inherit in an investment project (Trigeorgis, 1996). Substantial evidence indicates that the 
infrastructure projects are key areas for using the application of real options. Many 
researchers have used real options for valuing infrastructure projects. Blank et al. (2009) 
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valued a government‘s options to guarantee minimum and maximum traffic to mitigate the 
demand risk of a toll road in Brazil using analytical and simulation methods. 
Charoenpornpattana et al. (2003) analysed build–operate–transfer (BOT) projects focussing 
on the real options of minimum traffic guarantee and shadow tolls. Zhao et al (2004) 
developed a real option model for the development and operation phase of a highway. The 
model focussed on three risk types: traffic demand, land prices and highway deterioration. 
Other authors have applied real options for valuing infrastructure projects, including Chiara et 
al. (2007), in valuing the multiple exercise of real options in a toll road project; Ford et al. 
(2002), in measuring the strategic flexibility of a toll road; Ho and Liu (2002), in evaluating 
the financial viability of privatised infrastructure project; and Rose (1998), in valuing option 
interactions in a toll road infrastructure project. A detailed analysis of these studies has 
already been provided in this section.   
 
Typically, real options in a project are more complex, in that the project incorporates a set of 
multiple real options. When options are combined, their interactions exist and the valuation of 
those options becomes more complicated. Trigeorgis (1993a) researched the interactions 
between two options or among more than two options. His study concluded that the combined 
value of two options in the presence of each other may differ from the sum of the separate 
value of each option. Literature related to the interaction among options in infrastructure 
projects is rare. There are Huang and Chou (2006) on the interaction between a minimum 
revenue guarantee and an abandon option, Rose (1998) on the interaction between 
abandonment and deferral options.   
 
Valuing an investment project is difficult due to its substantial uncertainty and complexity, 
which make it necessary to use sophisticated tools to evaluate opportunities and risks. Real 
option analysis offers a framework for assessing the risks in a project. Real options are used 
to capture the managerial flexibility under uncertainty and to simplify complex problems. The 
real option approach has recently gained growing attention in the project evaluation field. 
Many authors have illustrated the applicability of the real option methodology for evaluating 
infrastructure and R&D projects. The next table lists previous works on the application of real 
options to project evaluation.         
 
Authors Project type Finding on the study 
 Blank et. al. (2009) Toll road  The authors proposed three real options in their 
study: a minimum traffic guarantee, a 
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Authors Project type Finding on the study 
maximum traffic ceiling and the abandon 
option. In the minimum traffic guarantee, the 
government subsidises demand that is lower 
than the lower bound level, whereas in a 
maximum traffic ceiling, the concessionaires 
pay the government if demand exceeds the 
upper level. In addition, the implicit abandon 
option was considered to influence the 
government‘s decision about the guarantee 
option.  
 
The analytical approach and the Monte Carlo 
simulation approach were proposed to evaluate 
the real options for the toll project. Their study 
showed that the government‘s guarantee option 
had two benefits: i) the guarantee could reduce 
the probability of project‘s default and ii) the 
government could design a level of guarantee to 
minimise the probability of abandonment from 
the concessionaires. It can be argued that 
adopting the abandon option in a project should 
be carefully reviewed, as doing so may create 
unfavourable consequences, such as social and 
political problems, for governments. This 
research agrees with the authors that three 
objectives should be carefully considered: the 
concession scheme should be attractive to 
private capital; the probability of abandonment 
should be limited; and the overall risks of the 
project should be minimised. 
Charles and Liu 
(2006) 
Infrastructure 
and 
transportation 
The authors used a Monte Carlo simulation of 
cash flow to value the government‘s support 
and the repayment option in an infrastructure 
106 
 
Authors Project type Finding on the study 
project  project. The case study of the Malaysia–
Singapore Second Crossing project was used in 
their study. The simulation showed that the 
value of the government support, in the form of 
subsidy payments, may be substantial, relative 
to the base net present value. In addition, a 
repayment option can be designed to set a limit 
on the concessionaire‘s return. The value of a 
government guarantee may be significant and 
create significant government expenses. Hence, 
the appropriate level of government guarantee 
should be determined. 
Vandoros and 
Pantouvakis (2006) 
PPP Project (toll 
road project) 
The author evaluated ―the option to abandon‖ a 
hypothetical toll road project. The hypothetical 
toll road project was used to evaluate and 
compare both traditional NPV and real option 
analysis using the Black and Scholes method.  
 
The authors concluded that real options 
incorporate managerial flexibility in decision 
making for evaluating projects at the appraisal 
stage. The study is limited to a hypothetical 
project, in that the use of a case study could 
provide more realistic results. The authors 
argued that the advantage of real option 
analysis over NPV is its flexibility to deal with 
uncertainty in the decision making process. The 
authors did not analyse the limitations of the 
Black–Scholes model. 
Lewis et. al (2004) Research and 
development 
project  
The authors presented a method for evaluating 
research and development projects. The authors 
determined the value of a deferral option and 
defined five variables that would impact the 
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option‘s value: 
  -Future cash flow 
  -The investment cost 
  -The interest rate  
  -Time 
  -The volatility of the future cash flows 
The authors used the binomial lattice and 
Black–Scholes models to price an option‘s 
value. The authors defined the deferral option 
as the call option. The dividend payment was 
considered to be the cost of deferral.  
 
The study showed that the deferral option 
provided the value of managerial flexibility. In 
a sensitivity analysis of the independent 
variables, the present values of the future cash 
flows and their volatilities were the most 
sensitive factors in the option‘s value and 
should be forecasted with great care. It can be 
argued that the cost of the deferral option 
should be considered, as it may have significant 
impacts on the deferral option‘s value. The 
lender in the project can apply the deferral 
option, as the lender may have the option to 
delay long-term funding and may wish to see 
the progress of the construction. 
Zhao et. al (2004) Highway project The authors presented a real option model for 
decision making in highway development. The 
study focusses on three real options: land 
acquiring, expansion and rehabilitation. The 
model focusses on three risk types: traffic 
demand, land prices and highway deterioration. 
The uncertainties were simulated using Monte 
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Carlo simulation. The authors proposed optimal 
decision making for highway expansion and 
rehabilitation. However, they did not address 
the limitations of applying Monte Carlo 
simulation, especially in valuing American 
options. 
Charoenpornpattana 
et. al (2003)  
BOT highway 
project 
The authors presented the role of government 
support in BOT projects. The authors focussed 
on two types of government support: the 
minimum traffic guarantee and the shadow toll.  
 
The project‘s cash flows were divided into two 
parts to evaluate the value of the government 
support: the cash flow without support and the 
support component. The support component 
could be valued by the real option approach, 
with the support component composed of a set 
of multiple options. To evaluate the real 
options, the authors used the binomial lattice 
with a risk-neutral approach. The case study of 
the M2 toll road project in Australia was 
selected for illustration. The level of the 
minimum traffic guarantee and the level of toll 
rates were determined using the binomial 
model. However, the minimum traffic 
guarantee may not be the best strategic choice 
for governments, as it may create significant 
future liabilities for governments. 
 
This research can be extended to investigate the 
other types of government support. The study 
did not conclude which types of support the 
government should incorporate into the project.   
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Pichayapan  et al 
(2003) 
Expressway 
project 
The authors evaluated an expressway project 
with the option to delay an investment decision. 
The paper showed that as long as the project 
could be delayed without any additional cost, 
the longer delaying time provided higher NPV. 
The value of delay options is more valuable for 
financially unfeasible projects with low 
volatility. However, economic NPV should be 
analysed for public transportation projects for 
which a delay decision is worthless.  
 
The authors suggested that a social loss due to 
delaying the project should be included into the 
calculation of an option‘s value; otherwise, the 
option‘s value will seem to be overestimated. 
Table 3.10: Previous literature associated with using real options in project evaluation 
 
The approach in this research differs from that of Charoenpornpattana (2003), Blank (2009) 
and Charles and Liu (2006), in that their studies focus on the government‘s options in the 
development of infrastructure projects. This research extends the application of real options to 
a project‘s other main stakeholders, not only the government but also financial institutions 
and private companies. In addition, this study proposes a real option interaction model among 
the government, the financial institution and the private company. This research begins with 
the financial institution‘s options in infrastructure development (Chapter 4) and then defines 
and determines the government‘s options in infrastructure projects (Chapter 5). Next, the 
options for the private company in the project are valued (Chapter 5). Lastly, this study will 
determine the value of the option interactions among the government, the private company 
and the financial institution (Chapter 6).  
 
3.8 The options for governments, private companies and financial institutions in 
infrastructure projects 
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This section presents the options for main stakeholders in the development of infrastructure 
projects. These main stakeholders are the government, the private sector and the financial 
institution. Examples of each stakeholder‘s real options will be presented in this subsection.  
 
There is a global trend for many governments to engage in public‐private partnerships (PPPs) 
to provide infrastructures services. Most of these engagements are done through a contractual 
concession. Concession is a type of Public Private Partnership (PPP) of which a PPP is an 
association, agreement or cooperation between a government and a private company oriented 
to pursue and accomplish a project. Such concessions can be awarded through direct 
negotiation between the government and the concessionaire.  
 
The negotiation process may be facilitated by various valuation techniques which may range 
from a simple rule-of-thumb, as learning from past project‘s experiences, to sophisticated 
methodologies, such as Monte Carlo simulation and real option analysis (Razgaitis, 2003). 
Real option in infrastructure development is initially about risk negotiation between two 
parties, the grantor (government) and the concessionaire (private company), and the 
subsequent allocation of risk. All value and risks are negotiated in order to allocate to the 
appropriate party. For example, when the private company can negotiate with the government 
to provide a revenue guarantee of the project for a certain level, the revenue risk is partially 
allocated to the government.   
 
The negotiation table between the government and the private company can be extended to 
the other parties such as financial institution (FI). In the negotiation, the government may give 
the option to defer the concession fee to the private company as well as provide the option to 
abandon the project to FI. With the option arrangement, one party either private company or 
FI can optimize the value of the option. The private company can earn benefit (which will be 
a cost to the government) by exercising a deferral option, while the FI can benefit by 
exercising the abandon option. Though the real option is extended to three parties 
(government, FI and private company), the option agreement is still between two parties such 
as the deferral option between the government and the private company and the abandon 
option between the government and the FI.   
 
As stated in the previous chapter, infrastructure projects usually face substantial risks, such as 
cost overrun and revenue risk, during the construction and operation phases. To mitigate such 
risks, the concessionaire (the private company) often negotiates with the government and 
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financial institutions for some support. The presence of such support will increase the 
concessionaire‘s flexibility in investment decisions and thus increase the project‘s value. On 
the other hand, financial institutions will request the option flexibility to defer or abandon to 
provide funding for projects until circumstances become favourable. In addition, risk 
allocation among the main stakeholders is also critical for the success of a large project‘s 
development (Khan and Parra, 2003). Jin and Doloi (2008) and Roumboutsos and 
Anagnostopoulos (2008) suggested a research study on this topic using a quantitative 
approach to identify appropriate risk allocation in PPP infrastructure projects. Next, in 
chapters 4–6, this research will apply real options to help determine the appropriate amount of 
risk allocation among the government, private company and financial institution.  
 
Khan and Parra (2003) and Zhang (2005) listed some typical interests of the major parties in 
the development of large-scale infrastructure projects related to key risk factors, i.e., financial 
and market risk: 
 
 Government: Governments look for an appropriate toll -charge for public services, as 
well as public affordability, the lowest total life cycle cost of for a project and a 
project's completion within its budget. 
 Private sponsor: Private companies look to optimize of their investments by allocating 
more capital in profitable projects, as well as a low- equity injections in projects, the 
protection of private investments from market risk and currency's conversions or 
transfers to mitigate the market risk. 
 Financial institution: Financial institutions look for certainty in the project's cash flow, 
the project's ability to service debt and a credit enhancement from the reliable parties.   
 
The complexity and obscurity of the risks facing a project‘s stakeholders make it difficult to 
distribute the risks appropriately. Before distributing such risks, it is essential to understand 
the real options for key stakeholders, which will help to mitigate and allocate risks in PPP 
projects. 
 
3.8.1 Government support in projects 
 
Risk identification, risk analysis, risk mitigation, risk sharing and government support are 
crucial to the success of infrastructure projects. Risk identification and risk analysis have been 
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discussed in Chapter 2. This subsection will provide information on risk sharing by the 
government.  
 
Fishbein and Babbar (1996) defined eight levels of government financial support (presented 
in figure 3.5) to project sponsors, ranked by government financial exposure from low to high: 
1) concession extensions, 2) revenue enhancement, 3) minimum traffic guarantees, 4) shadow 
tolls, 5) grants and subordinated loans, 6) exchange rate guarantees; 7) debt guarantees and 8) 
equity guarantees. In addition, governments can help to mitigate political risk through 
providing support, guarantees or financing (Schaufelberger and Wipadapisul, 2003). 
 
 
 
Figure 3.5: Level of government support in BOT projects  
Source: Fishbein and Babbar (1996) 
 
In figure 3.5, the risk allocation mechanisms range from concession extensions to equity 
guarantees. Concession extensions involve limited government risk, in that the private 
company still takes the project‘s main risks i.e., revenue shortfall risk. A minimum traffic 
guarantee is a common type of government support in which governments compensate the 
concessionaire if the project‘s revenue falls below the guarantee level. With a minimum 
traffic guarantee, the government holds the option and determines the appropriate level of 
guarantee. Revenue risk is partly shared between the public and private sectors. 
Charoenpornpattana et al. (2003), Huang and Chou (2006), Brandao and Saraiva (2008), and 
High 
Impact on ability to 
raise financing  
Low 
High 
Concession extension 
Revenue enhancement 
Shadow Toll 
Minimum traffic or revenue guarantee 
Subordinated loan 
Grant 
Government financial exposure 
Exchange rate guarantee 
Debt guarantee 
Equity guarantee 
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Blank et al. (2009) developed real option models to determine the value of revenue 
guarantees. Charoenpornpattana et al. (2003) determined the value of projects with minimum 
traffic guarantees using the real option approach. Their research found that the value of 
support was important for the success of PPP projects, as it helps to make projects more 
attractive for private investors. Huang, and Chou, (2006) studied the interaction between the 
minimum guarantee option and the abandon option using Taiwan high-speed rail as a project 
case. They applied derived option pricing formulas to value the options. They concluded that 
the value of the abandon option was worthless when the guarantee level was high enough e.g., 
at 350% of revenue. Brandao and Saraiva (2008) used a real option model with Monte Carlo 
simulation to assess the value of a government guarantee. They applied their model to the BR-
163 toll road in Brazil. They found that a minimum traffic guarantee with a cap on total 
government expenditures for the project increased the project‘s value and reduced the revenue 
risk for the private investor. However, a minimum traffic guarantee may not be the best option 
for the government to support a project, as the revenue risk is mostly transferred to the public 
sector, creating significant exposure for the government in the future. This research will 
explore the different types of government options to define the appropriate level of 
government support in PPP projects.  
 
Example of PPP projects that applied revenue guarantees include the 4th Line of the Sao 
Paulo Metro in Brazil, the El Cortijo–El Vino toll road in Colombia and the Santiago–
Valparaiso–Vifia del Mar Toll Road in Chile. In these projects, the government provided a 
guarantee to help reduce the risks for the private sector and lender in the PPP project. This 
research differs from Charoenpornpattana et al. (2003) and Blank, et al. (2009), in that it 
extends the model‘s scope to study the interaction among the government options as well as 
the option interactions among the main stakeholders in PPP projects.  
 
Among the various types of government support, an equity guarantee is the highest degree of 
government support (Fishbein and Babbar, 1996). A government gives a private company the 
option to sell (put option) the project to the government at a specific price that guarantees a 
minimum rate of return. This equity guarantee option can be exercised in very specific 
conditions, which are defined in the concession agreement. The other government guarantees 
are debt and exchange rate guarantees. In a debt guarantee, the government promises to pay 
the lender the principal and interest in case of financial default. A government provides an 
exchange rate guarantee to mitigate exchange rate volatility.  
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Debt guarantees which the risk of repayment are frequently used by governments to pursue 
policy objectives for supporting PPP infrastructure projects in financial distress. A guarantee 
is valuable to prevent the lender or bondholder in the event of payment default with a cost to 
government.  With lending guarantee, the incentives of the debt holders (financial institutions 
or bondholders) in monitoring the performance of the project company may fall. Therefore, 
government‘s guarantee should preserve project companies‘ incentive to management risk 
they can manage. To create the incentive for continued project monitoring or to discourage 
private companies which may reluctant to repay debt, government may set the guarantee 
mechanism i.e. limited guarantee for a portion of debt or limited guarantee only for 
unexpected lower revenue. The government may require the borrower to provide any 
securities such as assignment of future earning for any recourse. Furthermore, the government 
may set control account to make sure that the project‘s revenues are actually used to repay the 
FI loans or bondholders and any cash deficiencies are covered by properly exercising debt 
guarantee.   Equity and debt guarantees enhance a project‘s cash flow while limiting the 
downside, similar to the hedging feature of options. This research will apply real option 
methodology to examine the value of these options.  
  
In addition, governments can provide other forms of support to enhance a project‘s economic 
feasibility, such as by granting subordinated loans and guarantees for traffic revenue 
(minimum traffic guarantees and shadow tolls). A subordinate loan serves to increase a 
project‘s debt leverage and to decrease the cost of equity funding (El-Amm, 2003). A shadow 
toll is a payment structure for the number of vehicles using the road that uses the government 
instead of toll users. Fishbein and Babbar (1996) argued that it may not be efficient for the 
government to provide shadow tolls to protect private investors from revenue risks. In this 
option, the government‘s contribution is proportionate to the traffic volume. Therefore, the 
support may not be adequate if traffic flow is lower than expected, as the revenue risk is 
wholly owned by the government. Charoenpornpattana et al. (2003) argued that shadow tolls 
contribute to projects if the government defines a suitable set of support variables, such as toll 
rate and traffic levels. Therefore, the government‘s revenue risk is limited. 
 
Governments in many countries support projects through revenue enhancement and 
concession extensions. Governments help to enhance project revenue by limiting competitors, 
increasing demands by providing interconnections with other transport projects or allowing 
the development of ancillary facilities (Charoenpornpattana et al., 2003). A government may 
extend the concession period for a private company to earn a reasonable return if revenue falls 
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below a specified level, such as in the Mexico City Toluca Toll road project. By giving 
revenue enhancements and concession extensions, a government can limit its financial 
exposure to projects. Fishbein and Babbar (1996) argued that, although these two options 
limit a government‘s liability in projects, they do not protect the private investor‘s risks 
regarding traffic or revenue shortfalls, as these risks still belong to the private sector.  
 
3.8.2 Private-sector options in a project's development  
 
Private partnership is becoming an essential tool in developing infrastructure projects. 
Governments in many countries may set up support mechanisms to stimulate private 
investment into projects. Project finance is a typical tool used to fund large-scale 
infrastructure projects and bring private capital into the provision of infrastructure projects. A 
private company may participate in projects in different ways, e.g., as advisors, insurers, 
project developers, operators and investors. Private investors normally attempt to not 
participate in high-risk projects. They may require a higher rate of return to compensate for a 
project‘s risk. It is essential for private companies to ensure that their investments are at an 
optimal level.  
 
Private investors can employ various means to mitigate project risks, such as an abandonment 
option, project extension or debt rescheduling. In an abandonment option, a private company 
can withdraw from a project if the project‘s cash flow is negative (Pollio, 1998). Podhraski 
(2014) argued that the abandonment option is difficult for the private sector to apply in PPP 
projects due to the protection of public interests. This is because the abandonment option 
allows private companies to stop a project if it turns out to be loss-making. The abandonment 
option may interrupt the service to the public, which is usually not acceptable for the 
government. However, an abandonment option can be awarded to the private sector within a 
short period of time, i.e., within the construction period or early in the operating years. An 
example of the abandonment option involves the 345-km Taiwan High-Speed Rail project, 
which links Taipei and Kaohsiung. In this project, a private company had the option to 
abandon the project within a specific short-term period after signing the contract. This 
research will investigate the best time for a private company to abandon a project.  
 
A project‘s investors may require the option to reschedule or to extend repayment in the 
contract obligations if the project experiences low traffic (Schaufelberger and Wipadapisul 
2003). Rose (1998) studied the private companies‘ option to defer the concession fee to the 
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government. The value of this option is similar to the value of the company‘s call option to 
defer payment to the government. Ross found that the value of the deferral option was 
significant relative to the project‘s value (about 30% of the total concession fees). However, 
the deferral option may not be preferable as a policy choice under the government is 
experiencing budget constraints, as the government will receive less revenue.   
 
3.8.3 Financial institutions’ options in project development 
 
Large infrastructure projects in global markets are usually funded using project finance 
arrangements. According to S&P, global project finance origination reached a record peak of 
around 680 projects in 2007 but sharply declined to approximately 250 projects in 2013 after 
the financial crisis. In addition, referring to Thomson OneBanker data, global project finance 
loans reached its highest level of USD $247 billion in 2008 but decreased sharply in 2009 and 
recovered to USD $204 billion in 2013. Financial institutions are a primary source of project 
financing. Normally, financial institutions are not comfortable with funding long-term 
projects; therefore, they will attempt to limit their funding risks by allocating the risks to the 
other project participants, such as by requiring a government guarantee and equity injections 
from the project company. The project company, on the other hand, may require support 
mechanisms from the lender in the form of some equity injections, prolonged debt service and 
bank guarantees.  
 
Multilateral finance institutions such as the World Bank, the International Finance 
Corporation and the International Monetary Fund, as well as regional development banks 
often act as lenders or co-financiers in developing infrastructure projects within developing 
countries. The World Bank has funded approximately 12,300 projects in 173 countries from 
1947 to 2015. In addition to direct funding, they may provide full or partial guarantees for 
insuring infrastructure development in developing countries. The partial guarantees mainly 
cover country risks such as political risk and force majeure, and may be extended to cover 
foreign exchange risks. The guarantees are triggered when credit default occurs due to 
government non-compliance with its contract obligations.  
 
Based on the literature review, real options for financial institutions (FIs) have been 
neglected, which has inspired the author to continue working in this area. Details on applying 
real options to FIs will be explored in the next chapter.   
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3.9 Summary  
 
This section starts by reviewing the similarities and differences between financial options and 
real options. The most important difference is that the former is actively traded in the market, 
with shorter maturity compared to real options. Real option models, including the binomial 
lattice model, the Black–Scholes model and Monte Carlo simulation, are also introduced as 
important approaches for valuing real options. Previous studies have widely applied real 
options to evaluate projects, although there are some limitations. Among the various real 
option models, the binomial model‘s advantages are its ability to find solutions for the 
valuation of American options, its flexibility to value more compound options and its 
mathematical simplicity for interpretation in real projects. The application of the binomial 
model to a project‘s valuation problems looks natural because the binomial model is 
commonly used to model project flexibility. This research applies a binomial lattice model 
with risk-neutral probabilities to estimate the value of option flexibility with the changes in a 
project‘s value over time.  
  
This section also provides reverent literature reviews on applying real options in project 
evaluation. The presence of options in the project can be shown by real option theory. The 
literature motivates me to further study real option valuing and the interactions among real 
options in the context of project finance.   
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Chapter 4: SES Case Study: Financial-Institution Option 
 
This chapter presents the approach this study used in order to answer the research questions 
addressed in the literature review. In this chapter, the real-option valuation model is presented 
in which the binomial lattice is used for valuing the real option for the financial institution. 
This research then formulates a set of multiple options for financial institutions and 
determines the values of the option interactions.  
 
This research study began with a review of project-evaluation method, risk identification, risk 
analysis, the risk allocation in the large-scale infrastructure project (Chapter 2) and the real-
option methodology (Chapter 3). The main finding from the literature review is that 
traditional project evaluation techniques (i.e., NPV, IRR) tend to understate the value of the 
project and neglect managerial flexibility in the analysis.  
 
The literature also showed that a typical project finance is mainly subject to financial risks 
(e.g., lower than expected revenue due to the uncertainty of traffic demand and the 
construction cost overrun). Furthermore, to explore the critical risks in a practical context, this 
thesis uses a qualitative method to collect data from a selection of 6 large infrastructure 
projects in Thailand. The analysis of case studies allowed the identification of three main risk 
factors: i) an underestimated project demand ii) construction cost overrun, and iii) large 
amounts of debt. The traditional project evaluation (i.e., NPV, IRR) falls to capture the 
investment decision regarding these risks and therefore, an additional, flexible tool to handle 
such risks is required. In addition, based on the result of the literature review on risk factors in 
infrastructure projects, this thesis found that the risk allocation between the main project‘s 
parties is essential for a successful project. 
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Figure 4.1: The schematic representation of study methodology  
 
The data collected from large infrastructure projects were then used to identify fundamental 
and critical variables in the model. The selected hypothetical project was used to develop the 
traditional cash-flow model. The appropriate real options were selected from the literature. 
Then, this study used the real-option model with the binomial lattice to simulate cash-flow 
behaviour and to analyse the impacts of the financial risk of projects. This research used 
Excel spreadsheet for all numerical simulations and calculations. Finally, the value of real 
options and their combinations in the context of project finance are investigated in order to 
enhance the value of the project. The results will be used as a guideline for policy design and 
implementation. Figure 4.1 is a representation of the methodology adopted in this DBA thesis. 
 
This research selected the second-stage expressway system (SES) project for real-option 
analysis because of the availability and completeness of the project‘s information in the time 
Literature review 
(Chapters 2-3) 
Selected key risk factors 
Selected model for traffic demand to construct cash flow model  
Selected hypothetical project 
 
 
Identify the fundamental and critical variables in model 
 
Data gathering from 
project’s sites in Thailand  
Model development 
 Traditional cash-flow method 
 Sensitivity of traditional cash-flow model 
 Real option application/Option combinations/Sensitivity analysis 
of real option model 
(Chapters 4-6) 
Recommend types of options/bundle of options to enhance the 
value of the project 
(Chapters 4-6) 
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that data were collected. The SES project is the first example of a public–private participants 
(PPP) implementation in Thailand.  
 
The traffic flow is assumed to follow the geometric Brownian motion (GBM) with a constant 
volatility. For real-option analysis, the NPV of the SES project is initially determined by the 
traditional discount cash-flow method. The binomial lattice of the selected real options is 
determined, and the real-option value can be computed. 
 
4.1 An introduction to financial institution option 
 
This section will discuss the real option for a financial institution in the PPP infrastructure 
project. The primary aim of this section is to study the implementation of a real option in the 
infrastructure projects.  
 
One of the major concerns when a financial institution provides financial support to large 
infrastructure projects is the uncertainty of the project‘s cash flows, which is a main source 
for repaying its debt obligation. A lender is looking for the risk-mitigation mechanism which 
can help reduce project risk. The credit quality of the project can be improved if the lender is 
sufficiently shielded from the repayment risk. This section presents the application of the real 
option to value and investment project in the context of a financial-institution option. Real 
options for financial institutions are identified and evaluated. The option interaction in the 
form of multiple real options is also investigated in this section. This section aims to 
demonstrate the application of the real-option method to value investment projects and show 
how the real options can mitigate risks for the financial institution. 
 
This chapter provides practical insight into financial-institution risks for a large-scale 
infrastructure project. This research proposes the application of financial-institution options in 
the case study of toll-road concession. The financial-institution options and their interactions 
are evaluated, interpreted, and designed for policy implementation. The finding of this part 
would facilitate the risk-analysis and risk-mitigation processes that can be conducted by the 
financial institution prior to the development of the infrastructure project. 
 
For large-scale infrastructure development, the project is normally initiated by the 
government. Governments from many countries, specifically in developing countries, 
stimulated private-sector participation in large-scale infrastructure project because of their 
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limited resources and budgets. From there, many public infrastructure projects have been 
privatised worldwide; benefits and risks are substantially distributed between the public and 
private sectors. Large infrastructure projects typically involve various risk factors. Thus, the 
successful implementation of those projects depends on an effective management of the key 
project risks. Government benefits from private-sector participation in a project are that the 
appropriate risks can be transferred to the private sector. On the contrary, the private sector 
and financial institution encounter a number of project risks, such as cost overrun risk, market 
risk, and financial risk. To ensure the project‘s financial viability, the private company and 
lender demand some support from governments. The government may provide support to the 
project in the forms of equity guarantee, debt guarantee, minimum-traffic guarantee, grant, 
and concession extension, which will be studied in the next chapter. Additionally, the lender 
may guard against the risks of the project (e.g., cost overrun and lower than expected revenue) 
by extracting the deferral or abandon options from the government and project company. 
 
The main focus of this chapter is the lender‘s options in the PPP infrastructure project. In 
traditional project finance, the types of loan facilities supported by lenders are revolving 
credit, term loan, standby letter of credit, and a bridge loan and guarantee (Finnerty, 1996). 
The lenders will need some mechanisms to manage risks if the project fails to perform when 
compared to its anticipated performance. Although there are many types of financing options, 
a lender still requires some form of security in case the borrower defaults on the loan. This 
kind of security can be in the form of individual option or a bundle of options. This study 
evaluates the lender options in the project and will illustrate the use and value of real options 
in the transportation project. This study will provide illustrations through the case study, 
focussing on valuing individual options and interactions among the options (option to defer, 
and abandon option). This study will apply the real-option valuation theory in the context of 
project finance in order to enhance the project‘s value. In general, the real options in the 
project are often more complex, which makes them difficult to value using the general close-
form analytical solution. In order to value such complex options, the numerical approach (i.e., 
the binomial lattice and the simulation approach) can be applied. 
 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. It starts by reviewing the risks financial 
institutes face in infrastructure projects. Next, this chapter introduces types of options for 
financial institutions. The chapter also provides a brief overview of the case study used in this 
research. The option-valuation technique is illustrated through a retrospective case study of a 
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transport-development project in Thailand. Lastly, this research provides a conclusion and 
recommends the appropriate options for the financial institution. 
 
4.2. Financial institution’s risks in the PPP infrastructure project 
 
This section examines the project risks primarily from the perspective of the lender. This 
section will illustrate how the lender‘s risks are mitigated. Financial-institution risks in the 
project can be mitigated and reallocated through the implementation of a real option. Before 
moving forward to the analysis of the lender‘s risks in the PPP project, the risk factors of the 
PPP infrastructure project are worth to understand.  
 
A review of the literature showed that much attention has been given to identifying the 
general risks of the PPP infrastructure project (Schaufelberger and Wipadapisut, 2003; EL-
Amm, 2003; and Wibowo and Kochendorfer, 2005). Those studies found that inadequate 
revenue is the most significant risk during the project‘s operational phrase whilst construction 
cost overrun is one of the major risks in the construction phrase. This study will employ real-
option methodology to mitigate these two risks. The project‘s specific risk for the lender will 
be explored in the next section. 
 
4.2.1 Risks of financial institution in PPP infrastructure project 
 
This subsection provides the project‘s specifics for the financial institution. Whilst research 
has attempted to identify risks in the infrastructure project, it is also useful to consider the 
specific risks associated with financial institutions (FIs). There are several types of risks that 
potentially affect the lender in infrastructure projects. These risks are listed in table 4.1.  
   
Risks Definition Risk to FI  
Credit risk The risk related to the sponsor 
or project-company‘s 
creditworthiness 
Lender is exposed to the risks of 
principal and interest losses. 
Completion 
risk  
The risks of cost overrun or 
time delay 
The lender may have to reschedule 
or allow refinancing of his loan. 
Furthermore, the lender may have 
to provide additional funding to the 
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Risks Definition Risk to FI  
project company when the project 
has incurred cost overruns.  
Market risk The risk of traffic demand falls 
below expectations.  
Revenue generation is below 
projection, affecting the ability to 
repay debt declines.  
Financial risk Risks of foreign exchange, 
interest rate, labour cost, and 
price of the project‘s inputs and 
outputs 
The cash flow can be affected in a 
way that forces the lender to 
reschedule or refinance its loan. 
 Economic risk  Risk of economic downturn  Revenue falls more than expected 
because traffic volume reduces. As 
a result, the ability to repay debt for 
the project is declined.  
Political and 
country risk  
The risk from unexpected 
changes in regulations or a 
failure by the government to 
implement tariff adjustments. 
These risks are inherited by a 
lender who provides a cross-
border loan to the project 
company. 
Host country is not in an economic 
position to accept a transferrable 
currency to repay foreign debt. 
Political party interrupts the 
project, causing the project‘s delay 
and cost overrun. 
Table 4.1: FI risks in infrastructure project 
Source: Kreydieh (1996) 
 
The FI‘s problem in the case of project finance is to assure that the revenues generated from 
the project‘s assets will be sufficient to repay the loan. Table 4.1 showed that there are 
numerous key risks for lenders that may affect a project‘s cash flow. The lenders will need 
some mechanisms to manage or mitigate such risks. Tools such as real options provide the 
lender with flexibility to cope with those risks, therefore making lending more attractive to the 
lender. 
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4.3. Evaluation of the transportation-investment project 
 
The standard technique for evaluating projects is the net present value of the expected cash 
flow from the investment project, discounted by an appropriate rate. In financial theory, the 
capital asset pricing model (CAPM) is used to determine a theoretically appropriate discount 
rate of an asset, though the drawback of this approach is widely acknowledged. One 
disadvantage of this approach is that it neglects the stochastic nature of the project‘s cash 
flows. Although CAPM appears as the simplest technique to use, the high volatility of traffic 
demand induces some fundamental uncertainties which are difficult to solve using this 
traditional discount cash-flow method. The traffic demand is quite uncertain in the 
transportation project because the traffic volume may swing 10–20% per year. Under such 
conditions, the valuation model for the transport project proposed by this research considers 
the traffic demand as a stochastic variable in which certain price is assumed to be non-
stochastic. 
 
The binomial lattice discrete-time valuation model can be used to accurately approximate 
solutions from the continuous-time valuation model. The application of the binomial model is 
widely used by researchers and practitioners for transportation project evaluation. Among 
them are Blank et al (2009), Pichayapan et al (2003) and Charoenpornpattana et al (2003). In 
their studies, traffic flow is considered to be a stochastic variable in the model.  This research 
focuses on a transportation system valuation in which traffic flow is a critical parameter. As 
traffic flows evolve stochastically overtime, the value of the project will also vary in the same 
manner. The volatility of the traffic demand also increases the option value of the project.  For 
transportation project evaluation, the traffic flow is assumed to follow the geometric 
Brownian motion (GBM). This assumption is often adopted by many researchers such as Ho 
and Liu (2002), Garvin and Cheah (2004), Brandao and  Saraiva (2008) and Blank et al 
(2009). This research starts with the general model for predicting traffic volume. In general, 
traffic volume is uncertain which means the traffic flow is a stochastic process. GBM 
represents an uncertainty in traffic flow as follow; 
 
 dV/V = µ dt +ζ dz 
 
Where V is the monthly or yearly traffic volume and μ is a traffic volume growth rate which 
is assumed to be constant, ζ is the volatility of traffic equaled to √
∑     ̅  
   
and dz is 
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incremental to a geometric Brownian motion (GBM) which is equal to ϵ√  where ϵ is a 
normally distributed random variable whose mean is 0 and variance is 1. It is observed that 
the traffic flow is dependent on volatility (ζ) and trend (µ). A small volatility and drift rate 
may have a major impact on the range of possible future outcomes. The assumption of a 
GBM means that traffic flow is normally distributed, which implies that future traffic is log-
normally distributed as follow: 
 
     
 
  √  
 
           
                        and denotes a lognormal µ, ζ2 by 
x ∼ lognorm (µ,ζ2)  
 
Since the traffic flows follow a GBM, they may apply a binomial tree to represent a traffic 
path (Blank et. al., 2009). The traffic volume is assumed to follow a GBM which for each 
node, the traffic ‗S‘ in the period ‗i' and state ‗s‘ can be increased to uSsi or decreased to dS
s
i.  
By performing backward calculation, the investment decision can be exercised in each node 
(figure 4.2).    
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
            
 
 
 
 
 
where p is the risk-neutral probability of traffic demand 
 r is a risk-free interest rate 
 σ is traffic volatility = √
∑     ̅  
   
 
Figure 4.2: The binomial tree of the traffic volume in the project 
 
The simple binomial model is presented to simulate the traffic demand for the infrastructure 
project. This model used a binomial model with risk-neutral probabilities, representing a 
discrete time characteristic to approximate the uncertainty associated with the changes in the 
value of a traffic demand (or project‘s cash flow) over time. This model rather explicitly 
p 1-p 
S0d 
𝑢  𝑒𝜎√ 𝑡 
𝑑  𝑒 𝜎√𝛥𝑡 
𝑝  
𝑒𝑟 𝑡  𝑑
𝑢  𝑑
 
 
 
 
p 
1-p 
S0ud 
 
S0 
S0u 
S0u
2 
S0u
3 
S0u
2
d 
S0d
2 
S0ud
2 
S0d
3 
126 
 
recognises the volatility of demand for an infrastructure asset. Figure 4.2 illustrated the 
binomial path set up in the risk-neutral world. 
 
The main assumption of the binomial lattice used in transport project valuation is that the 
traffic flow or the present value of the project fluctuates randomly in a complete, efficient 
market. Under the random walk assumption, the traffic volume jump is characterised by a 
normal or lognormal probability distribution. This means that the logarithm of the change of 
traffic volume [Log (V2/ V1)] follows a normal or bell-shaped curve. The statistical test of the 
proof that the change of traffic volume follows a lognormal distribution is given in appendix 
C. The result of the statistical test shows that annual traffic volume is well described by a 
lognormal distribution.  
 
Volatility is the critical parameter for option pricing in which the option values are sensitive 
to change in volatility. The estimation of the option‘s volatility is ambiguous and has an effect 
on the option‘s value. It is known that greater uncertainty (volatility) increases real option 
value. Volatility of the financial option can be implied by the current market price. However 
for real asset trading, implied volatility is difficult to observe from the current market price. 
An alternative is to estimate it using historical data.  Since volatility is a sensitive parameter, 
this research has completed the sensitivity test for different values of traffic volatilities (see 
section 4.6, 5.3, 5.8 and 6.5).   
 
It is expected to have different outcomes of real option valuation from a discrete-time model 
and a continuous-time model with yearly or monthly time intervals.  It is generally known that 
the binomial model converges to the continuous-time model (Black-Scholes model) when the 
number of time periods increases and the length of each time period is infinitesimally short. 
This proof was given by Cox, Ross and Rubinstein (1979). The binomial model that 
calculates option values for the SES project is checked against values from a Black-Scholes 
model in appendix D.   
 
To apply the binomial model for the SES project, it is important to expand on the 
understanding of risk neutrality, the complete market and a replicating portfolio in the case of 
an infrastructure project. It has been argued that while many practitioners have applied real 
option analysis on an infrastructure investment problem using a standard financial option 
valuation model,(e.g., binomial lattice, Black-Scholes), the strict assumptions are rarely 
satisfied for real infrastructure projects, including the SES project. The assumption of risk 
neutrality is crucial in real option work. What discount rate should be used is the most critical 
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task and the discount rate can also change over time which is a shortfall for the traditional 
discounted cash flow method. The assumption of risk neutrality resolves this shortfall by 
transforming the real world into a risk-neutral world. In a risk-neutral world, all assets are 
evaluated at the risk-free interest rate and the project uncertainty is captured in the evaluation 
process by the volatility measure (Garvin and Ford, 2012).  
 
The main assumption behind risk neutrality is that the underlying asset is traded in a complete 
market. Financial options use a strong relation between the underlying asset and the option to 
replicate the results of a riskless asset portfolio, and the value of option is obtained from the 
observation of the capital market. This standard option valuation uses the known price of an 
underlying asset to estimate the relevant price of the derivative asset. Therefore, it seems that 
the use of a replicating portfolio requires that the markets where assets are traded be 
complete. In a complete market, a replicating portfolio can be found among traded assets and 
the price resulting from when the replicating portfolio and derivative price are the same (no 
arbitrage principle). Indeed, these characteristics of the complete market are relatively rare for 
an infrastructure project including the SES project. Copeland and Antikarov (2001) proposed 
the use of the present value of the project as the best market value for the asset.  With this 
method, it allows to use the project itself as the basic asset in the replicating portfolio with the 
assumption that a project without flexibility is highly correlated with the value of the project 
with options (a form of the marketed asset disclaimer: MAD). Therefore, cash flows/NPVs 
from the SES project can be used as trade proxies in the market. Moreover, cash flows/NPVs 
from the SES project can still be reasonably tracked through the infrequency of real asset 
trading in the market. Therefore, these assumptions of risk neutrality and the complete market 
are reasonable in the case of the SES project.    
 
4.4. Case illustration: the SES in Bangkok, Thailand 
 
The SES is selected as a case study to illustrate the application of real options. Information 
about this case was gathered from corporate prospectus, presentations, news articles, and field 
data collection. 
 
4.4.1 Project background 
 
The SES project was a pioneer amongst toll-road projects in Thailand to be delivered by 
private financing concessions beginning in the 1980s, when the Thai government started to 
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persuade private sectors towards infrastructure development. SES was built to connect the 
outer areas of Bangkok (including Nonthaburi and Pathum Thani provinces and the southern 
area of Bangkok) to the central area of Bangkok. The project awarded a 30-year build-
transfer-operate (BTO) concession from the Expressway Authority of Thailand (EXAT), a 
government agency, to a private company named ‗Bangkok Expressway Public Company 
Limited‘ (BECL). In this project, BECL invested in all construction and operation costs, 
worth approximately 37 billion baht to construct a 6-lane elevated road with a total distance of 
38.5 kilometres. BECL took responsible for the design, construction, operation, and 
management of the toll road. BECL connected their path with the first-stage expressway 
system (FES) to form the network that covered the Bangkok area.  
 
In 1996, Northern Bangkok Expressway Company Limited: NECL, a company in which 
BECL holds a 53% stake, was established to operate the Udon Ratthaya expressway (URE) 
from 1996 to 2026. NECL is an extension of the existing SES which faces high competition 
from local and alternative toll roads. As a result, NECL‘s traffic volume was far below 
original projections, which resulted in operating losses. 
 
4.4.2 Unit root analysis of traffic time series in the SES project 
 
In this research, it is assumed that variations of traffic volume follow a GBM. Therefore, 
assuming that traffic volume evolves according to a GBM process, then it follows the random 
walk. The GBM process, which is sometimes called a lognormal growth process, has gained 
wide acceptance as a valid model for the growth in traffic volume overtime. It also means that 
the change in traffic volume (log ratios of traffic volume) is normally distributed over any 
time interval (Δt) and that the change in traffic volume is independent of previous data (log 
ratios independent of their past values).   
 
In this research, a test is performed for the hypothesis of a GBM for the evaluation of traffic 
volume on the SES project. Series available for SES project have been used, that cover a 12-
year period. In this research, traffic statistics on a monthly and annual basis have been tested 
for the GBM assumptions. The results of the testing of GBM assumptions are shown in 
appendix C.  
 
Using the statistical analysis of the monthly data of the traffic flow, the p-value for the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test of the random walk with drift is more than 0.05; hence, 
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the null hypothesis cannot be rejected that the traffic follows a GBM.  On the other hand, the 
p-value for the Shapiro-Wilk test of normality is less than 0.05; therefore the null hypothesis 
that natural logs of traffic are normal is rejected. In addition, the significant value of the Box 
Ljung statistic is less than 0.05; hence, the null hypothesis that the natural logs of traffic 
values are independent is rejected. This outcome is due to the seasonality of the monthly data. 
With the unit root test, we cannot reject the hypothesis that traffic volume follows a GBM. 
Therefore, we can still conclude that the monthly data is modelled as a GBM process. 
 
For the statistical analysis of the annual data, the problem of the seasonality in traffic volume 
is avoided. According to the results obtained in the t-statistic of the ADF test described in 
appendix C, the GBM hypothesis cannot be rejected. However, it should be emphasised that 
the number of annual data is only 12. Furthermore, we found that the lognormal ratios are 
normally distributed and independent. Hence, we can conclude that the annual data are 
consistent with the GBM process. Therefore, we rely on the annual value for the real option 
evaluation.     
 
4.4.3 The SES traffic-demand model 
 
With the binomial model and the Brownian motion of traffic flow, the expected high and low 
demands of the SES project were assigned. For example, the current demand starts at 138 
million trips per year, so the expected high and low demands were assigned values of 168.6 
(138 x e
0.2
) million trips per year and 113 (138 x e
-0.2
) million trips per year, respectively, as 
shown in figure 4.3. Risk-neutral probabilities, p and 1 − p, were calculated, as referenced in 
the ‗boxed‘ formula in figure 4.2. In this case study, the risk-neutral probabilities were 0.60 
for the high initial traffic volume and 0.40 for the low initial traffic volume. The binomial 
model is then calculated until the end of the project life, at which point the traffic demand is 
capped with the maximum capacity of the expressway. A slight modification in the binomial 
lattice model is required to ensure that infeasible traffic demand is not generated. In the 
binomial model of the SES project, the traffic demand of some of the paths hits the upper 
capacity boundary at year 7 which will have the effect on the underlying value (project cash 
flow) of the option valuation. This would limit the value of the project net cash flow and the 
value of the option; especially a call option which can never be worth more than the 
underlying cash flow. However, the binomial lattice has an advantage since the model could 
take into account the road maximum traffic capacity. This maximum capacity can be used as 
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the cap for annual traffic values in the binomial lattice. Thus, in this binomial lattice model, 
the annual traffic volume is limited to the maximum traffic capacity.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3: The binomial lattice of the SES traffic demand (million trips per year) 
 
The traffic demand is then used to calculate the project‘s net cash flow. The project‘s net cash 
flow is represented by the present value of the earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) over 
the concession period. The next section will present the base case model of the SES project. 
 
4.4.4 The cash-flow model of the SES project 
 
The cash flow analysis for the SES project is evaluated from an ex ante perspective using 
revenue and cost estimating from a project feasibility study submitted by the project 
consultant to the government agency. 
 
The revenue structure is designed to combine all tolls from the first stage expressway (FES) 
and the SES. Then, the combined revenue is shared between the government and BECL 
(project owner). The EXAT is responsible for the collection of all tolls and shares revenue 
(with the exception of certain suburban routes of the SES). The proportion of revenue sharing 
is represented in table 4.2. 
Expressway  Aspects  Distance 
(Km)  
Revenue Share 
Period Government’s 
share of toll 
revenue (%) 
BECL’s share 
of toll revenue 
(%) 
FES Urban 27.1 1. The first 9-years 
period  
(02/09/93 – 01/09/02) 
40 60 
SES* Urban and 
Suburban 
38.5 2. The last 9-year 
Period 
(01/03/11 – 28/02/20) 
60 40 
1-p 
p 
1-p 
138 
 
138 
168.6 
205.9
 
251.5
 
168.6 
113 
92.5
 
113
 
75.7
 
p 
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Expressway  Aspects  Distance 
(Km)  
Revenue Share 
Period Government’s 
share of toll 
revenue (%) 
BECL’s share 
of toll revenue 
(%) 
URE** Suburban 32 3. The 9-year period 
between Periods 1 
and 2 
(02/09/02 – 8/02/11) 
50 50 
* The revenue of SES is shared for only Sections A and B. For Sections C and, D, BECL owns 100% of revenue. 
** NECL owns 100% of URE revenue.  
Table 4.2: The revenue- sharing scheme between the FES and the SES 
 
The revenue of the SES project can be determined by the following equation; 
 
Operating income = Average daily traffic (Vt) x Average toll rate (Xt) x 365 days 
     = {Average daily traffic (inbound areas) x Average toll rate (inbound areas)    
        + Average daily traffic (outbound areas) x Average toll rate (outbound    
        areas)} x 365 
*Remark: The SES project divided into two parts, inbound and outbound.   
 
Toll rates are subject to adjustment every 5 years using the consumer price index (CPI) for the 
Bangkok metropolis issued by the Ministry of Commerce. 
 
The total construction and development costs were estimated at 25.147 billion baht, which 
was assumed to be split evenly over 3-year construction periods. To value the SES project, 
the operating cash flow, which is represented by earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) is 
used. The operating cash flow is subtracted by capital expenditures in a certain year during 
the concession period. The cash flow of the project is computed as follows: 
 
Cash flow (Cft) = Operating income – Operating Expense – Capital expenditure 
   = ∑Vt Xt – Et –Ct          (1) 
Where  
  Vt =  the expected traffic volume at year t  
  Vt =  Average daily traffic (inbound and outbound) x 365 days 
  Xt  =  the average toll rate (inbound and outbound) at year t 
Ct = the capital expenditure at year t 
  Et = the operating expenses at year t 
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The volatility of traffic volume is estimated by using historical data:  
Volatility of traffic volume (ζ traffic)   = √
∑     ̅  
   
     (2) 
   ̅   = the average traffic volume 
 
The average daily traffic demand is assumed to increase 2% annually on average for an 
operational period of 27 years. The demand is expected to reach full capacity during the 
operational period. The schedule of average annual toll rates started at 30 baht and gradually 
rose to 80 baht by the 27th year of operation. The schedule of average annual toll rate is 
shown in table 4.3. The operating expenses include operation and maintenance costs and other 
expenses. The operating cost was estimated to begin at 262 million baht and predicted to 
grow, as shown in table 4.4. The capital expenditure includes land acquisition. To estimate the 
discount rate, the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) is used: 
 
WACC  =  Re* we + Rd wd (1-t)       (3) 
 
where Re is the required return on equity, Rd is the cost of debt and we and wd are a proportion 
of the equity and debt financings. Re is estimated by the capital asset pricing model (CAPM): 
 
Re  = Rf + βe (Rm - Rf)       (4) 
 
where Rf is a risk-free interest rate that is normally determined from treasury yield (6% for 
10-year treasury yield) and Rm-Rf is the equity-risk premium , which is historically 5–12% in 
Thailand. In this case, it is reasonable to select the conservative value of 12%. The last 
parameter is βe which compares the sensitivity of the expected excess asset returns to the 
expected excess market returns. In the SES project, this research assumed that project return 
is moderately relative to the economic condition of Thailand. For this reason, it estimated that 
βe = 0.6 for the project company (BECL). By substituting the estimated value of key 
parameters, the discount rate for the SES project is estimated at 12.23%, which is reasonable 
for an infrastructure project in Thailand. The summary of parameter estimations and the 
project information are given in table 4.3. 
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Concession period Total concession period: 30 years 
Construction period: 3 years 
Operation period: 27 years 
Project cost Construction cost: 25.147 billion baht, estimated to be 
equally distributed over 3 years.  
Land acquisition cost: 10 billion baht (land cost was 
supported by government). This research includes land cost 
as a part of total project cost. 
Traffic volume Initial traffic volume starts from 121 million trips per year 
for inbound areas and 17 million trips per year for outbound 
areas.  
 
Year               Inbound areas              Outbound areas           
               (million trips per year)  (million trips per year)           
 
  4                          121                             17 
  5                          130                             19 
  6                          164                             23 
  7                          186                             24  
  8                          208                             25 
  9                          197                             23 
  10                        204                             23 
  11                        210                             24  
  12                        214                             24 
   . 
   . 
   . 
  30                        214                             24 
 
Volatility of traffic volume: 20% (based on historical data) 
Toll rate Toll rate starts from 30 baht per trip and increases 10 baht 
every 5 years for inbound areas and 10 baht for outbound 
areas (increases 5baht for every 5 years). 
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                      Inbound areas        Outbound areas           
                       (baht per trip)          (baht per trip) 
 
Years 4-8    :         30                           10 
Years 9-13  :         40                           15 
Years 14-18:         50                           20     
Years 19-23:         60                           25 
Years 24-28:         70                           30 
Years 29-30:         80                           35 
Yearly operating expense Shown in table 4.4 
Tax rate 30% 
Discount rate Using the weighted average cost of capital where 
WACC  = Re* (E/V) + Rd (D/V) (1-t) 
       Rd   = 12% (from historical data) 
       Re   = 13.4% (calculating from Equation 4) 
       t     = 30% (corporate tax)  
Risk-free interest rate Assume using treasury yield for 10-year period = 6% (based 
on historical data) 
Table 4.3: The parameter estimation of the SES project 
 
4.4.5 The base case of cash-flow analysis for the SES project 
 
The base case analysis follows the original expectation in which all parameters are set as 
described previously in table 4.3. The SES valuation model is presented in table 4.4. Under 
assumptions in the base case, the project‘s NPV is at negative -7,749 million baht. Without 
managerial flexibility, the passive NPV would reject the SES project based on negative NPV. 
 
Time Average 
daily 
traffic 
(Inbound 
areas) 
(Trip/day) 
Toll rate 
per 
vehicle 
(Inbound 
areas) 
(Baht) 
Average 
daily traffic 
(Outbound 
areas) 
(Trip/day) 
Toll rate 
per vehicle 
(Outbound 
areas) 
(Baht 
Operating 
Income 
(Million 
baht) 
Operating 
expense 
(Million 
baht) 
Construction 
Cost 
(Million baht) 
Net Cash 
flow 
(Million 
baht)* 
0       -10,000 -10,000 
1       -8,382 -8,382 
2       -8,382 -8,382 
3       -8,382 -8,382 
4 331,507 30 46,575 10 2,348 262  2,086 
5 356,164 30 52,055 10 2,530 254  2,276 
6 449,315 30 63,014 10 3,182 319  2,863 
7 509,589 30 65,753 10 3,588 347  3,241 
8 569,863 30 68,493 10 3,994 322  3,672 
9 539,726 40 63,014 15 5,073 338  4,735 
135 
 
Time Average 
daily 
traffic 
(Inbound 
areas) 
(Trip/day) 
Toll rate 
per 
vehicle 
(Inbound 
areas) 
(Baht) 
Average 
daily traffic 
(Outbound 
areas) 
(Trip/day) 
Toll rate 
per vehicle 
(Outbound 
areas) 
(Baht 
Operating 
Income 
(Million 
baht) 
Operating 
expense 
(Million 
baht) 
Construction 
Cost 
(Million baht) 
Net Cash 
flow 
(Million 
baht)* 
10 558,904 40 63,014 15 5,241 344  4,897 
11 575,342 40 65,753 15 5,400 416  4,984 
12 589,041 40 65,753 15 5,520 377  5,143 
13 586,301 40 68,493 15 4,655 948  3,707 
14 583,562 50 60,274 20 5,765 415  5,350 
15 586,301 50 63,014 20 5,810 777  5,033 
16 586,301 50 63,014 20 5,810 457  5,353 
17 586,301 50 65,753 20 5,830 480  5,350 
18 586,301 50 65,753 20 5,830 647  5,183 
19 586,301 60 60,274 25 6,970 611  6,359 
20 586,301 60 63,014 25 6,995 625  6,370 
21 586,301 60 63,014 25 6,995 581  6,414 
22 586,301 60 65,753 25 5,736 610  5,126 
23 586,301 60 65,753 25 5,736 1687  4,049 
24 586,301 70 63,014 30 6,682 673  6,009 
25 586,301 70 63,014 30 6,682 1197  5,485 
26 586,301 70 65,753 30 6,712 741  5,971 
27 586,301 70 65,753 30 6,712 900  5,812 
28 586,301 70 65,753 30 6,712 817  5,895 
29 586,301 80 65,753 35 7,688 858  6,830 
30 586,301 80 65,753 35 7,688 3,498  4,190 
* Net cash flow of the SES portion 
Table 4.4: The SES valuation model  
Source: EXAT  
 
Next, the sensitivity analysis of the key parameters was done with the following: a) the 
average daily traffic volume, ranging from -20% to 20% of original forecasting, b) discount-
rate ranges from 8% to 20%, c) construction cost, ranging from -20% to 20% of the original 
cost, d) beta ranging from -20% to 20% of original forecasting and e) risk-free interest rate 
ranging from -20% to 20% of original forecasting. The results of the sensitive analysis of key 
parameters were presented in figure 4.4. The result showed that the project‘s NPV is sensitive 
to the discount rate, the average daily traffic volume, construction cost, beta and risk-free 
interest rate respectively, ranking the observed values from high to low impacts (Figure 4.4). 
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Figure 4.4: The sensitivity of key parameters for the SES project 
 
4.5 The FI’s options in the SES project 
 
This section presents the real options for the FI in the large-scale infrastructure project. Large 
infrastructure has been typically financed on the basis of the cash flows of the project. In 
project finance structure, lenders normally have limited recourse to the project sponsor‘s 
assets other than the project itself. Lenders have recourse based on the cash flow generated 
from the project and the assets of the project. In project finance, lenders have to look to a 
specific asset or pool of assets for their debt services. In case of project default, the lenders‘ 
opportunities for principal recovery are much more limited (Finnerty, 1996). The 
consequences of project default would fall heavily on the lender. The lender is subjected to 
project-specific risk which is non-diversified (Sorge, 2004).  
 
Evaluating the financial viability of a large infrastructure project is complex and challenging 
for an FI. This is mainly because of the uncertainties involved: the project‘s size, a long 
period of time, and the project complexity. The project company may make the project viable 
for an FI by offering a support mechanism to create a condition so that the FI can participate 
in financing the project. The FI options are necessary tools for project development, otherwise 
the project company may not be able to achieve a financial close due to an unfavourable result 
of the financial projections. For example, a lender may refuse to provide loan because the 
traditional project-valuation method will result in an underestimated project NPV. The use of 
options-based project-valuation methods is required to improve the feasibility of the 
infrastructure project.  
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Whilst most literature has focussed on an analysis of options the government support in 
infrastructure projects, little effort has been given to analyse the needs of the FI option. The FI 
options in the project finance can be valued using real-option methodology. Types of 
flexibilities embedded in a transportation project by an FI may include the following. 
 
4.5.1 Option to defer long-term project financing 
 
In traditional project funding, lenders normally take the risks of construction delay and cost 
overrun, in which the lender may have to reschedule or refinance his existing loan. Lenders 
may mitigate the risks associated with construction and start-up by delaying their funding 
decisions until the commencement of operations (Loke, 1998). Deferment could allow the 
lender to gather better information and observe project development. If the project is delayed 
with a total cost overrun, the lender may choose to forego any long-term financing.  
 
The deferral option is the option between the financial institution and the private company.  
With the deferral option, the lending contract is developed into two parts; i) the bridging loan 
contract (three-year terms for the SES project) with deferral option and ii) the long-term 
financing contract. If the existing lender decides not to exercise the deferral option and to 
continue to support the project, the bridging loan is replaced by the long-term financing. If the 
deferral option is exercised a new lender can come in to fund the continuing operation of 
project (long-term financing part) and the existing collaterals are transferred to the new 
lender.   
 
The deferral option is formulated under a funding option held by the lender. The deferral 
option defines the value of keeping the project funded whilst lenders defer the decision to 
finance the project. The deferral option is viewed as a European call option, with the 
expiration date at the date of commencement of project‘s operations. Figure 4.5 shows the 
concession schedule of the SES project that began with the construction phase at time t = 0 
and ended the construction phase at t = 3 when the operational period starts. During the 
construction stage, the lender may provide a 3-year medium-term bridging loan. This option 
enables lenders to defer funding for up to 3 years, and the lender gains benefits until more 
information is known before funding.  
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Construction phrase           Operation  phrase         Concession End      
 
  
t=0                 t=3                                                        t=30 
 
Figure 4.5: Concession period of the SES project 
 
The lender may decide to walk away from providing funds at any time during the construction 
phase, but this research assumes the final decision can only be made at the date of 
commencement of the project‘s operations (t = 3). The construction phase was assumed to be 
the specific period stipulated in a contract by which the contractor must complete 
construction. Based on key assumptions, the option was formulated under a deferral option 
held by the lender at t = 0 and set to expire at t = 3. Let C denote the project‘s construction 
costs. Suppose C were a random variable, and suppose C were modelled by the binomial 
lattice.  
 
In the deferral option, three stages of future construction costs are identified, which were the 
expected construction cost, the higher than expected cost, and the lower than expected cost. 
Flyvbjerg et al (2003) found that the construction cost of the transportation project was on 
average 28% higher than the estimated project cost, and cost overruns of 40 to 120 percent 
above the estimated cost were common. For simple illustration, the construction costs during 
3-year construction period were assumed a value of 1.0 (the expected cost), 1.30 (high cost), 
and 0.9 (low cost) times of the projected construction cost. Figure 4.6 shows the binomial 
model of the construction cost in the risk-neutral world.  
 
The option to defer is then viewed as a European call option on the net present value of the 
project‘s construction cost, with the exercise price equal to the expected project revenue. If 
construction cost is higher than the project‘s revenue, meaning negative net cash flows, the 
call option is then exercised.  
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Figure 4.6: The binomial lattice model of construction cost 
 
The expected construction cost = 
             
      
  where p equals a risk-neutral probability, rf 
equals the risk-free interest rate, and t equals a time interval. The real-option value can be 
computed using a backwards risk-neutral valuation process. In a risk-neutral world, the value 
of a real option can be obtained from its expected future value, calculating from the risk-
neutral probability, p, and then discounting at the risk-free interest rate (6%). The risk-neutral 
probability, p, can be computed as follows: 
 
   
                                     
   
 
For the SES project:     
                
        
      
 
Figure 4.7 presents the binomial path of the construction cost of the SES project 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.7: The binomial path of the construction cost of the SES project 
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The deferral option is a call option with the strike price of the Expected ∑       of the project 
income at year 3 (31,532 million baht, calculated from the binomial model of the project‘s 
cash flows from the 3rd year to the 30th year). The call option will be exercised when the 
construction cost is greater than ∑       of project income. The value of the call option for 
each node in the path is presented in figure 4.7 in parentheses. Therefore, the deferral option 
is valued at 589 million baht by backwards calculation.  
 
It is known from the literature review that construction delay is a major risk in infrastructure 
project and it can affect the present value of the future cash flow. Because construction delay 
has significant effect on completion cost, this thesis performs sensitivity analysis of the 
deferral-option values for different periods of construction i.e., 3 years, 4 years, 5 years, 6 
years and 7 years. The results of the analysis are shown in the table 4.5. The results of the 
sensitivity analysis show that the value of the deferral option increases as the construction 
period increases.  
 
Construction period Value of deferral option 
(Million baht) 
3-year construction period - no delay                                   589  
4-year construction period - delay for 1 year                                1,147  
5-year construction period - delay for 2 years                                2,624  
6-year construction period - delay for 3 years                                3,990  
7-year construction period - delay for 4 years                                5,368  
Table 4.5: Sensitivity analysis of the option values for different periods of construction 
 
4.5.2 The abandon option 
 
An FI that provides a loan to the project sponsor may cancel funding if the project‘s cash flow 
or a traffic volume falls below a certain debt level (Buchen et. al., 2009) at any time during 
the operational stage. The abandon option can be represented by a put option in figure 4.8-c. 
 
The value of the abandon option is then equal to the following:   
Vt  =  Max (Xt-St, 0), where 
Xt  =  the exercise price of a put option (Threshold level: the outstanding debt)  
at time t  
St  =  the project‘s value (the NPV of EBIT) at time t 
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             (c)                                                 (a)                                              (b) 
 
Figure 4.8: The payoff for the abandon option 
 
 
Without the option case, if the cash flow lies above a certain (CH) level, the lender still 
receives loan repayment, whereas the project‘s ability to repay its debt will decrease if the 
cash flow decreases below the CH level. The loan payoff to the lender in a without-option case 
is shown in Figure 4.8-b. The mechanism used to mitigate the cash-flow risk of the project is 
based on the threshold (lower floor) level of the cash flow. The lender will exercise the option 
if the cash flow of the project lies below a certain specified level (CL). The threshold level 
represents the maximum acceptable risk level for the lender. This level may be the minimum 
cash flow that can repay i) both principal and interest to a lender (without threshold) or ii) the 
principal and minimum interest at a bank financial cost (with threshold case). The lender 
grants the project company the option to issue the notice in satisfaction of their obligation to 
pay the lower interest fee to the lender. The lender could decide whether to continue 
providing lending. The abandon option provides lenders the flexibility to withdraw from the 
project under a worse scenario. Figure 4.8-a represents the diagram of the loan‘s pay off with 
the abandon option.  
 
Traditionally if a lender does not receive the monthly payment the lenders have to exercise 
their right to dispose of the assets and repay the debt. The financial institution may suffer a 
large loss by selling asset at distressed prices. In order to alleviate such project risks the 
government may offer the financial institution the possibility of abandoning the project 
funding. In this structure, the financial institution has an additional flexibility given by option 
of abandonment at each repayment date. The financial institution may liquidate the project 
when the ―the exercise price (total outstanding debt) is greater than the present value of cash 
flow before debt in case FI remain funding the project. Whenever the net cash flow is 
CL 
CH 
Pay off (loan) 
Cash flow 
Abandon option 
Cash flow 
Pay off (loan) 
 
Pay off (loan) 
Cash flow 
Pay off without option Pay off with option 
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negative, the FI could decide whether or not to fund the project. This means that the 
embedded option increases project value. If the financial institution exercises the 
abandonment option and withdraws from lending, government or the state-owned banks has a 
legal liability to pay the debt.  With this financing option structure, lenders do not need to 
foreclose, force the project into bankruptcy and take over the project. 
 
To understand the abandon option, it is useful to demonstrate the theory using numerical data. 
The abandon option without threshold is used for demonstration. The abandon option without 
threshold is the American put option, which is exercised when the project NPV is less than 
the outstanding debt ending balance. 
 
The equation of the abandon option without threshold is shown in the following: 
AO (t-i) = Max (TD(t-i) – NPV(t-i), {p(AO(t-i+1)u+(1-p)AO(t-i+1)d}e
-rt
},0) 
 
where AO(t-i)   = the abandon option without threshold at intermediate state t-i 
AO(t-i+1)u  = the abandon option value at state t-i+1 with up state u    
AO(t-i+1)d  = the abandon option value at state t-i+1 with down state d  
TD(t-i)  = the ending outstanding debt at stage t-1 
NPV(t-i) = the NPV before debt at stage t-1 
p    = the risk-neutral probability (%)  
r  = the risk-free interest rate 
The example of a 2-period binomial model is presented in figure 4.9. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.9: The abandon-option calculation of the 2 operation years 
 
Table 4.6 presents the numerical data of 2 periods for the abandon option without threshold. 
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Year 4* 5 6 
TD(t-i) 19,995 18,943 17,890 
NPV(t-i) 19,416 26,172
1 32,3743
 
  1,59832
 
22,9874
 
   12,2615
 
AO(t-i) 1,156 91 10 
  2,960 228 
   5630 
* the SES project started operation in year 4 
1= NPV5u , 2= NPV5d , 3= NPV6uu, 4= NPV6ud ,  NPV6du, 5= NPV6dd 
Table 4.6: The numerical data for the abandon option without threshold (Million baht) 
 
4.5.3 The option to expand  
 
An FI may have an option to expand the scale of the project by providing an additional loan 
amount. The lender provides an additional loan when the project‘s performance is beyond the 
expectation. For an option to expand when traffic level grows beyond the maximum capacity, 
the lender may consider providing additional or top-up loans to expand the project‘s capacity. 
However, for the elevated toll-road project (i.e., the SES project), which was not designed for 
the capacity expansion, this research omitted the option to expand in its analysis. 
 
4.5.4 Investment option  
 
The task of constructing a project requires nontrivial investments. Thus, it is often beyond the 
resources of a single company to invest in the large-scale project. Cooperation, especially 
cooperation which brings the requisite capital and skills, may be sought to share the costs of 
meeting the anticipation of the future project‘s opportunity. The investment option can be 
constituted for use by the FI to share the project‘s risk. The assignment of the right for lenders 
to buy equity in a project is a common feature of many agreements. Pure risk sharing arises in 
the agreement if lenders have to commit capital inflows that are dependent upon the 
uncertainty of a future demand. This obligation should not be judged to be favourable to the 
FI. The lender faces a difficult decision to invest in such projects. Under such circumstances, 
the lender may prefer that the terms of the agreement provide a call option, not an obligation, 
for the lender to invest in the ownership of the project. 
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The opportunity to invest in equity sharing in the infrastructure project has worthwhile value, 
since lenders would invest only if the traffic volume rises significantly, making the project 
interesting, whereas they are not obligated to invest under unfavourable conditions. With 
investment options, the results indicate that unexpected growth in traffic demand increases 
the likelihood of lender acquisition. 
 
An FI may hold the option to invest in the equity share of the project after the commencement 
of commercial operation. The investment decision is based on the opportunity-cost concept, 
which is defined as a comparison between the expected future option value and the expected 
future profit earned by estimating investment timing of real options‘ early action. The option 
to wait to invest is analogous to a call option on the project value with the exercise price equal 
to an investment outlay. The main criterion for the lender‘s decision to invest in project is 
only if: 
 
a. The project is completed on schedule and well under budget. The estimation of time for the 
completion of construction is essential in situations in which completion delay could result in 
higher financing costs and future revenue losses (Sing, 2002). When the information 
regarding total construction investments is revealed, the option to acquire a stake in a project 
is likely to be exercised. The project is still financially feasible when the project is ready to 
operate. The decision is also based on accurate traffic-volume predictions. In this option, the 
investment opportunity is assumed to expire at time T when T is the length of time from 
beginning construction to completion. The investment decision is made if the present value of 
the expected cash inflow exceeds the investment cost or the total construction cost. The value 
of construction cost follows a discrete time (binomial lattice) model in which the construction 
cost moves to one of the two possible directions: ‗up‘ or ‗down‘. The probability of ‗up‘ and 
‗down‘ direction is defined as ‗p‘ and ‗1-p‘, respectively, as previously mentioned in the 
deferral option. We may assume a specific time at which the lenders can make an equity 
investment in the project. The time to exercise the option is decided when the value of 
exercising is higher than the value of waiting for the option until its expiration date.    
 
b. A fundamental problem facing the decision maker‘s decision to invest and expand into new 
transportation projects is characterised by uncertain traffic demand. Lenders may exercise 
options to invest in the project if the project cash flow or the traffic volume is above a certain 
level. The value to wait, before proven market demand, has to be traded off with the benefit of 
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investing today. The exercise of an investment option is accompanied by an acquisition of 
equity share. This option gives the lender the opportunity to take ownership of the project. It 
is assumed that timing the acquisition should be triggered by a market signal indicating an 
increase in the project‘s cash-flow valuation. The lender may delay investing until the net 
benefit from the real investment project is higher than the option value for delaying an 
investment decision (Net benefit – Option value > 0). With the investment option, the lender 
may delay the decision to invest in the project within the maximum allowable period of n 
years after the commencement of commercial operation. The investment option can be done 
at one specific due date. This research defines the designated date as the 5th anniversary after 
the commencement of the commercial operation, which seems suitable for the SES project. 
When the traffic demand is proven, the option to invest is likely to be exercised.  
 
Investment option provides FI opportunity for a stock share purchased from the original 
project‘s shareholder at a later stage. This new equity investment does not increase cash flow 
or expand the project. The capital structure and the project‘s cost of fund still remain the 
same. However, FI can enhance its overall yield with a higher return on equity.      
 
The investment option will be exercised if the project‘s value for the investor (lender), S is 
greater than the exercise price, X: the liability of the project (outstanding debt). The 
investment option is calculated with the following equation: 
 
IVt = MAX (St-Xt, 0), IV = the value of the investment option at time t 
 
St-Xt is the value shareholder equity during the life of the option. The lender could decide 
whether to invest if the cash flow is negative. The lender‘s investment decision is viewed as a 
call option. The value of a call option can be used by working backwards through the 
binomial tree. The binomial tree can be built to represent the traffic movement, as shown in 
figure 4.2. For the SES project, the investment decision is assumed at the end of the 5th year 
after the commencement of the commercial operation, of which the value of the option is the 
following: 
 
IV5 = Max (NPV5+ [p NPV6u+ (1-p) NPV6d ]e
-rf(1)
- TD(5),0), where: 
TD(t) = the outstanding debt ending at stage t 
NPV(t) = the NPV at stage t 
IV(t) = the value of investment option at stage t  
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p   = the risk-neutral probability (%)  
rf = the risk-free interest rate 
            
4.5.5 Result and discussion 
 
Using the binomial lattice model with the risk-neutral probability, the NPV and the real-
option value for the SES project could be determined. Real-option value is calculated with the 
binomial model with 27 time steps (total concession year minus construction period). The 
values of the deferral, abandon, and investment options are determined with the backwards 
calculation of the binomial path. The option value is the difference between the NPV with 
option and the base NPV (without option). The results of the numerical calculation for the 
SES project are shown in table 4.7. 
 
Type of options Base NPV 
(Million baht) 
NPV with option 
(Million baht) 
Value of option 
(Million baht) 
Traditional cash flow 
calculation 
-7,749   
F1) Deferral option -7,749 -7,160 589 
F2) Abandon option 
without threshold * 
-7,749 -7,040 709 
F3) Abandon option with 
threshold ** 
-7,749 -7,506 243 
F4) Investment option 
(limit investment within 5 
years after the 
commencement of 
commercial operation ) 
-7,749 -7,576 172 
* The normal debt service level that is equal to principal plus bank normal interest rate 
** The threshold amount is set at minimum debt service level that is required by lender 
(principal and minimum interest at bank financial cost) 
Table 4.7: The value of real options (FI) calculated from the binomial lattice model 
 
The result of traditional project evaluation methods, such as NPV analysis, has an 
unfavourable outcome with a large negative NPV (-7,749 million baht). The traditional NPV 
represents a shortfall in the project‘s cash flow, reflecting the uncertain characteristics of the 
transportation project and the risks involved in the investment project. Furthermore, academic 
147 
 
researchers such as Trigeorgis (1996) and Ye and Tiong (2000) pointed out the inadequacy of 
the traditional NPV method, and they suggested that the project NPV can be improved by 
employing the real-option methodology.  
 
The value of passive NPV, based on the net cash-flow analysis, is -7,749 million baht; thus, 
the lender may neglect to support the project either in the form of project funding or investing 
in the project‘s shares. Based on the NPV with real-option calculation for the FI, the SES 
project still has a negative NPV, though it shows a sign of improvement.  
 
In addition, it could be seen that the ‗abandon option without threshold‘ has the highest option 
value (709 million baht), followed by the ‗deferral option‘, ‗the abandon option with 
threshold‘, and ‗investment option‘, respectively. However, if the project with FI option is 
still unfeasible, then the FI may ask for some support mechanisms from other stakeholders 
(e.g., government). 
 
4.5.6 Interactions amongst multiple options 
 
Most real-option literature to date has tended to value individual options. Options embedded 
in large-scale infrastructure projects typically take the form of a set of real options. For large 
and more complex projects, there exists a set of multiple options, and interaction amongst 
them is typical. The combined value of real options can have a large impact on the value of a 
project. Simon Rose (1998) was one of the pioneers to evaluate the interaction among real 
options. He demonstrated how the two options were interacting in the Trans-Urban City Link 
project in Melbourne, Australia by applying the Monte Carlo simulation. His paper illustrates 
the importance of properly valuing the interaction between the government‘s options to defer 
and abandon options. Two and multiple interacting options were identified in the hypothetical 
project.  
 
Next, this research gives an illustration of how the combination of real options and their 
interactions are evaluated. In general, the exercise of prior options may alter not only the 
underlying asset itself but also the value of the subsequent option, causing the option 
interaction. For example, an option to invest would increase project scale and may decrease 
the opportunity for the option to abandon. The level of interaction effect is dependent on the 
type of real options (call or put), its exercise time (European or American options), whether 
being in or out of the money, and its order or sequence (Trigeorgis, 1993a).  
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To illustrate the nature of option interaction, this research provides the example of interacting 
real options between the abandon and investment options. The FI may abandon (i.e., the first 
option) the project funding if the project cash flow is negative. This option is a put option. 
The value of the abandon option can be enhanced by adding the investment option, the second 
option. The second option, giving the right to the FI to assume the ownership of the project, 
can be priced by finding the equity value (the asset value represented by net operating cash 
flows minus the liability represented by total debt outstanding). The second option is the 
European call option, which can be exercised at the specific date in the contract. The exercise 
of the investment option will enhance the FI return. The value of combined options is the FI‘s 
call option to invest in the project plus the value of FI‘s put option to abandon the project. 
Thus, one can imply that after the FI chooses to exercise the investment option, the FI‘s return 
is the combination of return on equity and return on debt. The investment option increases the 
project‘s value and then decreases the opportunity to exercise the abandon option. In order to 
explicitly measure the interaction effect, both options are valued simultaneously. 
 
The value of simultaneous multiple options may differ from their values in isolation. For 
example, the combined value of two options may differ from evaluating each option 
separately and adding the results (Trigeorgis, 1993a). The option can be valued with and 
without interaction, and the value of the interaction effect can be calculated by the value of 
combined options (with the interaction effect) minus the value of the first option minus the 
value of the second option. The combined value of two options in the presence of each other 
may differ from the sum of the separate value of each option due to i) whether options are of 
the same type or different types; ii) the separation of their exercise times; iii) whether options 
are in or out of money; and iv) their orders or sequences. The interaction effect (IE) for two 
combined options is calculated with the following formula: 
 
IE = the value of combined options – the value of the first option – the value of the 
second option 
 
The value of the interaction effect is shown in the following table: 
Option value 
(million baht) 
Project NPV 
with options 
Interaction No interaction 
(value isolation) 
Interaction 
effect 
F1, F2 -3,209 4,540 1,298 3,242 
F1, F3 -5,119 2,630 832 1,798 
F1, F4 -3,173 4,576 761 3,815 
F2, F4 -7,216 533 881 -348 
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Option value 
(million baht) 
Project NPV 
with options 
Interaction No interaction 
(value isolation) 
Interaction 
effect 
F3, F4 -7,327 422 415 7 
F1,F2,F4 -1,912 5,837 1,470 4,367 
F1,F3,F4 -2,003 5,746 1,470 4,276 
F1= the deferral option 
F2= the abandon option without threshold  
F3= the abandon option with threshold 
F4= the investment option 
Table 4.8: The value of the interaction effect for the SES project  
 
The interaction effect can be large and have a positive or negative value. Table 4.7 and table 
4.8 showed the value of the individual option and the value of the combined options. For 
example, the value of the SES project slightly increases from -7,749 million baht to -7,160 
million baht with the value of the option to defer (F1), to -3,209 million baht with the option 
to defer and option to abandon without threshold (F1, F2), to -1,912 million baht with the 
option to defer, option to abandon without threshold, and investment option (F1, F2, F4). The 
change in option value of a combined option of F1, F2, and F4 by adding each option is 589 
million baht when adding the deferral option (F1), 3,951 million baht when adding option F2 
to F1, and 1,297 million baht when adding F4 to a combined option of F1 and F2. The 
illustration shows that by adding more options to the existing option, with more options 
combined, the incremental value of adding options tend to be lower. Furthermore, some 
options, when combined, showed a negative interaction, such as the combination of the 
abandon option without threshold (F2) and the investment option (F4).  
 
The practical illustrations can be described in the following. For the combination of options 
F1, F2, and F4, the FI engages in the project by providing financial support to the project. 
However, the FI has the option to defer (option F1) providing long-term financing in order to 
avoid the completion risk. The FI can delay up to the time the construction completed. The FI 
will re-evaluate the impact of the construction time and cost on the feasibility of the project. If 
the project is still feasible, the FI may consider long-term financing. After a certain year of 
operation, if the traffic flow is more than expected, then the FI may select to invest in the 
project and gains the combination return-on-investment and the return-on-debt financing. 
However, if the project value is lower than estimated, FI can permanently abandon the 
project, and the private company has to pay back the loan. By adding the value of the 
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combined investment and abandon options to the first option, the interaction effect increased 
the value of first option (i.e., the deferral option). For example, even though the project 
experienced cost overrun compared to the original estimated, FIs may consider providing a 
loan by introducing the abandon option, because they still have the option to exit the project 
later. The timeline and formula for the combination of deferral, abandonment, and investment 
options are presented as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                     
  
t=0                 t=3        t=5                                        t=30 
 
Figure 4.10: Timeline for the combination of the deferral, abandon, and investment 
options 
 
The value of the option interaction and the interaction effect can be calculated by the 
following equation: 
 
OC = the Expanded NPV – the Passive NPV 
IE = OC – DO-AO-IV 
where, 
Expand NPV = the NPV with option 
Passive NPV = the NPV without option 
OC  = the combination of deferral, abandon and investment options 
DO  = the deferral option  
AO  = the abandon option 
IV  = the investment option  
IE  = the interaction effect among deferral, abandon and investment options 
 
For the combination of deferral, abandon and investment options, if the Expand NPV and the 
Passive NPV are equal to -1,912 million baht and -7,749 million baht, respectively, then the 
option value is 5,837 million baht (-1912-[-7,749]). The interaction effect is 4,346 million 
baht (5,837-589-709-172).  
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Investment 
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Among all FI options, the combination of deferral, abandon, and investment options is the 
most valuable, with the highest project NPV. The combined option tends to be more additive 
when a) the options involved are different types: two calls and one put, combined with no 
overlap between their exercise regions (see figure 4.10) and b) three options interact with each 
other, indicating high interaction effect at 4,367 million baht. However, if the project is not 
feasible under FI options, then additional support from other main stakeholders, such as the 
government and the private company, is required. 
 
4.6 Volatility and seasonality analysis: Financial institution option 
 
In this subsection, the analysis of the option value is conducted based on systematic seasonal 
variations of the traffic flow. For this study, a typical monthly period of traffic flow was 
selected from January 2004 to April 2015. To account for seasonal effects of traffic flow, an 
analysis explores the volatility for annual traffic data from 2004 to 2015. Based on year-to-
year growth rates (see table A5 in appendix A) as well as seasonal adjustments for traffic 
volume (see table A6 in appendix A), traffic volatility is valued at approximately 4% and the 
risk-free rate in the model is valued at 3%. The deferral option, the abandon option and their 
combinations are selected for sensitivity analysis.   
 
The most important parameter for the option value is the volatility of traffic volume. It is 
generally known that option values increase (decrease) with an increase (decrease) in 
volatility. However, the result shows that the deferral option is less sensitive to changes in 
traffic volatility. Table 4.9 shows the relationship of various options, calculated using 
binomial lattice, to changes in volatility. The approach accounted for the seasonality effect of 
traffic flow.  
Option type for the SES project Option value (million 
baht) at 20% of 
volatility and 3% of 
risk-free interest rate  
Option value (million 
baht) at 4% of volatility 
and 3% of risk-free 
interest rate, account 
for seasonality  
The deferral option 56.5 56.5 
The abandon option (without 
threshold) 
962 0 
The combination of deferral option 
and abandon option 
3,625 54.8 
Table 4.9: The value of FI option at different volatility levels     
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4.7 Sensitivity to other parameters: Financial institution option  
 
The second most important parameter in estimating option value using the binomial lattice is 
the risk-free interest rate. Therefore, the effect of the risk-free rate on the value of real options 
is explored in this subsection. The deferral option, the abandon option and their combinations 
are selected for sensitivity analysis. In general, the interest rate of the project is often 
increased to compensate for risk. In the binomial lattice, the project‘s cash flows will move up 
or down by an amount calculated using volatility and time to expiration, while the interest rate 
used in real options is a risk-free interest rate.  
 
The option value increases with decreases in the risk-free interest rate for the put option (the 
abandon option) while it decreases with decreases in the risk-free interest rate for call option 
(the deferral option). The relationship is shown in Table 4.10.  
 
Option type for the SES project Option value (million 
baht) at 6% of risk free 
rate (20% of volatility) 
Option value (million 
baht) at 3% of risk-
free interest rate        
(20% of volatility) 
The deferral option 589 56 
The abandon option (without 
threshold) 
709 962 
The combination of deferral option 
and abandon option 
4,540 3,625 
Table 4.10: The value of FI option at different risk-free interest rates     
 
4.8 Summary 
 
This research has introduced a practical way of using real options to evaluate managerial 
flexibility for FIs involved in the investment project. The project contains both internal and 
external risks, which can affect the traffic demand and the profitability of the project. Some 
risks (e.g. demand risks, cost overrun) are partially mitigated by formulating the real option. 
This chapter provided an example of the valuation of a real option in the context of a large-
scale infrastructure project. This research used the binomial lattice model to evaluate a large-
scale transportation project.  
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This research has demonstrated how the large-scale transportation project is evaluated along 
with the value of the deferral, abandon, and investment options from the FI perspective. This 
research has presented a numerical method to solve the real-option problem. The real-option 
model has several advantages over the traditional net cash-flow evaluation. The model 
evaluates the managerial flexibilities of being able to optimise the FI supports in investment 
projects. The model is simple to use and does not require the estimation of risk premiums 
because it uses the risk-free interest rate. Finally, the model is useful for designing and 
formulating a set of more complex options in which the optimal structure can be determined. 
The FI can design and construct options in order to achieve the desired value.  
 
The real-option mechanism for lenders in a large-scale infrastructure can be demonstrated. 
Options such as the investment option are flexible, providing firms and FIs with the discretion 
to expand into favourable environments while avoiding some of the losses from the downside 
risk. Real-option methodology presented a way to formulate the trial and learning aspect to 
lenders. This instrument, when applied by the FI, can add to the project‘s value, reallocate 
risks, reduce risks, and increase the project‘s attractiveness.  
 
The results indicated that the number of options has some values, and values have improved 
the result of project performance. However, it seems that the individual FI option is not 
enough to make the project more attractive for the provision of financial funding. The project 
still needs some support from other stakeholders, such as the government and private 
companies. However, by applying the real-option approach, the FI can rationally determine 
the value of support it needs. The FI can design and formulate the type of real options to 
achieve the desirable level.  
 
The result of the study also shows that the value of the option is significantly affected by the 
interaction between options. By adding more options, the value of the combined option is 
generally different from the sum of its value in isolation. The result of study supports 
Trigeorgis (1993a) in that the greater the number of options combined, the lower the 
incremental value of adding options tends to be. Furthermore, by simple summing, a 
separated option value may miscalculate the value of the project. These interactions are more 
likely useful by designing a proper financial package. Real-option-based valuation can be a 
particularly useful tool for FIs to reduce risks and make the project more attractive. 
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Furthermore, the sensitivities show the effect on option value as single variable (volatility and 
risk-free interest rate) changes. Option value is related to the volatility and risk-free interest 
rate. The volatility decreases will decrease the option value. Risk-free interest rate increases 
will increase the value of deferral (call) option and decrease the value of the abandon (put) 
option. It is also found that the impact of volatility and interest rate on the value of the 
combination of options is more complex. For example, an increase in the interest rate will 
increase the magnitude of the payoff on the call option component (the deferral option) but 
lower the payoff on the put option component (the abandon option).  
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Chapter 5: SES Case Study: Government and Private Company Options 
 
This chapter begins with government support for the SES project. The real options model is 
proposed as a methodology for the design and formulation of government support. The real 
options methodology allows the government to analyse the benefits and costs of each level of 
support and options. Real options also propose alternatives for governments to limit their 
financial cost, while still maintaining benefits to the other main stakeholders: the financial 
institution and the private investor. 
 
The second part of this chapter involves the options of the project‘s sponsor (the private 
company) in the SES project. Regarding the various risks such as cost overrun and demand 
risks in transport projects, different options for the private company have been proposed. 
Three real options of the private company are proposed and analysed: i) the deferral option ii) 
the abandon option and iii) the grant option. Finally, sensitivity analysis on the two variables, 
the volatility and risk-free interest rate is performed for government and private company 
options and the results are discussed.  
 
Section I: Government options in the SES project 
 
This section focuses on government support for the SES project. It begins with the roles and 
types of the government‘s financial support for the project. Three types of support are 
formulated as the real options. This section then presents the different interactions between 
the government options. Furthermore, sensitivity analysis on key variables is performed and 
the results are discussed.  
  
It is recognized that risks in infrastructure development may impact enormously on the 
success of the project. In these cases, governments normally provide support in order to 
alleviate such risks. The support schemes are often offered in the concession agreement 
between the government and the private sector. Government needs to play a crucial role in 
making the project development successful. The government may act as the owner, regulator, 
financier, manager or operator of the transport infrastructure project (Hasselgren, 2013). 
 
5.1 Government role in the development of infrastructure projects 
 
The role of governments in the development of infrastructure projects is presented in this 
subsection. Infrastructure projects around the world involve a large amount of investments 
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and private participations in the project are required. The governments of many countries, 
with budget constraints, have been forced to limit their spending on new infrastructure 
projects despite a country‘s demand for new infrastructures. Therefore, governments have 
advocated the private sector to fulfill the infrastructure requirement through the public-private 
partnership (PPP) framework. Normally, the private sector is concerned with a project‘s 
viability and profitability, whereas the public sector focuses mainly on social benefit. To 
attract private investment in the project, it is essential for the government to ensure that the 
project is not only socially and economically viable but also financially feasible. In order to 
invest in a risky project or a financially unviable project, a government may have to offer 
various incentives or support, such as revenue guarantee, equity guarantee, grants or 
subordinate loans, to attract private investment. 
 
The use of these instruments makes such projects viable and attracts private investment in the 
project. Nevertheless, such mechanisms are difficult to quantify. Government support for 
public projects is rather subjective and requires an appropriate valuation method. This 
research proposes the real option methodology for evaluating the value of support from the 
government perspective.  
      
5.2 Types of government support for infrastructure projects 
 
This subsection illustrates the types of government support in the forms of real options. Much 
of the literature – Charoenpornpattana et al (2003), Fishbein and Babbar (1996), 
Schaufelberger and Wipadapisul (2003) – defines the types of government support for 
infrastructure projects which are summarised in table 5.1. These studies indicate that support 
from the government is necessary for the success of the project development. 
 
Type Definition 
Equity guarantee Government provides the private company a guaranteed 
minimum return on equity in the investment project, or the 
government gives the project company the option to sell the 
project to government with a guaranteed minimum return on 
equity. 
Debt guarantee Government provides support in case the cash flow generated 
from the project is insufficient to service its debt obligation. The 
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Type Definition 
support amounts should be at least enough to service the debt. 
Exchange rate 
guarantee 
Government protects the project company from the risk of an 
exchange rate fluctuation. 
Grant and subordinated 
loan 
Government provides support in the form of a grant and sub-debt 
to promote the project economics. The subordinated loan will be 
serviced after all debt obligations have been settled. 
Shadow toll Government pays the toll, instead of users, to the project 
company. The toll rate can be adjusted, depending on the 
demand level. 
Minimum traffic 
guarantee 
Government pays the project company if the project cash 
flow/revenue falls below the specific guarantee level. 
Concession extension Government gives the project company the right to extend the 
concession period, in case the project‘s revenue is below 
expectation. 
Revenue enhancement Government enhances the project‘s revenue by limiting 
competitors, facilitating demands or allowing the development of 
ancillary facilities. 
 
Table 5.1: Type of government supports 
 
Out of all the types of government support, the minimum traffic guarantee, the debt guarantee 
and the equity guarantee have the ability to capture the upside potential and limit the 
downside risk of the project. These features are similar to the payoff diagram for the long call 
or put option on the project. Therefore, these support mechanisms by the government for the 
project can be evaluated through the real option methodology. 
 
5.2.1 The minimum traffic/revenue guarantee 
 
Large infrastructure projects usually face substantial revenue risks, with the allocation of 
revenue risk as crucial in the development of a PPP project. To mitigate the downside risks of 
revenues, the project company often negotiates with the government to provide a minimum 
revenue guarantee. The main approach widely adopted around the world to mitigate the 
revenue risk is the revenue or traffic guarantee, whereby risks are distributed between the 
government and the concessionaire. Based on the minimum guarantee mechanism, a 
government supports the revenue shortfall at a certain level to guarantee the concessionaire‘s 
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income. The guarantee level should be at least enough to cover the debt obligation in which 
the lender‘s risk is also mitigated. Among the different types of support from governments, 
the minimum traffic guarantee provides the cash flow with a downside risk protection. This 
cash flow feature is similar to the option feature. 
 
In the minimum traffic guarantee, the government may grant the private company a contract 
to compensate the revenue shortfall during the operation phase. The government will pay the 
private sector the revenue shortfall equal to: 
 
K = a minimum revenue guarantee 
 
The minimum guarantee option is similar to a ‗European put option‘ whereby the exercise 
price is the minimum guarantee level (K). If the guarantee covers the whole operation period, 
then the option can be exercised every years (Δt =1 year) when the net revenue falls below the 
guarantee level. This means that the guarantee option value increases if the revenue or traffic 
volume decreases below a certain level. The level of revenue or traffic guarantee is shown in 
figure 5.1. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                              
 
 
 
  
                                                                                                           
                                                                           
                                                                     
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1: The expected traffic flow & the Min. traffic guarantee 
 
The payoff for the minimum traffic guarantee (MTG) can be seen in figure 5.2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Traffic volume or revenue 
Year 
Expected traffic/revenue 
Minimum traffic/revenue 
guarantee 
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Figure 5.2: The payoff for the minimum traffic/revenue guarantee (million baht)   
 
The guarantee option will be exercised if the actual toll revenue or the actual traffic volume in 
each year is below the guarantee level. The government would then have to compensate for 
the revenue shortfall. 
 
Revenue or traffic guarantee is the mechanism to reallocate the traffic demand risk or the 
revenue risk, based on the range of traffic volume or revenue level. In this way, a government 
offers the minimum level of traffic or revenue. For example, if the guarantee revenue was set 
at 90% of the projected traffic volume, and actual traffic volume lay between 90% and 100% 
of the projected volume, then there would be no need for subsidy by the government. When 
traffic demand has fallen below 90%, support would be necessary. For the SES project, the 
guarantee period is 27 years, apart from three years of the construction phase. The valuation 
of the government guarantees can be modelled as a series of independent European put 
options with their maturity specified at the end of the fourth to the thirtieth years of the project 
operation phase. This option can be valued by the binomial model, given the assumption of 
the evolution of traffic volume as the geometric Brownian motion. The value of the guarantee 
option can be determined by the possibility of exercising the option when the traffic/revenue 
falls below the minimum guarantee level (Ki). The option value is calculated backward with 
the discounted rate at the risk-free interest rate, and the value of the project with the revenue 
guarantee can be then obtained by a simple sum of 27 option values along the paths on the 
binomial tree. The revenue received by the concessionaire in each period t, given that the 
revenue is limited with the maximum toll capacity, is therefore equal to: 
 
RGt  = Max {Min (Rt, Rmaxt), Gt}, where  
RGt = the revenue with the minimum guarantee at year t 
Rt  = the observed revenue at time t  
Payoff for MTG      
K Traffic/Revenue 
 
= 
Traffic/Revenue 
 
With Option 
 
Traffic/Revenue 
 
- 
Without Option 
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Rmaxt = the revenue at the maximum capacity at time t 
Gt = the level of revenue at the floor at time t  
 
The minimum traffic guarantee option allows governments to minimise the risk of a project‘s 
abandonment by the project owner or the lender. For the SES project, the guarantee value can 
be evaluated by the binomial lattice, as shown in table 5.2. This research selects the guarantee 
level at 80% and 90% which is widely used in the real project. 
 
Level of minimum 
guarantee 
NPV  w/o 
guarantee 
NPV  with 
guarantee 
Value of option 
80% -7,749 5,603 13,352 
90% -7,749 7,209 14,958 
Table 5.2: Value of the real option for government minimum guarantee at 80% and 
90% (million baht) 
Table 5.2 shows the value of project net present value (NPV) with the guarantee level at 80% 
and 90%. We can see that the contractual guarantee at 80% increases the project value by 
13,352 million baht, and this option value increases when the guarantee level increases to 
90% (14,958 million baht). The result of the real option model showed that the total value 
added by the minimum guarantee traffic options to the original NPV can be very high. The 
guarantee level (80% or 90%) represents the revenue floor that is set to reduce the risk of the 
project to the project company. The value of the option increases as the guarantee level 
increases. For example, at 90% guarantee level, the government has to pay an additional 
amount of 1,606 million baht or an increase of 12%, compared with the guarantee level at 
80%. It can be seen that at the high levels of guarantee, the minimum guarantee option helps 
the private company to reduce or even eliminate risks, meaning that the project becomes a 
nearly risk-free project. To implement effective government policy, the government may 
select to provide the guarantee level at 80%, which the government can negotiate with the 
project owner and lender. It should be noted that granting guarantees at high level may create 
future liability for the government. 
 
5.2.2 Debt guarantee option 
 
The government provides a debt guarantee when the project‘s cash flow is insufficient to 
service debt obligation. This is a full guarantee or a cash flow deficiency guarantee to repay 
the lender‘s debt. The credit risk of the project company is transferred to the credit of the 
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government. Furthermore, the debt guarantee provides more opportunity to finance the project 
at a lower cost of capital, as the credit risk becomes the risk of a government unable to meet 
its commitment. The debt guarantee option makes lenders more comfortable to provide 
financial support to the project company. 
 
In a debt guarantee, the government reduces the project risk by setting the condition to repay a 
principal debt and interest when default occurs. In this type of guarantee, the government 
legally has an obligation to pay back the principal and interest to the loan issuers on a defined 
repayment schedule. Therefore, the government takes a risk on the amount of principal 
guarantee, and the benefit to itself is difficult to identify (e.g., potential tax paid, job creation). 
Such benefits, however, are beyond the scope of this study. 
 
The debt guarantee option can be valued as the put option on the project‘s cash flow, where 
the put option has maturity equal to the loan‘s maturity and its exercise price equals the 
interest and principal payment to the debt holder or lender. With the debt guarantee, the debt 
amount is safe as the loan obligation can be transferred to the government, while without the 
guarantee the debt is the obligation of the project company. 
 
The debt guarantee option is analogous to the European put option, whereby the value of the 
debt guarantee equals the value of the put option on the project‘s cash flow before debt, and 
the exercise price of each option is the amount of debt obligation due each year. The debt 
guarantee option will be exercised if the net cash flow (before debt service) in each year is 
insufficient to service its debt obligation. The government has to subsidize the cash shortfall. 
The payoff for the debt guarantee option can be viewed in figure 5.3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3: The payoff for debt guarantee option (million baht)   
 
 
Payoff for Debt 
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Obligation 
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EBIT 
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With the debt guarantee option, the project‘s free cash flow (after debt) received by the 
concessionaire in each period t, given that the project‘s cash flow is limited with the 
maximum toll capacity, is: 
 
Rdt = Max [Max {Min (Cbt, Cmaxt), 0,}, Dt] where 
Rdt =  the project‘s free cash flow with debt guarantee at time t 
Cbt =  the observed project‘s free cash flow (before debt) at time t 
Cmaxt = the project‘s free cash flow at maximum capacity at time t 
Dt =  the amount of debt (principal and interest) that has to be serviced by the  
project company at time t 
 
The payoff for the debt guarantee option is then equal to: 
 
Vdt = Max (-(Cbt-Dt), 0), where; 
Vdt = Value of the debt guarantee option 
 
The value of the debt guarantee option can be determined by the possibility of exercising an 
option when the net cash flow of the project falls below the level of debt obligation. The 
option value is calculated backward, so that the discounted rate at the risk-free interest rate 
and the value of the project with the debt guarantee can be then obtained by a simple sum of 
the value of each option. The value of the debt guarantee option is presented in table 5.3. 
 
Type of 
guarantee 
NPV w/o 
guarantee 
NPV with 
guarantee 
Real option value 
Debt guarantee -7,749 -4,637 3,112 
Table 5.3: Real option value of debt guarantee (million baht) 
 
It should be noted that the value of the debt guarantee increases the project‘s NPV. However, 
a project with an individual debt guarantee option is insufficient for the SES project. The 
NPV of the SES project is still negative which requires more options. The debt guarantee 
option was found to be more valuable if this option was combined with other types of 
government support to enhance project financial viability. 
 
5.2.3 Equity guarantee with caps (maximum guarantee at return on equity) 
 
The last type of government support is the equity guarantee, whereby the government 
guarantees the return to the project owner at least equal to the pre-specified amount (return on 
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equity). For the equity guarantee, government exposure can be limited by setting guarantee 
caps, so that government support is stopped once the pre-established ceiling is reached. The 
caps may limit either the aggregate value of options or each option individually. For the 
individual limit, the value of guarantee can be shown as: 
 
Value of guarantee for each year  = Min {Value of Option, Cap} or  
 
For the aggregate limit applied: 
 
Value of guarantee = Min {∑      (Value of option), Cap}  
 
The cap can be the value of a guarantee minimum return equal to a pre-specified amount. The 
equity guarantee feature is similar to the debt guarantee. If the cash flow of the project in each 
year cannot generate enough return to the project owner, its deficit will be guaranteed at the 
pre-specified return on equity. For example, if the equity injected into the SES project is 
4,100 million baht and the cost of equity is 13%, the annual free cash flow (FCF) of the 
project is then guaranteed at 4,100 x 13% = 551 million baht. The equity guarantee option is 
viewed as a European put option with the strike price at 551 million baht. The payoff of the 
equity guarantee option can be viewed as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.4: The payoff for equity guarantee option (million baht) 
 
With the equity guarantee option, the project‘s free cash flow (after debt) received by the 
concessionaire in each period t, given that the project‘s cash flow is limited with the 
maximum toll capacity, is calculated by the following equation: 
 
Ret = Max [Max { Min (Ct, Cmaxt), 0,}, Et] where 
Ret =  the project‘s free cash flow with equity guarantee option at time t 
Ct = the observed project‘s free cash flow (after debt) at time t 
Cmaxt = the project‘s free cash flow at maximum capacity at time t 
Payoff for Equity 
Guarantee     
Min. FCF 
= 551 Mbt. 
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Et = the level of the project‘s free cash flow that generates return equal to cost  
of equity at time t 
 
The payoff for the equity guarantee option at time t is determined by: 
 
Vet = Max (Et-Ct, 0) where 
Vet = the value of the equity guarantee option at time t 
 
The binomial lattice is used to value the equity guarantee option (Ve). The value of the equity 
guarantee option can be determined by the value of the exercised option when the free cash 
flow falls below the guarantee level. The option value is calculated backward, whereby the 
discount rate at the risk-free interest rate and the value of the project with the equity guarantee 
option can be then obtained by a simple sum of the NPV of each option. The value of the 
equity guarantee option is shown in table 5.4. 
 
 Type of 
guarantee 
NPV  w/o 
guarantee 
NPV  with 
guarantee 
Value of equity 
guarantee 
Equity guarantee -7,749 -2,788 4,961 
Table 5.4: Real option value of equity guarantee with cap (million baht) 
 
Based on the equity guarantee option, the project NPV was improved, although the project 
was not financially feasible. As a result, the project with an equity guarantee option does not 
attract the private sector to invest in the SES project. Therefore, more support from 
government was required and the government may consider adding more options to the 
project in order to make the project attractive. 
 
5.2.4 The combination of government options 
 
This part considers government support for the project as the combination of options (a 
‗bundle of options‘). The value of options for each combination can be seen in table 5.5. The 
more presents of the subsequence options increased the value of the project. The value of the 
combined option may differ from the value of the summation of each individual option, 
reflecting the interaction affect. This means that the exercise of the prior option may change 
the value of project‘s cash flow and then the value of the subsequent option, especially for the 
same option types. 
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Option 
type 
Project NPV 
with option 
Interaction No interaction 
(value isolation) 
Interaction 
effect 
G1, G3 7,712 15,461 16,464 -1,003 
G2, G3 9,021 16,770 18,070 -1,300 
G1, G4 9,080 16,829 18,313 -1,484 
G2, G4 10,305 18,054 19,919 -1,865 
G3, G4  -2,788 4,961 8,073 -3,112 
G1, G3, G4 9,080 16,829 21,425 -4,596 
G2, G3, G4 10,305 18,054 23,031 -4,977 
G1= the minimum traffic guarantee at 80%, G2= the minimum traffic guarantee at 90%, G3= the debt guarantee 
G4= the equity guarantee 
Table 5.5: Value of option combinations for government support (million baht) 
 
Table 5.5 shows the results of the numerical valuation for valuing the project‘s multiple real 
options. It is clear that the value of a combined option may differ from its value in isolation 
and the interaction effect is large and negative. Also, it shows that the option values in the 
presence of each other were not simply additive. For example, the value of revenue guarantee 
at 80% was 13,352 million baht and the value of equity guarantee was 4,961 million baht, 
while the value of both option combinations were presented at 16,829 million baht, showing 
negative interaction. With the single minimum traffic guarantee option, the project is feasible. 
However, the single debt guarantee and equity guarantee is insufficient and needs an 
additional option for the project. 
 
Adding the minimum traffic guarantee to the individual debt guarantee option or the equity 
guarantee option, even if the project is feasible, means that the interaction effect is negative. 
This is because options have the same exercise region and same type (see figure 5.5), and 
because the first option (minimum traffic guarantee) dominates the other options. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                     
  
t=0                 t=3                              t=22           t=30 
 
Figure 5.5: Exercise regions of government options 
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The combination of options for the government can be calculated with the following (See 
page 92-95 for mathematic proof): 
 
OC =  Expanded NPV – Passive NPV 
IE =  OC-MTG-DG-EG, where 
Expand NPV =  the NPV with option combinations 
Passive NPV =  the NPV without option combinations 
OC      =  the option combinations of the minimum traffic guarantee, debt and equity 
guarantees 
MTG =  the minimum traffic guarantee option 
DG =  the debt guarantee option 
EG =  the equity guarantee option 
IE        =  the interaction effect between the minimum traffic guarantee, debt and  
            equity guarantee 
 
Each government option feature is summarised in table 5.6. 
 
 Minimum traffic 
guarantee 
Debt guarantee Equity guarantee 
Type of option Put Put Put 
Underlying 
asset 
Underlying cash flow Underlying cash 
flow 
Underlying cash 
flow 
Exercise price Cash flow at minimum 
traffic guarantee (80% 
or 90%) 
Total debt obligation 
in each year 
Cash flow at return 
on equity 
Maturity time 1 year 1 year 1 year 
Discount rate Risk-free interest rate Risk-free interest 
rate 
Risk-free interest 
rate 
Table 5.6: Summary of government options 
  
The combined value of all three options (the minimum traffic guarantee at 90%, debt 
guarantee, and equity guarantee option) means that the expanded NPV and the passive NPV 
are equal to 10,305 million baht and -7,749 million baht respectively. In this case, the option 
value is 18,054 million baht [10,305 - (-7,749)]. The interaction effect is - 4,977 million baht 
[18,054 - 14,958 - 3,112 - 4,961]. 
167 
 
 
Based on the evaluation of government options in the SES projects, the results show that the 
combination of the minimum traffic guarantee at 90% and equity guarantee provided the 
highest value of support to the project company. Adding the debt guarantee option to this 
combination is useless, because the exercise area of debt guarantee option fully overlaps with 
the minimum traffic guarantee at 90% and the equity guarantee. 
 
The SES project is feasible with an individual minimum traffic guarantee option. Adding 
more options help to make the project more attractive. The minimum traffic guarantee may 
not be the best option for the government because it spends lot of government money, 
creating future contingent liability. The government may consider another type of support that 
helps to reduce its expenditure. It should be noted that the more support provided by the 
government, the larger the expense to its budget. 
 
5.3 Volatility and seasonality analysis: Government option 
 
In this subsection, the government option is analysed for the seasonality of the traffic flow. 
The volatility of the underlying cash flow is determined from the volatility of traffic volume. 
To account for the seasonal effects of traffic flow, an analysis explores the volatility for 
annual traffic data from 2004 to 2015. Based on year-to-year growth rates as well as seasonal 
adjustment for traffic volume (monthly data), traffic volatility is valued at approximately 4% 
(see table A5 and table A6 in appendix A) and the risk-free interest rate in the model is valued 
at 3%. 
 
Table 5.7 shows the relationship of various options, calculated using the binomial lattice, to 
changes in volatility. The approach accounted for the seasonality effect of traffic flow. It is 
found from the analysis that option value increases (decreases) with increases (decreases) in 
volatility except for the minimum traffic guarantee option. This is because i) the minimum 
traffic guarantee is modelled as a put option, in which any upward movement in underlying 
(traffic flow) would not benefit the put option and ii) a low risk-free interest rate (3%) is used 
for ―low-volatility traffic‖ which would increase the value of the put option (the minimum 
traffic guarantee) because of the discount effect on the exercise price.   
  
 
 
168 
 
Option Type for the SES 
project 
Option value (million 
baht) at 20% of 
volatility and 3% of 
risk-free interest rate 
Option value (million 
baht) at 4% of volatility 
and 3% of risk-free 
interest rate account for 
seasonality  
The minimum traffic guarantee 
at 90% 
24,897 24,902 
The debt guarantee option 4,332 3,003 
The equity guarantee option  6,350 4,326 
The combination of debt 
guarantee and equity guarantee 
options 
6,350 4,326 
Table 5.7: The value of government option at different volatility levels     
 
The result of the study shows that the minimum traffic guarantee is still the most valuable for 
―low volatility‖, followed by the equity guarantee and the debt guarantee, respectively.  
 
5.4 Sensitivity to other parameters: Government option  
 
The effect of risk-free interest rate on the value of real option for the government is explored 
in this subsection. In general, the interest rate of the project is often increased to compensate 
for risk. In binomial lattice, the project‘s cash flows will move up or down by an amount 
calculated using volatility and time to expiration while the interest rate used in real option is a 
risk-free interest rate. 
 
The option value increases with decreases in the risk-free interest rate for put option (the 
minimum traffic guarantee, the debt guarantee option and the equity guarantee option) while 
it decreases with decreases in the risk-free interest rate for call option. The relationship is 
shown in table 5.8. 
Option Type for the SES 
project 
Option value (million 
baht) at 6% of risk-free 
interest rate (20% of 
volatility)   
Option value (million 
baht) at 3% of risk-
free interest rate 
(20% of volatility) 
The minimum traffic guarantee 14,958 24,897 
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Option Type for the SES 
project 
Option value (million 
baht) at 6% of risk-free 
interest rate (20% of 
volatility)   
Option value (million 
baht) at 3% of risk-
free interest rate 
(20% of volatility) 
at 90% 
The debt guarantee option 3,112 4,332 
The equity guarantee option  4,961 6,350 
The combination of debt 
guarantee and equity guarantee 
options 
4,961 6,350 
Table 5.8: The value of government option at different risk-free interest rates     
 
It is seen that the minimum traffic guarantee is still the most valuable for ―low-risk free 
interest rate‖, followed by the equity guarantee and the debt guarantee, respectively.  
 
5.5 Section summary: government options in the SES project 
 
This study found that government support for the SES project is necessary and would help to 
improve the project‘s value. However, the government has to determine the optimal level of 
its support. The research presents a real option with the binomial lattice that can be used to 
assess the value of government options, and allows the government to analyse the benefits 
and risks of each type of support. The study also proposes the alternatives for the government 
to value its appropriate types of support and limit its exposure, but still maintain the benefits 
of the other project‘s stakeholders such as the project owner and financial institution. 
 
Three types of government guarantees were selected to value the amount of government 
support. The value of government guarantee can be modelled on the series of independent 
European options. These options can be valued directly by the binomial lattice model. Based 
on the binomial model, this research can determine the value of guarantees which it cannot do 
by the traditional evaluation method. The method proposed by this research can be applied in 
real projects to evaluate the type of guarantee being offered in a large PPP infrastructure 
project. However, guarantees can create significant future liabilities for the government. 
Specifying the level of guarantee would help the government to limit its liability and would 
be acceptable to all stakeholders involved. 
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From this study, the minimum revenue guarantee or traffic is found to be the most beneficial 
to the project company. The other types of support – the debt guarantee whereby lender‘s debt 
is secured by government subsidy and the equity guarantee whereby the project owner can 
ensure the project return – also improved the project performance, but were still insufficient 
for the SES project. The option of the equity guarantee has more value to the project company 
than the debt guarantee option, as the government provides a return guarantee to the project 
company not only to cover all debt obligation but also to secure the project company with 
some specified return. 
 
Based on the numerical calculation, it found that government support in terms of combined 
options has strongly affected the NPV of the project. The better combination of types of 
support, the higher the resulting NPV. The value of a combination of the minimum traffic 
guarantee at 90% and the equity guarantee options provided the maximum option value to the 
project. However, the more government guarantees, the higher the government expense. The 
level or type of government support should be discussed to establish a clear government 
guideline or policy. Furthermore, the sensitivity of government option value to volatility and 
risk-free interest rate is performed in this section. In general, it is found that option's value 
increases with an increase in volatility. While, a decrease in risk-free interest rate will 
increase put option value because it increases the present value of the exercise price. 
 
Section II: Private company options in the SES project 
 
This section firstly defines the roles of the private company in the infrastructure development. 
Later, the categories of private company options are defined and formulated. The values of 
each option and their interactions are calculated with the binomial lattice model. 
 
5.6 The role of private companies in developing infrastructure projects 
 
This section considers opportunities with specific real options for private participants in the 
large-scale transport infrastructure. Numbers of transport infrastructure projects have been 
awarded concessions in which governments retain ownership of the project‘s physical assets, 
but grant exploitation rights to a concessionaire. The financial analysis of a privatized 
infrastructure project is more complex and uncertain, due mainly to the project‘s size, contract 
duration, nonrecourse financing, and various project participants. Traditional financial 
analysis techniques such as NPV, IRR, and payback period have limitations and are 
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insufficient to deal with risks and uncertainties in the project. To make the project attractive 
for the private company, firms in an infrastructure development business have applied the real 
option theory as potentially offering an improvement over the traditional decision analysis 
approach. 
 
The success of a privatization project requires the effective risk management of major risks, 
such as demand and construction risks, and the usage of real options to explore financial 
opportunities. The latter will increase the private company‘s flexibility in an investment 
decision. The main focus of this section, therefore, is the analysis of private company options 
which can help the project company to mitigate financial risks. The following sections will 
present various options for private companies in large-scale infrastructure projects. 
 
5.7 Types of real options for private companies in large-scale infrastructure projects 
 
This section highlights the option flexibility for the project company in the development of 
infrastructure projects. It is generally well known that project complexity, as well as 
economic, financial and market risks, have increased frustration and diminished incentives for 
the private sector to invest in the infrastructure project. The academic literature proposes that 
this research applies real options to reduce risks in public infrastructure projects. Real options 
are the financial instrument that can help to improve the viability of infrastructure project. 
They are well-established tools that help to make the project more attractive to the private 
company, which normally invests in projects that are profitable, with a low level of equity 
investment, to ensure good risk management and mitigation. 
 
A large-scale infrastructure project may have a real option embedded in the contract 
agreement between the private company and the government. In the past, it was difficult to 
explicitly value the embedded options. This section presents a straightforward methodology to 
evaluate the options for the private company. Three options – deferral, abandon and grant 
options – are the main focus. These options limit the risk of the project and make it more 
attractive for private investors. These options and their interactions are valued with the 
binomial lattice model.  
 
 
172 
 
Type of private company 
option 
Definition 
Deferral option The private company may defer delivering the concession 
fee to the government when the project is 
underperforming. The deferred delivery date is pre-
specified in the concession contract. Benefit to the project 
company is the time value of money of the deferred 
amounts. 
Abandon option With permanent revenue decline, management can 
abandon the current project‘s operation and may return 
the project to the government or resell the project in the 
secondary market at a value pre-specified in the 
concession contract. 
Grant option Government promotes private investment by providing 
non-refundable grants to the private company. Projects 
can be relieved of financial obligation with a grant option. 
Government sacrifices its income in order to make the 
project more attractive. 
Concession extension Government provides the right to project company to 
prolong the concession term when the project‘s revenue 
falls below a specified level. Such support means less 
financial cost to government, but is less effective at 
easing financial status of project. 
Table 5.9: Type of private company option in infrastructure projects 
  
5.7.1 The deferral option  
 
This option allows the project company to defer payment of the concession fee to the 
government (Rose, 1998). For the SES project, the option is the deferral of revenue sharing to 
the government which normally pays at the end of each year. The private company is required 
to share 40% of total revenue with the government for the first nine years, 50% of total 
revenue for the next nine years, and 60% of total revenue for the last nine years (the total 
concession collection period = 27 years). The total revenue sharing is estimated at the very 
considerable sum of 154,081 million baht during the whole concession period. These amounts 
have a significant impact on the project return. In order to make the project more attractive to 
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a private company, the government may grant the company to issue a concession notification 
to delay payment in case of financial loss. The concession notifications are non-interest 
charged and due for payment at the end of the concession period. This deferral option is 
viewed as the European put option which can be exercised at the end of each year during the 
concession period. 
 
The option payoff to the project company is the time value gained in the payment of the 
concession fee, which is equal to the difference between the face value of the notification and 
the present value of its eventual repayment. The payoff for the deferral option can be 
expressed as the following equation: 
 
Option payoff                       
 
= max (0,      
   
          
)  where: 
FVt                =   the face value of notification issued in the period of t (value of revenue 
sharing in each year which is predetermined, based on the project cash 
flow of base case scenario). The payment will be paid at the end of the 
concession.  
PV(FVt)T-t  =   the present value of a payment FVt at time t 
T  =  the total concession period 
 ra,b    = the average risk-free interest rate between time a and time b 
 
The deferral option is triggered when the net NPV for each year is negative. The option 
payoff should be discounted from the time the notification is issued. The present value of 
payoff is given by: 
 
PV payoff =                                           
 
  = 
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  = 
   
         
  
   
         (     )
     
It is simplified to: 
  =             
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The payoff of the deferral option is similar to the payoff of the European put option with the 
strike price starting to trigger when the project NPV is less than zero (see figure 5.6). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.6: The payoff for the deferral option (million baht) 
 
 
The case study is taken from the SES project in Bangkok, Thailand. The project feature is 
given in chapter 4. The project NPV with the deferred option is determined by the binomial 
lattice model. This research provides an example of the deferral option calculation. The 
predetermined deferral amount for the SES project is presented in table 5.10. 
 
Year  4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Deferral amount 1,452 1,560 1,968 2,232 2,496 3,152 3,264 3,360 
Year 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
Deferral amount 3,440 4,280 5,325 5,350 5,350 5,350 5,350 6,420 
Year 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 
Deferral amount 6,420 6,420 7,704 7,704 8,988 8,988 8,988 8,988 
Year 28 29 30      
Deferral amount 8,988 10,272 10,272      
Note: the project started its operation in year 4 and the proportion of revenue sharing is 40–60%; the 
predetermined deferral amount is the amount of revenue sharing, paid to the government each year 
during the operation phrase 
Table 5.10: Predetermined deferred amount of the SES project (million baht) 
 
Payoff 
Project‘s net cash flow (million baht) 
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The predetermined deferral amount from table 5.10 is the amount of revenue sharing to the 
government during the operation phase of the SES project. The private company (the 
concessionaire) can delay a payment to the government if the project‘s cash flow is negative. 
For example, the predetermined revenue sharing of the SES project to the government in year 
10 is 3,264 million baht. The deferred benefit at year 10 is equal to 2,940 million baht [3,264 
– 3,264/(1+0.1223)30-10] at the discount rate of 12.23%. If the net cash flow on the binomial 
path is negative at year 10, the deferral option is triggered. The payoff of the option to defer is 
2,940 million baht. The total deferral amounts are the sum of all individual deferral options 
for each year, discounted at the risk-free interest rate. Table 5.11 presents the value of the 
deferral option for the SES project. 
 
Type of guarantee NPV  w/o 
deferral option 
NPV  with 
deferral option 
 Value of  deferral 
option 
Deferral option -7,749 -1,431 6,317.6 
Table 5.11: Value of the deferral option for the SES project (million baht) 
 
The deferral option gives the right to the private company to postpone the concession fee in 
the year that the project performs poorly. The deferment of concession payment is viewed as 
the European put option for the private company. In order to value the deferral option, it is 
necessary to determine ―t‖, the time that each concession fee will be paid. In the SES project, 
this research assumed that the repaid amount will be at the end of the concession (thirtieth 
year). The private company will exercise the deferral option if the project‘s net cash flow after 
debt in each year during the operation phase is negative. 
 
Granting the private company the right to defer the payment of the concession fee has a 
significant value of approximately 6,318 million baht for the SES project. The value is quite 
high relative to the total project value (~25% of the project investment cost). This value is 
contributed from the time value of the deferred payment. Clearly, the deferral option 
contributes significantly to the value of the project. However, the project with the deferral 
option is still financially unfeasible for the private investor, indicating a negative project 
NPV. Thus, the project sponsor may need to more support to make the project more attractive. 
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5.7.2 The abandon option (private company option) 
 
The second option for a private company is the option to abandon the project when the project 
cash flow does not measure up to expectations. In the worst case scenario, the private 
company has the option to abandon the infrastructure project at a specific time, in exchange 
for its salvage value or a value pre-specified in the concession contract. The private company 
may exercise the option to abandon the project if the private company does not feel 
comfortable with the actual revenue collection. If the traffic volume suffers a substantial 
decline, the management makes a decision to abandon the project. The private company may 
abandon the project permanently in exchange for the exit value (i.e., the value of pre-
negotiation in the contract or the terminated value). The abandon option is written in the 
concession at the contract-signing date, and is set to expire before a specific date (i.e., the pre-
construction completion date). The abandon option can be valued as a European or an 
American option on the current project value (net NPV) with the exercise price equal to the 
exit value. 
 
In this option, the project company has been given the right to abandon a project at a specific 
repayment date. Its payoff can be determined as: 
 
Max (L –E, 0), where 
 
E = is the expected remaining NPV on a project if it continues to the end of its life 
L  = the liquidation or abandonment value (the pre-estimated NPV) for the same project at the 
same point in time. 
 
Following is an illustration of the option to abandon for the SES project. A private company 
has an abandon option at the fifth year of the operation phase. The pre-estimated project NPV 
at the fifth year is 23,518 million baht. The binomial path of the project‘s net cash flow at the 
fifth year is 15,169 million baht, which means the observed cash flow is lower than estimated. 
Then the abandon option of private company is: 
 
Abandon option at year 5 = Max (L5-E5,0) 
    = Max (23,518-15,169,0) 
    = 8,349 million baht 
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The abandon option is analogous to a European put option. The project company will exercise 
the option when the expected project NPV is less than the pre-estimated value (see figure 5.7). 
The firm can abandon a project with the possibility of reselling the physical project‘s asset at 
salvage value or predetermined value (pre-agreed project NPV). This option allows the 
private company to sell the asset back to the government or the public agency. The sellback 
agreement may specify at the initial stage of contract signing or are negotiated ex post. The 
concessionaire may decide to walk away at a specific time during the concession. The project 
ownership is transferred to the government. The government can recover the project‘s cash 
flow either by collecting it itself or by providing a new concession to a new private company. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.7: The payoff for the abandon option (million baht)   
 
In this option, we can assume that the exercise price is the liquidation or abandon value (the 
value of the pre-estimated project NPV). The option will be exercised when the remaining 
project value (the revised NPV) is less than the abandon value. The remaining project cash 
flow in the abandon option is equivalent to the revised net present value of the project‘s cash 
flow in the binomial lattice model. As time passes since the project started commercial 
operation, the uncertainty about the project cash flow is resolved. However, if the actual cash 
flow is substantially lower than the expected ex ante, it will lead to a revised NPV that is 
lower than the exercise price. The private company may consider executing a put option. One 
of the main challenges is to solve the optimal stopping time (time to abandon the project) 
which is not the scope of this study. 
 
Payoff 
Project NPV 
Pre-estimate project‘s NPV 
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With the abandon option, the private company (the buyer) has the right to exercise the option 
at a set number of times, i.e., years 5, 10 and 20. The abandon option with the binomial lattice 
model is calculated in table 5.12. 
 
Type of guarantee NPV  w/o 
guarantee 
NPV  with guarantee Real option 
value 
Abandon option at 
year 5 of operation 
-7,749 -6,949 825 
Abandon option at 
year 10 of operation 
-7,749 -6,896 853 
Abandon option at 
year 20 of operation 
-7,749 -7,310 439 
Table 5.12: Value of the abandon option of the private company (million baht) 
 
The option to abandon creates the value to the private company. The value of the abandon 
option is 825 million baht, 853 million baht and 439 million baht at the fifth, tenth and 
twentieth years since the operation started respectively. The abandon option at year 10 of 
operation is the most valuable. It assumes that a clearer picture of project demand would be 
developed within ten years since commencement of the operation phrase. Thus, the decision 
to abandon is likely to depend on whether additional time will improve the traffic volume 
prediction. (This is a reasonable timeframe which gives the project owner enough information 
about the project.) Over 10 years, the abandon option provides a lower value for the private 
company. With the abandon option, the project‘s NPV is still negative. The project is 
therefore not attractive to the private company. 
 
5.7.3 The grant option  
 
The private company has an option to receive a grant from the government, making the 
project more attractive. The government can help to enhance the project performance by 
providing the private company with an irrevocable grant. In order to receive a grant, the 
project should meet certain qualifications. As the project has a high probability of a negative 
NPV, the private company could qualify to receive a grant from the government. The grant 
option is the multiple exercise option which the project company receives payment from the 
government each year. 
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In the SES project, the grant amount is set at the amount of the estimated revenue sharing in 
each year to the government (between 40% and 60% for the SES project). When the net 
project‘s cash flow is negative, the private company can claim the amount that has been paid 
to the government. The private company can waive all or a portion of revenue sharing to the 
government in the year of inferior performance. With the grant option, the private companies 
hold yearly European put options throughout the project operation period. The payoff of the 
grant option can be written as: 
 
i)  If NCFi   ≥ 0 = 0 
ii) If NCFi  < 0 = Min (-NCFi, Gi ), as 
NCFi = the Net Cash flow in each year 
Gi  = the level of government grant each year (the amount of revenue  
    sharing in table 5.10) 
 
The payoff of the grant option is similar to the payoff of the one-year European put option. 
The put option is exercised when the project NPV is less than zero (shown in figure 5.8). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.8: The payoff for the grant option (million baht)   
 
To give a simple example: suppose the project net cash flow in the fifth year of operation is -
2,033 million baht, and the portion of the revenue sharing to government is 2,496 million 
baht, then: 
 
Grant option value = Min (-NCFi, Gi ) 
= Min. (-(-2,033), 2,496) 
   = 2,033 million baht 
 
Payoff 
The project‘s net cash flow (million baht) 
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The value of the grant option is calculated by summation of the individual options in the 
binomial path. The value of the grant option for the SES project is presented in table 5.13. 
 
 Type of 
guarantee 
NPV  w/o 
guarantee 
NPV  with 
guarantee 
Value of grant 
option 
Grant option -7,749 -4,660 3,089 
Table 5.13: Value of the grant option (million baht)   
The value of the grant option using the binomial model for the SES project is worth 3,089 
million baht. The project NPV with a grant option is still negative. In the real option analysis 
with a single grant option, the project is financially not feasible, and therefore the project does 
not attract private funding. In this case, more options are required to make the project more 
attractive to a private company 
 
5.7.4 The other options: options to extend concession period 
 
In the concession contract, the key issue is to set the duration of the concession as well as the 
degree of managerial flexibility, whether or not the concession extension is allowed. The 
project company may be granted the option from the government to extend the concession 
term in case the revenue falls below a certain level. 
 
This research does not consider how the concession is lengthened. That evaluation needs 
more complex mathematical/financial techniques beyond the scope of this study. However, 
this research initially found that the option to extend concession affects the concession value, 
in which more revenue will be collected by the concessionaire. It is generally argued that the 
extension option is privately valuable as it allows a concessionaire to increase its overall 
project returns. For the SES project, the private company did not have the option to extend its 
concession. 
 
5.7.5 The combination of options for the private company 
 
The last part of this section is considered the private company options as the option 
combinations (the bundle of options). When the options are combined, they will interact with 
each other.  The option combinations allow the private company to combine two or more 
options. The values for each option combination and the timeline of the option can be seen in 
table 5.14 and figure 5.9 respectively. 
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Option value Project NPV 
with option 
Interaction No interaction 
(value isolation) 
Interaction 
effect 
P1, P2 -1,431 6,318 7,171 -853 
P1, P3 -1,381 6,368 9,407 -3,039 
P2, P3 -3,971 3,778 3,942 -164 
P1, P2, P3 -1,381 6,368 10,260 -3,892 
P1 = the deferral option 
P2 = the abandon option at year 10 of operation period 
P3 = the grant option 
 
Table 5.14: The value of option combinations for private company (million baht)   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                     
  
t=0                 t=3             t=10                          t=30 
 
Figure 5.9: Timeline of deferral, abandon and grant options for the SES project 
 
Considering the combination of two options, the combination of deferral option and grant 
option is the most valuable option. Though the value is highest, the interaction effect is large 
and negative (-3,039 million baht). This is because the exercised region of the deferral and 
grant options fully overlaps (see figure 5.9) and both options are put options. The result shows 
that adding the second option (grant option) to the first option (deferral option) seems 
inefficient. 
 
As we can see in table 5.14, the combined value of real options is different from the sum of 
the separate option values. It can be seen that the interaction effect has negative value for the 
combination of two and three options. The combined value of three options (deferral, 
abandon, grant) is the same as the combined value of the grant and deferral options, and is not 
Abandon 
option 
 
Deferral option/Grant option 
 
Construction 
Phrase 
 
Operation Phrase     
 Concession End     
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significantly different from a combined value of the abandon and deferral options. This can 
conclude that the combination of options within the private company is inefficient. 
 
The results indicated that the abandon option when combined with other options could create 
more option value, while the most favourable for the private company is the deferral option. 
However, adding the second option to the deferral option seems worthless. When the study 
looks at the option bundle, it seems that the project is still financially not feasible. The 
combination of options within the private company is impractical. As a result, the projects 
with only the private company option are not attractive for investment. The project needs 
more support from the government and financial institutions in order to make the project 
feasible and more attractive. 
 
5.8 Volatility and Seasonality Analysis: Private company option 
 
In this subsection, the private company option is conducted based on systematic seasonal 
variations of the traffic flow. In this case, the volatility of the underlying cash flow is 
determined from the volatility of traffic volume. The volatility of traffic volume is calculated 
on historical data during 2004-2015. Based on year-to-year growth rates (see table A5 in 
appendix A) as well as seasonal adjustments for (monthly) traffic volume (see table A6 in 
appendix A), traffic volatility is valued at around 4% and the risk-free interest rate in the 
model is valued at 3%. 
  
The option value is most sensitive to volatility changes. It is generally known that option 
value increases (decreases) with an increase (decrease) in volatility. Table 5.15 shows the 
relationship of selected private company options, calculated using binomial lattice, to changes 
in volatility which the approach accounted for the seasonality effect of traffic flow.  
 
Option Type for the SES 
project 
Option value (million 
baht) at 20% of 
volatility and 3% of 
risk-free interest rate 
Option value (million baht) 
at 4% of volatility and 3% 
of risk-free interest rate, 
account for seasonality  
The deferral option 10,367 5,331 
The grant option 4,302 3,003 
The combination of the deferral 
option and the grant option 
10,433 5,367 
Table 5.15: The value of private company option at different volatility levels    
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An option‘s value of the deferral option and the grant option decreases with a decrease in 
volatility of the traffic flow. The result of the study shows that the combination of the deferral 
option and the grant option is still the most valuable for ―low volatility‖, followed by the 
deferral option and the grant option, respectively.    
 
5.9 Sensitivity to other parameters: Private company option  
 
The effect of risk-free interest rate on the value of real options for private company is 
explored in this subsection. In general, the interest rate of the project is often increased to 
compensate for risk. In the binomial lattice, the project‘s cash flows will move up or down by 
an amount calculated using volatility and time to expiration, while the interest rate used in 
real options is a risk-free interest rate. 
 
The option value increases with a decrease in the risk-free interest rate for the put option (the 
deferral option and the grant option). The relationship is shown in table 5.16.  
Option Type for the SES 
project 
Option value (million 
baht) at 6%-risk free 
interest rate (20%-
volatility) 
Option value (million 
baht) at 3%-risk free 
interest rate (20%-
volatility) 
The deferral option 6,318 10,367 
The grant option 3,089 4,302 
The combination of deferral 
option and grant option 
6,368 10,433 
Table 5.16: The value of selected private company option at different risk-free interest 
rates     
 
The result of the study shows that the combination of the deferral option and the grant option 
is still the most valuable for ―low interest rate‖, followed by the deferral option and the grant 
option, respectively.    
 
5.10 Section summary: the private company option in the SES project 
  
The major finding of this study was that the private company found a diverse range of 
potential uncertainties which formulated risks associated with the project. The main risk was 
the uncertainty of the future market condition (traffic condition). To mitigate such risk, the 
options for potential courses of action can be formulated. These options were based on 
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looking at the major risks and selecting options and combinations of options which were most 
suitable to reduce downside exposure.  
 
From the result of this analysis, the option to defer is a preferable policy choice under 
government support to the private company, and its justification is more straightforward. 
Granting the private company the option to defer payment of the concession fee gains a 
significant amount. This value is quite high compared with project value. Furthermore, the 
sensitivity analysis shows that the option values decrease with decreases in volatility and the 
option to defer remains a preferable option for the private company.   
 
After traffic volatility, the other significant risk factor is risk-free interest rates. A decrease in 
interest rate will improve the value of the option because the payoff on the option is the NPV 
of the project cash flow then both the payoff and its NPV will raise when interest rates 
decrease. For the combination of two options, the combination of the deferral option and the 
grant option is still the most valuable option under both low volatility and interest rate. 
 
Overall, the private company‘s options in the selected project look promising. When the 
options were combined, they supported each other and their values were increased. The 
interaction increases the value for the first option, especially for the abandon option. In 
contrast, the interaction is insignificant for the deferral option. Furthermore, although the 
option bundle increases the project‘s value, it seems insufficient to attract private investors. 
The study should extend further to capture the more complex option combinations between 
the government, the financial institution and the private company. 
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Chapter 6. SES Case Study: Option Combinations 
 
This chapter deals with the nature of the option interactions among the government, the 
financial institution and the private company as well as the valuation of the project flexibility 
in the context of multiple real options. Interaction between options reflects the type, the order 
of option involved, whether in the money or not, and the separation of exercise time. This 
chapter will illustrate through a case-study example the importance of properly accounting for 
interactions among the government, the financial institution and the private company. 
 
6.1 Introduction of the option interaction in the project 
 
This section deals with the option interactions in the project. The multiple options are 
formulated, and the values of option interactions are determined. As explained in the previous 
chapters, it seems that the single option from the financial institution and the private 
company, except for the government, is insufficient to make a project feasible. This chapter 
illustrates the importance of proper option combinations for the government, the financial 
institution and the private company. Myers (1987), Trigeorgis (1993a,b) and Ross (1998), the 
pioneers in the field of real option application, attempted to value option bundling and 
demonstrated the interaction among options. The results of their studies indicated that some 
option combinations had a very significant value partially as a result of the interaction 
between the options. The implication of their analyses is that the value of options in the 
presence of combination may differ from its value in isolation. The combined value of two or 
more options therefore may differ from the values of each option separately and of simply 
adding the results.  
 
The main point of this research study is to design and formulate the real option as a package 
for the private investor, the government and the financial institution. The option package is 
provided for mitigating all financial risks such as revenue and construction overrun risks 
related to project. The previous study in chapter 4 and 5 showed that the various support 
options from the government, the financial institution or the private company, though 
valuable, may not be enough to make project financially attractive. Valuing the option 
combinations among the government, the financial institution and the private company is 
required. It is generally known that real-life projects are often more complicate and involve a 
set of multiple options.  
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The option combinations can be considered in the form of the package of two or more options 
from i) the government and the financial institution, ii) the government and the private 
company and iii) the financial institution and the private company. This study applied the 
binomial lattice approach which is a very flexible technique to evaluate option combinations. 
The SES project in Bangkok Thailand is used to illustrate the application of option 
combinations. 
 
6.2 Combination of the government and the financial institution options 
 
This section focuses on option combinations involving the government and financial 
institution. As mentioned before, each party has its own interests, and they involve a 
collection of multiple real options in the project. When their options are proposed at the same 
time in the project, it is essential to understand the interaction effect. Generally, the cash flow 
of the project with options is divided into three components: the cash flow without option 
support, the option support component and the option interaction. The support component 
actually contains the combination of options. It consists of several option elements, called 
―bundle of options‖. Options can be valued simultaneously and the bundle of options is 
broken down into the value of individual option elements and the interaction effect. 
Therefore, the value of project NPV without support plus the value of the option bundle is the 
value of the project NPV with option support.  
 
The following is the bundle of the selected individual options from the government and the 
financial institution. The selective criterions are the individual option value and its implication 
to the project. The value of the project‘s NPV with option and option interaction are shown as 
follows: 
 
Option value 
(million baht) 
Project NPV 
with option 
Interaction No interaction 
(value 
isolation) 
Interaction 
effect 
G1, F1 16,269 24,018 15,546 8,472 
G2, F1 -1,324 6,424 3,701 2,723 
G3, F1 1,268 9,016 5,550 3,466 
Government support 
G1 = Minimum traffic/revenue guarantee option at 90% level of guarantee 
G2 = Debt guarantee option 
G3 = Equity guarantee option  
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Financial institution option 
F1 = Deferral option 
Table 6.1: The value of the government and the financial institution option combinations 
and their interaction effects (million baht) 
 
When more than two options from the government and financial institution are embedded in 
the project, they interact. Each option combination is valued by the binomial lattice model, 
and the interpretation is presented as follows: 
 
6.2.1 Combination of the minimum traffic guarantee option (government) and the deferral 
option (financial institution) 
 
When the minimum traffic guarantee is combined with the deferral option under concession 
package, they will interact with each other. Both options are of opposite types—the prior call 
option (the deferral option) and the latter put option (the minimum traffic guarantee). They 
interact with each other with non-overlapping exercise region; therefore, the project 
performance is enhanced (see figure 6.1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                     
  
t=0                 t=3                              t=22           t=30 
 
Figure 6.1: The exercise region of the government and the financial institution options 
 
In general, the exercise of the prior option will alter the underline asset and hence the value of 
subsequent option. For example, the lender has an option to defer funding for the project until 
the operating commencement date. Lender gains the benefit in case of the project cost 
overruns, which decreases the ability to pay debt, by cancelling the project funds. By adding 
the minimum traffic guarantee option, the probability of the lender to exercise the deferral 
option is lower as the lender foresees the future cash flow with guarantee. This is because the 
project cash flow under the minimum guarantee (at 90% level) is strong enough to repay debt 
in some project cash flow scenarios, though the project cost is overrun. By adding both 
Construction 
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Minimum traffic guarantee 
Option/ Equity Guarantee 
 
Debt guarantee option 
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options together, the project NPV turns out to be 16,269 million baht, and the SES project is 
financially feasible. In addition, the result showed that the value of the interaction effect is at 
large 8,472 million baht as the option has no overlapped portion in the exercise areas and the 
exercise of the prior option may destroy the latter option in some paths of the binomial lattice 
model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2: The 3-year binomial path of total construction cost and the value of the 
deferral option (in parenthesis) in million baht 
 
Suppose the construction cost is higher than the expectation at 33,471 million baht (see 
Scenario A in figure 6.2). With a single deferral option, the financial institution may decide to 
forego financing project, then the value of the deferral option is 589 million baht (in figure 6.2 
and referred to Chapter 4 for detail). By adding the minimum traffic guarantee, the value of 
the minimum traffic guarantees the option at the 3rd year will increase to 15,840 million baht 
(table 6.2) under 33,471 million baht of total construction cost, compared to 1,939 million 
baht of the single deferral option (Scenario A in figure 6.2). Therefore, the lender, with the 
combination of the deferral option and the minimum traffic guarantee options, still continues 
to support the project. The values of the minimum traffic guarantee under various 
construction costs are presented in the following table: 
 
Scenario  Total construction cost at 
3rd year  (million baht) 
Value (NPV) of the minimum 
traffic guarantee option at 3rd 
year  (million baht) 
A 33,471 15,840 
B 29,414 20,227 
C 25,848 24,083 
(0) 
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Scenario  Total construction cost at 
3rd year  (million baht) 
Value (NPV) of the minimum 
traffic guarantee option at 3rd 
year  (million baht) 
D 22,715 27,471 
Table 6.2: The value of the minimum traffic guarantee at the end of the 3rd year of the 
binomial path for various construction costs (million baht) 
 
The project‘s NPVs of the combined deferral option and the minimum traffic guarantee option 
along the binomial path are presented in figure 6.3. Finally, going backwards through the tree 
until the value of option today is calculated, the NPV value of combined options is 16,269 
million baht [e
 (0.06*1)
 (16,238x0.71+19,864x (1-0.71)); with p=0.71, rf =6%]. The binomial 
path of the combined deferral and the minimum traffic guarantee option is shown in figure 
6.3. Therefore, it can potentially create improvements in the project‘s value through the 
combined deferral and the minimum traffic guarantee option.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.3: The 3-year binomial path of total construction cost and the value of the 
combined deferral and minimum traffic guarantee options (in parenthesis) in million 
baht 
 
6.2.2 Combination of the debt guarantee option (government) and the deferral option 
(financial institution) 
 
Previously, the debt guarantee option by the government itself was not enough to make the 
project attractive for investment. However, when the debt guarantee from the government was 
combined with the deferral option from the financial institution, the project‘s NPV is 
improved. Both options are different; one call option (the deferral option) and one put option 
(the debt guarantee option). Both options are in a sequential order which affects the conditions 
of the first; the deferral option will impact the second option, the debt guarantee option (see 
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figure 6.1). When both options are of different type, they are exercisable under negatively 
correlated conditions. The effective underlying asset for the latter option may be highly 
conditional on prior exercise of an earlier deferral option (e.g., at higher construction cost in 
the prior option), then the option value of exercising the latter (the debt guarantee) option, 
given the condition of the former, would be large.  
 
For example, at the higher construction cost of 33,471 million baht (see figure 6.2), with a 
single deferral option, the financial institution may decide to forego funding the project. By 
adding the debt guarantee option, the value of the debt guarantee option at the 3rd year will be 
9,684 million baht, improving the project‘s NPV. Therefore, the lender may decide to fund 
the project with the combination of the deferral option and the debt guarantee option. The 
values of debt guarantee under various construction costs are presented in the following table 
6.3: 
 
Scenario  Total construction cost at 
3rd year (million baht) 
Value of the debt guarantee 
option at t=3 (million baht) 
A 33,471 9,684 
B 29,414 7,403 
C 25,848 4,875 
D 22,715 3,231 
Table 6.3: The value of the debt guarantee option at the end of the 3rd year of the 
binomial path for various construction costs (million baht) 
 
The project‘s NPVs of the combined deferral option and the debt guarantee options along the 
binomial path are presented in figure 6.4. Using a backward calculation, the value of the 
combined option is 6,424 million baht [e 
(0.06*1
) (7,413x0.71+5,347x (1-0.71))]. The option 
values of the combined deferral and the debt guarantee options are shown (in parenthesis) in 
figure 6.4. The value of project is improved by the combined deferral and the debt guarantee 
option. 
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Figure 6.4: The 3-year binomial path of total construction cost and the value of the 
combined deferral and debt guarantee options (in parenthesis) in million baht 
 
The interaction effect is relatively high at 2,723 million baht (shown in table 6.1). Interaction 
increased the value of the debt guarantee option. In the worst scenario of project‘s cost 
overrun, the debt guarantee option from the government is exercised and helps to increase the 
project‘s value. The opportunity to exercise the deferral option decreases when it was 
combined with the debt-guarantee option. It is implied that the project generates sufficient 
cash flow to service debt obligations. However, the option combinations are still insufficient, 
and the project is financially infeasible. More options are required. The project NPV is 
slightly negative at 1,324 million baht, and the government may consider providing other 
supports as the project is nearly feasible. 
 
6.2.3 Combination of the equity guarantee option (government) and the deferral option 
(financial institution) 
 
The project becomes more attractive when the equity guarantee option (government) and the 
deferral option (financial institution) are combined. Both options are of opposite types: one 
call option (the deferral option) and one put option (the equity guarantee option). In addition, 
the condition on the first (the deferral option) will alter the value of the subsequence (the 
equity guarantee) option. There is no overlap between the two options (see figure 6.1). The 
conditional probability of exercising the second option (the equity guarantee) given prior 
exercise of the first option (the deferral option) would be small. Both are optimally exercised, 
represented by the high interaction value at 3,466 million baht. The interaction is high when i) 
there is no overlap in the exercise region and ii) options are in the money. 
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(10,239) 
 
Under the scenario of the high construction cost, the individual deferral option is normally 
exercised by financial institutions to refuse to fund the project. With the option combination, 
the risk of construction cost overrun is protected by the equity guarantee option from the 
government. In the case of high construction cost, the conditional probability of exercising the 
equity guarantee option would be higher and also the option would have a larger value. The 
values of the equity guarantee under various construction costs are presented in the following 
table: 
 
Scenario  Total construction cost at 
t=3 (million baht) 
Value of the equity 
guarantee option at t=3 
(million baht) 
A 33,471 13,015 
B 29,414 10,498 
C 25,848 7,619 
D 22,715 5,640 
Table 6.4: The value of the equity guarantee option at the end of the 3rd year of the 
binomial path for various construction costs (million baht) 
 
The 3-year binomial path of the combined deferral and the equity guarantee option is 
presented in figure 6.5. The value of the project is enhanced by the combined deferral and the 
equity guarantee option. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.5: The 3-year binomial path of total construction cost and the value of the 
combined deferral and equity guarantee options (in parenthesis) in million baht  
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The combination of the deferral option and the equity guarantee option is valued at 9,016 
million baht [e
(0.06*1)
 (10,239x0.71+7,915x(1-0.71))]. The project is feasible with these two 
option combinations, worth at 1,268 million baht (-7,749+9,016). This option may be 
considered a good choice for the government to support as it does not spend a large 
government budget with equity guarantees and the project is still feasible. For policy design, 
the project is recommended to propose the combination of the deferral and the equity 
guarantee option in the project‘s scheme. 
 
6.3 Combination of government and private company options 
 
This section focuses on the option combinations involving the government and private 
company. The values of the SES project with various option combinations and their 
interactions are shown in the following table: 
 
Option value 
(million baht) 
Project NPV 
with option 
Option 
interaction 
No interaction 
(value 
isolation) 
Interaction 
effect 
G1, P1 12,549 20,298 21,275 -977 
G2, P1 -1,357 6,391 9,430 -3,039 
G1,G3,P2 11,469 19,218 23,008 -3,709 
Government support 
G1 = Minimum traffic/revenue guarantee option at 90% level of guarantee 
G2 = Debt guarantee option  
G3 = Equity guarantee option  
Private company option 
P1 = Deferral option 
P2 = Grant option  
 
Table 6.5: The value of option involving the government and private company and their 
interaction effects 
 
When options of the government and private company are combined in the project, there is an 
interaction effect. Overall, the project value is enhanced. Option combinations are valued by 
the binomial lattice model as follows:  
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6.3.1 Combination of the minimum traffic guarantee option at 90% (government) and the 
deferral option (private company) 
 
When the minimum traffic guarantee option is combined with the deferral option under a 
concession package, there is an interaction effect. Both options are a European put option. 
The degree of interaction depends on the option sequences and whether the latter option is in 
the money or out of the money when the first option is exercised. The investment project with 
its collection of real options for the government and private companies is summarised in 
figure 6.6. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                     
  
t=0                 t=3                              t=22           t=30 
 
Figure 6.6: The exercise region of the government and private company options 
 
To determine the values of the option combination and its interaction effect, they are valued 
simultaneously. The payoff for this option combination can be determined in the following 
ways. 
 
i) The project‘s revenue with minimum traffic guarantee is: 
RGt  = Max {Min (Rt, Rmaxt), Gt}, where  
RGt = the revenue with the minimum guarantee at year t 
Rt  = the observed revenue at time t  
Rmaxt = the revenue at the maximum capacity at time t 
Gt = the level of revenue at the floor at time t  
 
ii) The deferral option payoff of private company (Vdt) is:  
Vdt = Max (0, FVt-PV(FVt)T-t) if Ct < 0   
=          Max (0,      
   
          
)), or 
=  0 if Ct > or equal 0, where 
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FVt       =   the face value of notification issued in the period of t (the value of revenue 
sharing in each year which is predetermined, based on the projected cash flow 
of a base case scenario). The payment will be paid at the end of the 
concession.  
PV(FVt)T-t  = the present value of a payment FVt at time t 
Ct =  the observed project‘s free cash flow (after debt) at time t 
T =  the total concession period 
 
The deferral option is triggered when the project‘s NPV in each year is negative, then the 
private company can delay the concession payment. The deferred amount can be seen in table 
5.10 in Chapter 5. The payoff (cash flow) for the combined minimum traffic guarantee and 
the deferral option (Vdmt) is: 
Vdmt = Max (0, FVt-PV(FVt)T-t) if Smt <0, or 
 = Vmt if Smt > or equal 0 
Smt =  the project‘s NPV with the minimum traffic guarantee 
Vmt = the option value of the minimum traffic guarantee at time t 
 
Tables 6.6 provides the example of the payoff calculating for the combination of the 
minimum traffic guarantee option and the deferral option.  
 
a) The binomial path of the projected cash 
flow after debt at t=8  
= -1,552 million baht 
 
a.1) the binomial path of the projected 
cash flow after debt with the minimum 
traffic guarantee at 90% at t=8 
= 295 million baht 
a.2) the value of the minimum traffic 
guarantee (Vmt) 
= a.1-a 
=295--(1,552) 
=1,847 million baht 
b) the predetermine deferred amount at t=8  = 2,496 million baht 
c) the deferral option payoff  
max (0, FVt-PV(FVt)T-t) 
t= 8 
T=30 
= max (0, FVt-PV(FVt)) 
= max(0, 2,496-PV(2,496)) 
= max(0, 2,299)) 
= 2,299 million baht 
d) the payoff (cash flow) for the combined 
minimum traffic guarantee and the deferral 
= Vmt if Smt > or equal 0 
= 1,847 million baht 
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option 
= max (0, FVt-PV(FVt)) if Smt <0 
= Smt if Smt > or equal 0 
e) Result By including the minimum traffic 
guarantee, the deferral option is out of 
the money. This case is an example of a 
situation where that the first option may 
eliminate the latter option. 
Table 6.6: Calculating sheet for valuing the combination of the minimum traffic 
guarantee option and the deferral option 
 
In this combination, the interaction effect is negative at 977 million baht. The sum of the 
value of each separate option is higher than the combined value of the two options which 
represents a case of negative interaction. Therefore, measuring the value of option 
combination by simply adding the individual option value would be a slight overstatement. 
However, the combination of the minimum traffic guarantee option and the deferral option 
enhances the project‘s value, making the project feasible. The NPV of the SES project is high 
at 12,549 million baht. This combined option may not be worth it as it contains potential 
future liability to the government for the whole life of the project. 
 
6.3.2 Combination of the debt guarantee option (government) and the deferral option 
(private company) 
 
When the debt guarantee option and the deferral option are combined, the interaction effect is 
-3,039 million baht, signalling overlap in exercise region (presented in figure 6.6). As a result 
of the negative interaction, the combined value of options is less than the sum of the value of 
each separate option. This is because the exercise of the debt guarantee option will reduce the 
opportunity to exercise the deferral option or vice versa. These two options are the same type 
and are fully overlapped in the exercise areas. The value of this combined option can be 
determined as follows. 
 
i) The payoff of the debt guarantee option is:  
VDt =  Max (-(Cbt-Dt), 0) and the project‘s free cash flow with debt guarantee is  
Rdt  = Max [Max { Min (Cbt, Cmaxt), 0,}, Dt], where 
Rdt = the project‘s free cash flow with debt guarantee at time t 
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Cbt = the observed project‘s free cash flow (before debt) at time t 
Cmaxt = the project‘s free cash flow at maximum capacity at time t 
Dt = the amount of debt (principal and interest) that has to be serviced by the  
project company at time t 
 
ii) The deferral option payoff for private company is:  
Vdt = Max (0, FVt-PV(FVt)T-t) if Ct < 0   
=          Max (0,      
   
          
)), or 
=  0 if Ct > or equal 0 where 
FVt       =   the face value of notification issued in the period of t (value of revenue sharing 
in each year which is predetermined, based on the project cash flow of a base 
case scenario). The payment will be paid at the end of the concession.  
PV(FVt)T-t  = the present value of a payment FVt at time t 
Ct =  the observed project‘s free cash flow (after debt) 
T =  the total concession period 
 
Therefore, the payoff for the combination of the debt guarantee option and the deferral option 
(Vddt) is: 
Vddt = Max (-Ct ,max (0, FVt-PV(FVt) T-t) if Ct <0, or 
 = 0 if Ct > or equal 0 
Ct =  the observed project‘s free cash flow (after debt) 
 = Cbt-Dt 
 
Table 6.7 provides an example of the payoff calculation for the combination of the debt 
guarantee option and the deferral option. 
 
a) The binomial path of projected cash 
flow after debt at t=8  
= -1,552 million baht 
 
a.1) the binomial path of the project cash 
flow after debt with debt guarantee at t=8 
= -(a) 
= 1,552 million baht 
b) the predetermine deferred amount at t=8  = 2,496 million baht 
c) the deferral option payoff 
max (0, FVt-PV(FVt) T-t) at t=8 
= max (0, FVt-PV(FVt) T-t) 
= max(0, 2,496-PV(2,496)) 
= max(0, 2,299)) 
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= 2,299 million baht 
d) the payoff for the combination of the 
debt guarantee and the deferral option 
Max (Ct ,max (0, FVt-PV(FVt) T-t)) if Ct <0 
= Max (-Ct ,max (0, FVt-PV(FVt) T-t)) if 
Ct <0 
= Max (-(-1,552),2,299) 
= 2,299 million baht 
e) Result  The option value is equal to the value of 
the stand-alone deferral option. Though 
the debt guarantee option is in the 
money it is worthless when combined 
with the deferral option. 
Table 6.7: Calculating sheet for valuing the combination of the debt guarantee option 
and the deferral option 
 
The stand-alone deferral option is valued at 6,318 million baht which is slightly less than the 
combined value (6,391 million baht). This combination is an example of the two put options 
with almost full overlap in the exercise area, and the first option (the deferral option) can 
eliminate the second option (the debt guarantee option). It is implied that the combination of 
these two options may not be effective and that the project is still not financially feasible with 
negative NPV of -1,357 million baht. The project needs additional options to enhance the 
project‘s NPV. 
 
6.3.3 Combination of the minimum traffic guarantee option, the equity guarantee option 
(government) and the grant option (private company)  
 
The combination of three options—two options from the government (the minimum traffic 
guarantee and the equity guarantee) and one option from the private company (grant option) 
—are combined. The value of this option combination can be calculated as the following: 
 
i) The project‘s revenue with minimum traffic guarantee option is: 
RGt  = Max {Min (Rt, Rmaxt), Gt}, where  
RGt = the revenue with the minimum guarantee at year t 
Rt  = the observed revenue at time t  
Rmaxt = the revenue at the maximum capacity at time t 
Gt = the level of revenue at the floor at time t  
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ii) The payoff for the equity guarantee option (Vet) at time t is: 
Vet            =  Max (Et-Ct, 0), and  
The project‘s free cash flow with the equity guarantee option is: 
Ret  = Max [Max { Min (Ct, Cmaxt), 0,},Et] , where 
Ret =  the project‘s free cash flow with equity guarantee at time t 
Ct = the observed project‘s free cash flow (after debt) at time t 
Cmaxt = the project‘s free cash flow at maximum capacity at time t 
Et = the level of the project‘s free cash flow that generates return equal to a  
required return on equity at time t 
 
iii) The payoff of the grant option (Vgt) is:  
In case 
Ct  ≥ 0 =  0 
Ct < 0 =  Min (-Ct, Gt ), where 
Ct =  the observed project‘s free cash flow (after debt) at time t 
Gt =  the amounts of government grant for each year (the amount of revenue  
sharing in table 5.10) at time t 
 
Therefore the payoff for the combination of the minimum traffic guarantee option, the equity 
guarantee option and grant option is:  
 
Vmeg = Max (Et-Cmt,Vgt) if Cmt <0, or   
= Et-Cmt if 0<Cmt<Et, or 
=  0 if Cmt > Et, where 
Cmt =  the observed project‘s free cash flow (after debt) with the minimum  
  traffic guarantee 
Vgt = the value of the grant option at time t 
Table 6.8 presents the example of the payoff calculation for the combination of the minimum 
traffic guarantee option, the equity guarantee option and grant option. 
 
a) The binomial path of the projected cash 
flow after debt at t=8 of project operation 
= -1,552 million baht 
 
a.1) the binomial path of the projected 
cash flow after debt with the minimum 
traffic guarantee at 90% at t=8 
= 295 million baht 
b) the equity guarantee amount at t=8  = 551 million baht 
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c) the max grant amount at t=8  = 2,496 million baht 
d) the single equity guarantee option 
payoff 
= Max (Et-Ct, 0) 
= max (Et-Ct, 0) 
= max (551-(-1,552),0) 
= 2,103 million baht 
e) the single grant option payoff  
=Min (-Ct, Gi ) 
= Min (-Ct, Gi ) 
= Min (-(-1,552), 2,496 ) 
= 1,552 million baht  
f) the payoff for the combination of the 
minimum traffic guarantee option, the 
equity guarantee option and grant option 
=max (0,Et-Cmt,Gi) if Cmt <0 
= max (Et-Cmt, 0) if 0<Cmt<Et 
= 0 if Cmt > Et 
= max (Et-Cmt, 0) if 0<Cmt<Et 
= max (0,551-295,0) 
= 256 million baht 
g) Result By including the minimum traffic 
guarantee, the project NPV is improved. 
The grant option is out of the money. 
Adding the minimum traffic guarantee 
decreased the opportunity to exercise the 
grant option. Typically, if put options 
are overlapped, the combined option 
value will exhibit negative interaction. 
The interaction effect is moderately 
negative. 
Table 6.8: Calculating sheet for valuing the combination of the minimum traffic 
guarantee option, the equity guarantee option and grant option 
 
The combination of these three options enhances the project‘s NPV without option from -
7,749 million baht to 11,469 million baht. This combination combines three put options that 
overlap in exercise regions; therefore, the interaction effect is negative at -3,709 million baht. 
The minimum traffic guarantee option increases the value of the underlying asset (the 
project‘s cash flow). Then, the value of the equity guarantee option (put option) and grant 
option (put option) decreased as the value of the underlying asset (the project‘s cash flow) 
increases. However, this option combination is recommended as it spends a smaller amount of 
the government support. 
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6.4 Combination of financial institution option and private company option 
 
This section focuses on option combinations involving financial institution and private 
company. In typical project financing, the project company borrows funds from the financial 
institution for the development and operation of the project whilst cash flows that are 
generated by the project are used to make principal and interest payments on the loan. 
Therefore the uncertainty of the project‘s cash flow exists with financial institutions. To 
mitigate such risks, the managerial flexibility in the project is required by the financial 
institution.  
 
As shown in the previous section, managerial flexibility embedded in investment projects 
typically takes the form of a collection of real options. This part focuses mainly on valuing the 
combination of the financial institution option and the private company option. The values of 
the SES project with the combination of financial institution option and private company 
option and their interactions are shown in the following table:  
 
Option value 
(million baht) 
Project NPV 
with option 
Option 
interaction 
No interaction 
(value isolation) 
Interaction 
effect 
F1,P1 1,916 9,664 6,906 2,758 
F1,P2 2,973 10,721 3,678 7,044 
F1,F2,P1 2,598 10,347 7,615 2,731 
Financial institution option 
F1 = the Deferral option 
F2 = the Abandon option without threshold 
Private company option 
P1 = the Deferral option 
P2 = the Grant option 
Table 6.9: The values of the combination of the financial institution option and private 
company option and their interaction effects (million baht) 
 
The investment project with combination of financial institution option and private company 
option is summarised in figure 6.7. 
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t=0                 t=3                              t=22           t=30 
 
Figure 6.7: The exercise region of the financial institution option and private company 
option 
 
When the financial institution option is combined with private company option, there is an 
interaction effect.  Each option combination is valued by the binomial lattice model as 
follows:  
 
6.4.1 Combination of the deferral option (financial institution) and the deferral option 
(private company)  
 
When the first deferral option of financial institution and the second deferral option of the 
private company are combined, the project value is enhanced. With the combined option, the 
probability of the lender to exercise its first deferral option is less as the project‘s NPV with 
the second deferral option (private company) is enhanced as seen in table 6.10: 
Scenario  Total construction 
cost at year 3 
(million baht) 
Value of deferral 
option for financial 
institution without 
the deferral option 
(private company) 
at the 3rd year 
(million baht) 
Value of deferral 
option for financial 
institution with the 
deferral option 
(private company) at 
the 3rd year (million 
baht) 
A 33,471 1,939 13,122 
B 29,414 0 11,447 
C 25,848 0 9,149 
D 22,715 0 7,921 
Table 6.10: The value of the deferral option (FI) at the end of the 3rd year for various 
construction costs (million baht) 
 
Construction 
Phrase 
 
Concession End     
 
Operation Phrase     
 
Deferral Option 
(FI) Abandon option  
 
Deferral option/Grant option 
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The binomial path of the combined option is presented in figure 6.8. The value of the project 
is enhanced by combined both deferral options (financial institution and the private company). 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.8: The 3-year binomial path of total construction cost and the value of the 
combination of both deferral options (in parenthesis) in million baht 
 
The project‘s NPV of the SES project is improved from -7,749 million baht to 1,916 million 
baht with the value of the combined deferral options at 9,644 million baht. Therefore, the 
project is feasible. Though both options are put options, their exercise regions do not overlap, 
and one option supports the other option. Furthermore, two options have a different expiration 
date. The deferral option of the financial institution can be exercised during construction 
period whilst the deferral option of the private company can be exercised during the project 
operation phase. Because there is no overlapping in the exercise, the interaction effect is high 
at 2,758 million baht. This type of option combination is recommended for policy 
implementation. 
 
6.4.2 Combination of the deferral option (financial institution) and the grant option 
(private company) 
 
When the deferral option is combined with the grant option, there is an interaction effect. 
Valuing this option combination can be determined in the following ways.   
i) The payoff of the grant option (Vgt) of the private company is computed by the following: 
 Vgt = 0 if Ct  ≥ 0 or 
 = Min (-Ct, Gi ), if Ct < 0, where;  
Vgt = the value of grant option at time t 
Ct =  the observed project‘s free cash flow (after debt) 
1-p 
(10,742) 
 
(13,122) 
 
(11,906) 
 
(10,161) 
 
(8,285) 
 
Scenario A 
 
Scenario B 
 
Scenario C 
 
Scenario D 
 
p=0.71 
1-p 
p 
26,740 
 
25,147 
27,662 
30,428 
 
33,471 
 
29,414 
 
24,039 
 
23,499 
 
25,848 
 
22,715 
 
 
(9,149) 
 
(11,447)
(7,921) 
 
(9,063) 
 
(9,644) 
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Gi =  the amount of government grant each year (the amount of revenue sharing in 
table 5.10)  
 
In this financial scheme, the private company foresees the amount of grant that the 
government must pay to the concessionaire under the pre-agreed condition in the concession 
contract. The value of the project‘s NPV is enhanced with grant options, and therefore the 
likelihood to exercise the deferral option of the financial institution is decreased. The value of 
the deferral option at the end of year 3 for various construction costs is provided in table 6.11. 
 
Scenario  Total 
construction cost 
at 3rd year 
(million baht) 
Value of the deferral 
option for financial 
institution without  
grant  option (private 
company) at 3rd 
(million baht) 
Value of the 
deferral option for 
financial institution 
with grant option at 
3
rd
 year (million 
baht) 
A 33,471 1,939 14,737 
B 29,414 0 12,562 
C 25,848 0 10,127 
D 22,715 0 8,731 
 
Table 6.11: The value of the deferral option (FI) with/without grant option at the end of 
the 3rd year for various construction costs  
 
The binomial path of the combination of the deferral option (financial institution) and the 
grant option (private company) is presented in figure 6.9. The value of project is enhanced by 
the combination of the deferral option and the grant option. The value of this combined option 
at each node on the 3-year binomial path is shown in the parenthesis in figure 6.9. 
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(7,324
) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.9: The 3-year binomial path of total construction cost and the value of the 
combination of the deferral option (financial institution) and the grant option (private 
company): million baht 
 
Though the project‘s NPV improves from -7,749 million baht to 2,973 million baht, then, the 
SES project is financially feasible. The interaction effect is 7,044 million baht because there is 
no overlap in the exercise areas and the grant option has significant values under the cost 
overrun scenario (Scenario A in table 6.11). Therefore, the project does not require the 
additional options to increase its NPV. 
 
6.4.3 Combination of the deferral option and the abandon option without threshold 
(financial institution) with the deferral option (private company) 
 
Three options—two options from financial institution (the deferral and the abandon option 
without threshold) and one option from the private company (the deferral option)—are 
combined. Also, two put options (the abandon option without threshold of the financial 
institution and the deferral option of the private company) and one call option (the deferral 
option of the financial institution) are combined. The value of this option combination is 
calculated with the following steps. 
 
Step 1: Calculating the value of the combination of abandon option (financial institution) and 
the deferral option (private company). 
1.1) the payoff for the abandon option is: 
Vat  =  Max (Xt-St, 0), where 
Xt  = the exercise price of a put option (threshold level: outstanding debt) at  
time t                                 
1-p 
(11,174) 
 
(13,293) 
 
(14,737) 
 
(9,161)
Scenario B 
 
Scenario C 
 
Scenario D 
 
1-p 
p=0.71 
p 
26,740 
 
25,147 
27,662 
30,428 
 
33,471 
 
29,414 
 
24,039 
 
23,499 
 
22,715 
 
 
25,848 
 
(8,731)
(10,127)
(12,562) 
 
Scenario A 
 
(9,980) 
 
(11,947) 
 
(10,721) 
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St  = the project‘s value (the NPV of EBITDA) at time t 
 
1.2) the payoff for the deferral (Vdt) option is: 
Vdt = Max (0, FVt-PV(FVt)T-t) if Ct < 0   
=          Max (0,      
   
          
)), or 
=  0 if Ct > or equal 0 where 
FVt       =   the face value of notification issued in the period of t (value of revenue sharing 
each year which is predetermined, based on the project cash flow of a base 
case scenario). The payment will be paid at the end of the concession.  
PV(FVt)T-t  = the present value of a payment FVt at time t 
Ct =  the observed project‘s free cash flow (after debt) 
T =  the total concession period 
 
Step 2: The next step is to combine the abandon option (financial institution) and the deferral 
option (the private company) with the deferral option (financial institution). The probability of 
the financial institution to exercise its deferral option is less as the future cash flow (with the 
abandon option of financial institution and the deferral option of the private company) is 
enhanced as seen in table 6.12. 
 
Scenario  Total construction cost 
at 3rd year (million 
baht) 
Value of the combined 
abandon option of financial 
institution with the deferral 
option of the private company 
at 3rd year (million baht) 
A 33,471 15,369 
B 29,414 11,447 
C 25,848 9,149 
D 22,715 7,921 
Table 6.12: The value of the combined abandon option (financial institution) and 
deferral option (the private company) at the end of the 3rd year of the binomial path for 
various construction costs  
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The binomial path of the combination of deferral option (financial institution) and the 
abandon (financial institution) and the deferral option (private company) is presented in figure 
6.10.  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.10: The first 3-year binomial path of the combination of the deferral option and 
the abandon option (financial institution) and the deferral option (private company) in 
million baht 
 
The interaction effect of this combination is quite high, valued at 2,731 million baht. It also 
shows that the first option (the deferral option from the private company) eliminates the 
second and third option. When the deferral option from the private company is exercised, the 
abandon-without-threshold (financial institution) and the deferral option (financial institution) 
are out of money. In addition, the project does not need the additional options from either the 
financial institution or the private company to increase the project‘s NPV. It is noted that even 
though more options are applied, the option combination may not be worthwhile. 
 
6.5 Volatility and Seasonality Analysis: Option combinations 
 
In this subsection, the analysis of the option value for various option combinations value is 
conducted based on systematic seasonal variations of the traffic flow. In this case, the 
volatility of the underlying cash flow is determined from the volatility of traffic volume. The 
volatility of traffic volume is calculated on historical data during 2004-2015. To account for 
seasonal effects of traffic flow, an analysis explores volatility for annual traffic data from 
2004 to 2015. Based on year-to-year growth rates (see table A5 in appendix A) as well as 
seasonal adjustments for (monthly) traffic volume (see table A6 in appendix A), traffic 
volatility is valued at approximately 4% and the risk-free interest rate in the model is valued 
at 3%. 
(3,855) 
 
1-p 
1-p 
23,499 
 
(10,161) 
 
(11,758) 
 
(8,285) 
 
Scenario A 
 
Scenario B 
 
Scenario C 
 
Scenario D 
 
p=0.71 
26,740 
 25,147 
27,662 
30,428 
 
33,471 
 
29,414 
 
24,039 
 
25,848 
 
22,715 
 
(9,149) 
 
(7,921) 
 
(11,447)
(15,369)
(13,417) 
 
(9,063) 
 
p 
(10,347) 
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For all combinations of options, except the combination of options with the minimum traffic 
guarantee (government), the value of option combination decreases with a decrease in 
volatility of the traffic flow (from 20% to 4%). It is generally known that option value 
increase (decrease) with an increase (decrease) in volatility. Table 6.13 shows the relationship 
of various option combinations, calculated using binomial lattice, to changes in volatility, 
which the approach accounted for the seasonality effect of traffic flow.  
Option combinations  for the 
SES project 
Option value (million 
baht) at 20%-volatility 
and 3%-risk-free interest 
rate 
Option value (million 
baht) at 4%-volatility 
and 3%-risk-free 
interest rate, account 
for seasonality  
The deferral option (FI) and the 
minimum traffic guarantee 
(government) 
27,246 27,252 
The deferral option (FI) and the 
debt guarantee option 
(government) 
7,543 5,200 
The deferral option (FI) and the 
equity guarantee option 
(government) 
10,378 7,203 
The minimum traffic guarantee 
(government) and the deferral 
option (private company option) 
30,680 31,059 
The debt guarantee option 
(government) and the deferral 
option (private company option)  
10,463 5,367 
The minimum traffic guarantee 
and the equity guarantee 
(government) and the grant 
option (private company option) 
29,380 29,566 
The deferral option (FI) and the 
deferral option (private 
company) 
15,232 8,278 
The deferral option (FI) and the 17,503 9,013 
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Option combinations  for the 
SES project 
Option value (million 
baht) at 20%-volatility 
and 3%-risk-free interest 
rate 
Option value (million 
baht) at 4%-volatility 
and 3%-risk-free 
interest rate, account 
for seasonality  
grant option (private company) 
The deferral option (FI), the 
abandon option without 
threshold (FI) and the deferral 
option (private company) 
15,232 8,278 
Table 6.13: The value of option combinations at different volatility levels    
 
For the pair of options, the most valuable option is the combination of the minimum traffic 
guarantee option (government) and the deferral option (private company), regardless of how 
volatility of traffic is.   
 
6.6 Sensitivity to other parameters: Option combinations  
 
The effect of risk-free interest rate on the value of real option for option combinations is 
explored in this subsection. In general, the interest rate of the project is often increased to 
compensate for risk. In binomial lattice, how much the underlying asset moves up or down is 
determined by its volatility while the interest rate used in real options is a risk-free interest 
rate.  
 
It is shown from the analysis that the value of option combinations increases with the decrease 
in risk-free interest rate for all option combinations. The relationship is shown in table 6.14.  
 
Option combinations  for the 
SES project 
Option value (million 
baht) at 6% of risk-free 
interest rate (20%-
volatility) 
Option value (million 
baht) at 3% of risk-free 
interest rate (20%-
volatility) 
The deferral option (FI) and the 
minimum traffic guarantee 
(government) 
24,018 27,246 
The deferral option (FI) and the 6,424 7,543 
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Option combinations  for the 
SES project 
Option value (million 
baht) at 6% of risk-free 
interest rate (20%-
volatility) 
Option value (million 
baht) at 3% of risk-free 
interest rate (20%-
volatility) 
debt guarantee option 
(government) 
The deferral option (FI) and the 
equity guarantee option 
(government) 
9,016 10,378 
The minimum traffic guarantee 
(government) and the deferral 
option (private company option) 
20,298 30,680 
The debt guarantee option 
(government) and the deferral 
option (private company option)  
6,391 10,463 
The minimum traffic guarantee 
and the equity guarantee 
(government) and the grant 
option (private company option) 
19,218 29,380 
The deferral option (FI) and the 
deferral option (Private 
company) 
9,664 15,232 
The deferral option (FI) and the 
grant option (private company) 
10,721 17,503 
The deferral option (FI), the 
abandon option without 
threshold (FI) and the deferral 
option (private company) 
10,347 15,232 
Table 6.14: The value of option combinations at different risk-free interest rates     
 
For the pair of options, the most valuable option is the combination of the deferral option 
(financial institution) and the minimum traffic guarantee option (government) for 6% of risk-
free interest rate and the combination of the minimum traffic guarantee (government) and the 
deferral option (private company) for 3% of risk-free interest rate respectively. 
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6.7 Summary 
 
This chapter gives an example of the combined options from the government, financial 
institution and the private company in a large-scale infrastructure project. The option 
combination can be valued by the binomial option pricing. 
 
The results present that the combined options have a very meaningful value for the policy 
design and implementation. The option values are significantly influenced by the interaction 
between the options. Interactions may be small or large. Interactions are dependent upon type, 
being in or out of money, and the order of the options. In terms of numerical calculation, 1) 
the combination of the minimum traffic guarantee (government) and  the deferral option 
(financial institution) provides the highest option value but scarifies a lot of government 
budgets; and 2) the combination of the deferral option (financial institution) and the debt 
guarantee of government or the combination of the deferral option (financial institution) and 
the equity guarantee option of government or the combination of the deferral option (financial 
institution) and the grant option of the private company or the combination of the deferral 
option (financial institution) and the deferral option of the private company are recommended 
to apply to the project. This is because when these options are combined, the interaction effect 
is large. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion and Recommendation 
 
This chapter summarises the research findings related to the application of real options and 
option interactions among the key project stakeholders in large scale infrastructure projects. 
Referring to the purpose of this research, an attempt to minimise the knowledge gap between 
risk sharing between the public and private sector in PPP projects has been made. This 
chapter concludes and illustrates the achievements of the research. Limitations of this research 
and recommendations for further research explorations are also provided in this chapter.   
 
This study has applied the real option theory in large-scale infrastructure projects and the case 
study of the Second Stage Expressway System (SES) project in Bangkok, Thailand. This 
study has provided an analysis of the risk allocations among the three main stakeholders in 
the project; the government, the financial institution and the private company (project 
sponsor). This research demonstrates the complexity and the obscurity of risks and of 
appropriate and inappropriate risk allocation. It is concluded that the risks incurred in a large-
scale infrastructure project need to be thoroughly analysed, managed and allocated. The study 
also concurred with much of the academic literature and previous research studies that large-
scale infrastructure projects are subject to a high probability of project failure, requiring 
supports and commitments from the stakeholders in the project development. However, the 
degrees of appropriate support are doubted and require quantitative analysis to evaluate. The 
gap of the past research studies has inspired the author to continue research studies in the field 
of risk allocation in the context of project finance.  
 
This research noted the following lessons and findings from the past literature. The large 
infrastructure projects themselves without support are subject to the risk of project failure. 
The literature addresses the importance of the support from the main stakeholders, especially 
from the government, in the project development. Governments can make such projects 
feasible by offering support such as guarantees or grants under certain conditions. However, 
the government has to scarify the project success with its spending and such risks are solely 
transferred to the government. To mitigate the government risk, Public Private Partnerships 
(PPPs) are being applied. Private participation in infrastructure projects has been sought by 
governments in order to allocate project risks and to provide an additional source of funds in 
the project investments. The literature also mentions that the success of PPPs depends on 
reasonable support or risk sharing between the private sector and the government.  
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Determining the optimal level of government support and risk allocation may not be done by 
traditional project evaluation methods and the shortfall of such methods then requires the use 
of option pricing techniques. Real options are introduced as the tool to quantify the support of 
governments in investment projects. Much of the literature also refers to the notion that real 
options are suitable to determine the optimal decision for project investment. Typical project 
options include the option to abandon a project that is performing poorly or to provide the 
guarantee level when the project revenue is below plan. However, most of the literature 
focused on government support in the project. Options from other stakeholders such as 
financial institutions and the private company are missing in the studies. Furthermore, a 
quantitative tool to measure the risk allocations between the private companies and 
government is required. The risk allocations among them are somehow subjective. The 
designs of such support are somehow subjective and irrational. This is because of the lack of a 
suitable quantitative tool for evaluation, while the irrationality is derived from inefficiencies 
of the traditional method. In this research, the design and formulation of the option 
combinations among the government, financial institution and private company in large 
infrastructure projects are explored. 
 
Real options with the binomial lattice model are applied in this study to use for evaluating 
investment projects. This is because the model is simplified, flexible and efficient in the 
calculation. The study applied the real options in a real world project, the expressway project 
in Thailand. Initially, the study found that the project was infeasible, mainly due to the 
uncertainty of traffic revenue. Also, due to the government budget constraints, the project 
needed private participants. However, the project alone was not sufficiently attractive for the 
private sector to engage in the project. To decrease the risks of the project, concessionaires 
normally negotiate with the government and financial institutions to provide some support or 
options such as revenue guarantees or an abandonment option. The presence of the options 
will increase the main stakeholder flexibility in taking the investment decision and thus 
increase the project‘s value.  
 
The option combination among the main stakeholders, the government, financial institution 
and private company are developed in this study. The major contribution of this research 
study is to provide a theoretical and quantitative tool for evaluating the financial viability and 
risk allocations of large infrastructure projects from the perspectives of the government, 
financial institution and private company. The results of the study can be summarised in the 
following: 
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7.1 The project’s value without options 
 
The hypothetical project (the SES project) when evaluated by the traditional method, seems 
financially infeasible. The project‘s NPV of the SES project shows negative value. The 
project features may not be sufficiently attractive for the private sector to invest and for the 
financial institution to lend in this project. Therefore, the additional support or options are 
needed to make the project more attractive. A typical infrastructure project, especially in 
Thailand, is normally financially infeasible because the support of the government in the 
project is limited. To attract private investors and financial institutions to the project, 
governments may create the incentives, support or option features to enhance the project‘s 
value.   
 
7.2 The real options of the financial institution 
 
One of the major concerns of financial institutions about any project is the probability and 
impact of the revenue shortfall and cost over estimate.  From the financial model, the risk of 
the financial institution has been decreased by adding real options in the contract. Although 
the value of the project with options improved, the improvement was not significant. From the 
numerical model, it is found that the real options of financial institutions have a small impact 
upon the project‘s performance. The main findings from the hypothetical project are 
summarised as follows:  
 
7.2.1 Considering a single option, it is found that the abandonment option without a threshold 
provides the greater benefit to the project though the project is still not financially feasible. 
Normally, the financial institution (lender) will exercise the abandonment option, at the 
expense of the government (project sponsor) and the project owner, when the project cannot 
service all of its debt obligations. The government provides the needed financing, funds for 
cash-flow deficiency, guarantees for repayment of the existing debt and allows the project 
company to operate the project. The project company has to find alternative lenders for the 
replacement of a defaulting lender. The numerical model shows that the lender will exercise 
the option and gains considerable benefit when the revenue is greatly underestimated. The 
benefit of the abandonment option is small because the loan is normally a structured periodic 
payment and the probability to trigger the option is decreased as the time passes. The abandon 
option will have greater value in the early years because the amount of the outstanding debt is 
large. However, in the real world the lenders normally do not utilize the option in the initial 
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year of the project operation. Lenders may decide to wait and see. It should be noted that the 
values of other lenders‘ options such as the deferral option, are quite small and insignificant 
relative to the project‘s value.  
 
7.2.2 The value of the interaction effect is presented in the context of financial institution 
options. This research found that the combination of the deferral option, the abandonment 
option without threshold and the investment option provides the largest interaction effect.  
This combination shows no overlapping in the exercise areas between the abandonment 
option/the investment option and the deferral option.  The abandonment option can be 
exercised at the project‘s operation phrase while the deferral option is applied during the 
project pre-operation stage. The option to defer is formulated under a lending option held by 
the financial institution at the contract signing and expires before operation commencement. 
Furthermore from the model, the abandonment option during the project‘s operation reduces 
the probability of deferment. This is because the abandonment option increases the project‘s 
value and then reduces the probability of the lender deferring the financing of the project. 
 
7.2.3 Though the research study found that real options and their combinations are very useful 
tools for financial institutions, the project is still financially infeasible in the context of the 
SES project. An individual option of a financial institution is nevertheless limited in its 
practical value. Real life projects are financially structured in that they involve the collections 
of multiple real options from main stakeholders such as the government and the private 
company. The provision of supports or options from the government and the private company 
are required.   
 
7.3 The real options of the government  
 
It is generally learned from the literature that large infrastructure projects are subject to 
substantial market risks such as the revenue risk during the operation phase. To avoid the 
downside revenue risks, the project owner usually requires the government to provide support 
mechanisms. Government supports in the projects have option-like characteristics, and the 
option pricing model is used to determine the appropriate level of government support, which 
cannot be achieved through the traditional project analysis methods such as NPV or IRR. 
Such government supports include the revenue guarantee, the grant, the debt guarantee, the 
exchange rate guarantee and others. In revenue guarantee, the government is obligated to 
compensate for a revenue shortfall between a pre-specified revenue level and actual revenue 
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collection. Governments can make the project feasible by providing supports and subsidies to 
the project under certain conditions. Such supports can increase the credit capability of Public 
Private Partnership (PPP) projects that face high risks. However, the appropriate support level 
should be specified since such supports extend the government cost and budget.  From the 
model calculation the following were found: 
 
7.3.1 Based on valuing the individual option for the government, the results show that a single 
option such as the minimum traffic guarantee option, the debt guarantee option or the equity 
guarantee option can create value to the project. Among these options, the minimum traffic 
guarantee option provides the greatest promise. The project is attractive for an investment 
decision with government support in the form of a minimum traffic guarantee. The model also 
showed that the suitable guarantee level is around 80-90% of the revenue guarantee. 
However, the minimum traffic guarantee is valuable in the view of the private investors and 
financial institutions, but it requires substantial budgetary commitment from the government. 
If the project performs poorly due to high revenue risks, the lender or the private company 
may ask the government to provide the minimum traffic guarantee at the expense of the 
government. The other government supports may be a preferable policy choice under 
budgetary constraints, and their justification is straightforward. The single guarantee option 
may not be a good choice for the government. The minimum traffic guarantee option involves 
large government budgetary commitments, therefore its benefits and costs should be carefully 
reviewed. The other options, or option bundling, may be considered as an alternative for the 
government. The government can design an appropriate level of guarantee and type of 
guarantee which attracts private participation in the project as well as permitting an affordable 
government budget.   
 
7.3.2 It can be seen from the real option model that the support of the government in the form 
of the minimum guarantee may not be appropriate. Though this option increases the value of 
the project, it requires a large proportion of the government budget. In addition, other options 
from the government, such as debt guarantees and equity guarantees are insufficient to make 
the project attractive for investment, and therefore the option bundling is required.   
 
7.3.3 The government support can be seen as the combination of options. For the option 
combinations of two or more options, the combination of the minimum traffic guarantee at 
90% and the equity guarantee provided the most value to the investment decision. It can be 
seen that the project is made more valuable by adding more options. Also, this option 
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combination needs a substantial government budget commitment. With various types of 
option strategies, governments can choose a suitable set of options to optimize the 
relationship between the benefits and the cost. For example, governments can select the 
combination of the minimum traffic guarantee at 90% and the debt guarantee option under 
which the project is still valuable with a smaller government budget.  
 
7.3.3 The interactions among the options of the government support are quite significant. The 
interaction is likely to have an impact upon projects which are large, long and uncertain in 
terms of revenue collection. The positive interaction increases the project value but also raises 
spending on government costs. The negative interactions are likely to benefit the government 
as the value of the support decreases. Understanding these interactions and designing proper 
option combinations provides the government with the flexibility to manage the project to 
achieve the desired result.  It is found that within the government bundle of options, the 
negative interactions are more prevalent within a given project. The negative interaction 
decreases the value of the project as well as the expenses of the government. It also found that 
the more options are combined, the greater the negative interaction. 
 
7.4 The real options of the private company (concessionaire) 
 
The private company (sponsor) needs supports from the government and the lender to 
increase the project creditworthiness as well as to mitigate risks. The results of this study have 
delivered an interesting result. The project that is solely developed by the private company, 
either with or without options, is insufficient. The private company normally requires the risk 
allocation and mitigation in the project. Risks should be effectively shared and allocated to the 
lender and government. To allocate risks, the private company needs the strategic tools to 
properly evaluate an infrastructure project‘s potential for non-recourse project financing. 
Assessing a project‘s financial viability gives the private company the opportunity to 
explicitly consider whether i) to continue investing in the project without any request for 
support, or ii) to continue participating in the project with the additional supports from the 
government or the lender, or iii) to abandon the project by pushing the project back to the 
government after the project performs poorly. In such circumstances, this research proposes to 
present and to discuss the real option method for valuing private investments in public 
infrastructure. The real option model exams are based on the flexibility of the private 
company in the project at each stage of the project development, in the pre-operation, post 
construction and operation phrases. The highlight has been concentrated on the benefits of the 
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options and their interactions adding to the project‘s value. Major findings are presented as 
follows: 
 
7.4.1 The private company prefers to have option flexibility throughout the whole project 
cycle. This study showed that the option to defer the concession fee payment to the 
government provides the most benefit to the private company. The study found that the time 
value of the option is significant. Private companies have the flexibility to defer the 
concession fee to the government until the project can generate sufficient revenue.  It is found 
that the deferral amount of the project case-study is large, valued at approximately 25% of the 
project investment cost. However, with the arrangement of the single option, the project is 
still not financially feasible.  
 
7.4.2 One of the important findings in real options of the private company is determining the 
optimal timing of the irreversible investment during the life of the option. Considering the 
abandonment option, the private company can abandon the project, pushing the cost to the 
government and the lender when the project value has decreased to a level much lower than 
expected. The result of the model calculation with a hypothetical project indicates that the 
suggested time to abandon, in the case preferred by the private company, is between 5-10 
years of the operation period. Late exercising of real options on time significantly reduces the 
project‘s value. The study implied that the private company should carefully review the 
project viability during that period, thus deciding whether to remain in the project or to leave.    
 
7.4.3 Considering the option combination, the model demonstrates that the option interaction 
is small and negative. In the case of the small interaction, the additive is a good 
approximation. For negative interaction, it means that adding more options may be worthless 
or reduce the opportunity to exercise the prior option, thus the project‘s value remains the 
same as it would have been without adding the option. The main reason for small interaction 
is because options for private companies are of the same types, with most of the exercising 
areas overlapping.   
 
7.4.4 The single option and option combinations within the private company are found 
insufficient for the success of the project development. The supports or options across the 
private company are required. The model also found that a single deferral option almost 
makes the project feasible. Adding a few options from the government such as a debt 
guarantee, an equity guarantee or from the lender, i.e., the deferral option, may turn the 
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project to become financially feasible. Furthermore, the grant option is the second ranked 
option of the private company which can be combined with the government or the financial 
institution options to increase the project‘s value.     
 
7.5 Option combinations among the financial institution, government and private 
company 
 
Risk allocation between the financial institution, government, and private company is the 
critical success factor for PPP infrastructure projects. The quantitative method to quantify risk 
allocation is sophisticated. With real options, this research study can select the option 
combination, and compare and design a suitable policy. It is generally found that interactions 
among the options are dependent on the type, separation, whether or not the option is in or out 
of the money, and the option‘s sequence.  
 
Individual options applied to the project represent: i) insufficient to make the project feasible; 
ii) overload the risk exposures for specific stakeholders, i.e., government, and iii) spending a 
large budget in the case of government guarantees. Formulating option interactions among the 
financial institution, government and private company is inevitable. For example, the lender 
commits a loan based on the strong participation of the government and private company 
whereby the benefits of the lender are protected. The research study pairs the option 
interactions among the financial institution, government and private company. The main 
findings of the option interactions are as follows: 
 
7.5.1 In terms of policy design and implementation in the project, based on the real option 
model, the following option-combination structures are ranked by project NPV: 
Rank Government Financial Institution Private company 
1. The minimum traffic 
guarantee at 90% 
Deferral option - 
2. The minimum traffic 
guarantee at 90% 
 Deferral option 
3. The minimum traffic 
guarantee at 90% and 
the equity option  
 Grant option 
4.  Deferral option Grant option 
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Rank Government Financial Institution Private company 
5.  Deferral option and the 
abandon option without 
threshold 
Deferral option 
 
Table 7.1: Ranking of the option combinations among the government, financial 
institution and private company by the project NPV 
 
Based on the real option model, it can be shown that the government has an important role in 
establishing the financial structure for the large-scale infrastructure development. Without the 
government‘s support, the project may not be attractive for investment. However, though 
these option combinations enhance the project‘s value, making the project more attractive for 
private companies to invest and for financial institutions to provide funding, it is necessary to 
commit a large government budget. To provide support, the government has to carefully 
review the optimal financial structure tradeoff between government spending and the other 
economic and social benefits.  
 
7.5.2 For the pair of financial institution and government options, the most valuable option is 
the combination of the minimum traffic guarantee option (government) and the deferral 
option (financial institution). Though this combination is worth the most, it creates a 
substantial cost for the government. The degree of option interaction for this option is large, 
so that simple option addition does not provide a good approximation. This study also found 
that the combination of the equity guarantee of the government and the deferral option of the 
financial institution had a large interaction effect. This is because there is no overlapping in 
the exercise areas. This research also found that the degree of interaction was related to the 
option type and the areas of overlap in the exercise regions. Considering the combination of 
the equity guarantee option and the deferral option, the project is financially viable with 
suitable support from the government. This option combination is recommended for the 
policy design and implementation.  
 
7.5.3 For the pair of the financial institution and private company options, the most valuable 
option is the combination of the grant option (private company) and the deferral option 
(financial institution). This study found that the existence of a prior call option (deferral 
option of the financial institution) may alter the value of the project cash flow (underlying 
asset) and, then, the value of subsequent put options (grant option of the private company), 
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making for a large interaction effect. For example, the first deferral option (financial 
institution) under the construction cost overrun scenario will decrease the project cash flow 
and hence increase the value of the second grant option (private company). This option 
combination is suitable and recommended in that the project is financially feasible and does 
not require any additional option from the government. The government, in terms of policy 
design, may consider designing and structuring the project with this option combination. The 
financial institution has the benefit of being able to leave the project at an early stage while 
the private company has the option to receive a grant payment until the project cash flow is 
sufficient.   
 
7.5.4 For the pair of the government and the private company options, the most valuable 
option is the combination of the minimum traffic guarantee option (government) and the 
deferral option (private company). The computational model presents a slightly negative 
interaction effect for this option combination. With this option combination, the government 
supplies a lot of support, and therefore this option combination may not be worthwhile for the 
government. The second ranked option combination is the combination of the minimum 
traffic guarantee option (government), the equity guarantee option (government) and the grant 
option (private company). With this combination, the interaction effect is largely negative, 
thereby decreasing the government spending. Without the participation of a financial 
institution option, the combination of the minimum traffic guarantee option and the equity 
guarantee option of the government, and the grant option of the private company may be 
recommended for policy implementation. This study noted that the minimum traffic guarantee 
option is essential for the financial structure under the combination of the government and the 
private company options. 
  
7.5.5 For the three option combinations, the most optimal option is the combination of the 
deferral option and the abandon option without threshold (financial institution) and the 
deferral option (private company). With three options combined, the option value is large and 
accounts for around 40% of the project investment cost. The project turns financially feasible 
for the private entity and FI with support from the government. The presence of the deferral 
option (financial institution) will increase the flexibility of the investment decision and thus 
the project NPV. The deferral option of the financial institution under the worst case scenario 
(construction cost overrun) will increase the probability of the second (the abandon option 
without threshold) and the third options (the deferral option) to be exercised, thus increasing 
the value of the option. However, there exists an overlap in the exercise areas between the 
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abandon option without threshold and the deferral option, resulting in a large interaction 
effect. In terms of the policy design and implementation, this option combination may be 
considered as the options increase the value of the project, proper allocation of risks among 
the private company, financial institution and government. Therefore, the combination of the 
deferral option (financial institution), the abandonment option (financial institution) and the 
deferral option (private company) may be recommended as the project is still financially 
feasible with less government support.   
 
7.5.6 In terms of the value of the interaction effect across main stakeholders, the following 
option combinations are ranked: 
 
Rank Government Financial Institution Private company 
1. The minimum traffic 
guarantee at 90%  
Deferral option  
2.  Deferral option Grant option 
3. The minimum traffic 
guarantee at 90% and 
the equity guarantee 
option 
 Grant option 
4. The equity guarantee 
option 
Deferral option  
5. The debt guarantee 
option 
 Deferral option 
Table 7.2: Ranking of the value of the interaction effect (million baht) among the 
government, financial institution and the private company  
 
Valuing the interaction effect is beneficial because: i) it can increase the project‘s value; ii) 
option interaction may have a negative value which helps to reduce the incremental value of 
certain options such as the minimum traffic guarantee or equity guarantee option. Therefore, 
the government‘s future liability is limited with the interaction effects, and iii) it enhances the 
project valuation accuracy.   
  
Based on model simulations, the combination of the minimum traffic guarantee option and the 
deferral option (financial institution) gives the highest interaction effect. This combined 
option helps to enhance the project‘s value. It also was found that the option interaction 
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within the financial institution options is large. Meanwhile, the option bundling within 
government and the private company exhibits a negative interaction. Lastly, this research 
emphasizes the finding that ignoring interactions among options in the project‘s valuation 
process may result in a significant underestimation of the value of the project. 
 
7.6 Sensitivity testing and model validation 
 
Unlike financial options, the variables used in real option valuation are not directly observable 
in the market. For example, traffic volatility is an unknown input and requires estimation. In 
order to test the validity of the real option model, sensitivity analysis on the significant 
parameters is performed and the results are summarised as follows: 
 
7.6.1. The most significant parameter is traffic volatility, which has the most impact on the 
option value. In this study, it is found that an increase in volatility will increase the value of 
real options, bundle of real options and interaction effect (IE). For the SES project, traffic 
volatility is estimated using monthly data on traffic volume. However, it is observed that 
using monthly traffic data without accounting for systematic seasonal variations may affect 
the calculation of the option values. Therefore, annual traffic data that attempt to remove 
seasonal variations in the data are used to calculate annual traffic volatility. In this study, 
annual traffic volatility (4%) is compared to monthly volatility (20%) in the sensitivity 
analysis. The results indicate that option values increase with increases in volatility.  
 
7.6.2 The following option combinations are ranked by project NPV and option value due to 
the apparent lower project volatility (4% of traffic volatility): 
Rank Government Financial Institution Private company 
1. The minimum traffic 
guarantee at 90% 
 Deferral option 
2. The minimum traffic 
guarantee at 90% and 
the equity option  
 Grant option 
3. The minimum traffic 
guarantee at 90% 
Deferral option  
4.  Deferral option Grant option 
5.  Deferral option and the Deferral option 
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Rank Government Financial Institution Private company 
abandon option without 
threshold 
Table 7.3: Ranking of the option combinations by the project NPV due to the apparent 
lower project volatility  
 
At low traffic volatility, it also found that the government maintains an important role in 
establishing the financial structure for the large-scale infrastructure development. Without the 
government‘s support, the project may not be attractive for investment.  
 
7.6.3 The second most significant parameter is interest rate. The results showed that an 
increase in the risk-free interest rate will increase the value of call option and decrease the 
value of the put option. An increase in the risk-free interest rate would decrease the present 
value of the exercise price therefore increasing the value of call option and decreasing the 
value of the put option.    
 
7.6.4 In order to test the validity and the accuracy of the binomial model, the value of real 
options is measured against the equivalent value from a Black-Scholes model. It can be seen 
in this study that the option values that are calculated by the binomial lattice are close to those 
calculated by the Black-Scholes option pricing model.    
  
7.7 Summary 
 
Overall, the application of the real option approach in PPP infrastructure projects is 
promising. The real option approach applied to value the infrastructure project is complicated 
but the mechanism helps to design and implement government policy. In this study, the 
researcher considers various forms of government, financial institution and private company 
supports and options in large-scale infrastructure projects. Through this research study and 
model analysis, it can be demonstrated that the government plays a crucial role in the risk 
allocation in large-scale infrastructure projects. The most powerful individual option is the 
minimum traffic guarantee which is provided by the government. The government takes an 
active role as the guarantor to assist in the project‘s success. The level of revenue guarantee is 
the option for the government which should consider the balance between project‘s revenue 
and government costs. However, the government should properly evaluate the economic 
viability of such arrangements prior to offering optimal option proposals to the private 
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company. The inclusion of a single minimum traffic guarantee in the financial scheme may 
not be worthwhile for the government in that it creates future contingent liability. This 
research found that other government options such as the equity guarantee option, when 
combined with options from the financial institution, may be selected to implement in the 
project finance scheme.    
 
The relationship among the financial institution, government, and private company is 
significant. The lender is concerned about whether the loan will be repaid according to the 
original schedule in the contract. It is also a crucial role of the lender to investigate the 
creditworthiness of the project and the private company. It is found that project development 
undertaken solely by the private company is insufficient. To increase the project 
creditworthiness, the government plays the critical role. Governments can support projects by 
providing supports such as guarantees to create the project benefit, but these create costs to 
the government budget. Then the project is strengthened and the lenders feel confident to 
provide project funding. 
 
Interactions among the options are a critical consideration for policy design and 
implementation. Real options may interact for various reasons and with different degrees, 
depending on the probability of their joint exercise, areas of the interaction, and the type of 
the option during the infrastructure project lifecycle. Governments may consider the 
interaction effect among options in order to relieve their budgets. Great option combinations 
may be worthwhile for governments. Looking for the optimal approach with a balance 
between the project‘s value to be attractive for investors and the level of government subsidy 
required is essential. It is found that some option combinations are recommended: i) the 
combination of the equity guarantee option (government) and the deferral option (financial 
institution); ii) the combination of the deferral option (financial institution) and the grant 
option (private company) iii) the combination of the deferral option (financial institution) and 
the deferral option (private company) and iv) the combination of the deferral option (financial 
institution), the abandonment option (financial institution) and the deferral option (private 
company). The project is financially feasible with these options and the government expense 
is arranged at the appropriate level.    
 
The research methodology applies real options as an innovative tool in policy analysis. The 
application of real options enables modelling of individual risk factors, such as revenue risk 
and construction risk, before informing a comparison of the relative influence of uncertainty. 
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With real options, this research can critically compare the effects of different policy designs in 
order to solicit structured public financing schemes. However, policy makers should 
understand the model limitations and carefully consider the assumptions underlying the 
valuation methods, particularly traffic flow and the binomial option method.  Properly 
appraised project variables will provide good sources for investment decisions as well as 
policy design and implementation. Inappropriate applications can mislead and conclude 
improper policies.  
 
7.7 Recommendations  
 
Recommendations for future research studies have been identified during the progress of this 
research. The following areas are related to the valuation methodology for PPP infrastructure 
projects and real option modeling issues that can be explored for further research: 
 
7.7.1 Future research may be to apply other approaches using the real option model such as 
finite difference, or Monte Carlo simulations to value government, lender and private 
company supports in large infrastructure projects. In addition, extending this approach to 
another type of infrastructure project such as mass transit, or water pipe systems will be also 
very beneficial. 
 
7.7.2 This study found that if the variables in the model such as the traffic volatility change 
over time, the investment decision may be changed. The policy should be structured in such a 
manner as to allow its later revision. 
 
7.7.3 The limitations of the real option model should be understood by the policymakers and 
applicants. For example, the most pertinent limitation is the access to information since the 
development period. The information required for model simulation and computation is often 
confidential. In addition, the study suggested that the real option approach should be 
considered for the valuation of projects with option-like characteristics only after a careful 
review of the main assumptions in the context of specific applications, because the method 
may not be applicable to all situations.   
 
7.7.4 There are various other PPP infrastructure assets such as power plant projects, with 
likely option characteristics. The kinds of informational economies, insights, and policies 
227 
 
discussed here in relation to valuing infrastructure projects may be applied in accessing the 
economic value of other real assets as well.  
 
7.7.5 The main focus of this study is on the stochastic behavior, i.e., Brownian motion of the 
traffic revenue. Other factors such as macroeconomic data may be considered for project 
valuation to improve the benefits of the model.  
 
7.7.6 The social benefit may be added to value real options in large-scale infrastructure 
projects. This social benefit may either increase or decrease the real option value. For 
example, social losses due to delaying the project may decrease the value of the deferral 
option, whereas the social benefit may increase the value of the project as well as the value of 
the real option.   
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Appendix A  Data Sources of the Second Stage Expressway System Project 
(SES Project) 
 
A1 General project information 
Project type An elevated 6-traffic lane expressway for a total length 
of approximately 38.5 kilometers 
Concession type 30-year Build-transfer-operate (BTO) 
Project owner Bangkok Expressway Public Company Limited 
(BECL), a listed company in Thailand Stock Exchange 
Project sponsor  The Expressway Authority of Thailand (EXAT) 
Concession period Total concession periods : 30 years 
Construction periods : 3 years 
Operating periods: 27 years 
Land acquisition and 
construction  cost 
Construction cost: 25,147 million baht, estimated to be 
equally distributed over 3 years.  
Land acquisition cost: 10,000 million baht.  
Table A1: General project information 
Source: the BECL website (http://www.bemplc.co.th/)  
 
A2 Traffic volume and toll rate  
 
A2.1 Traffic volume (Million trips per year) 
Year of operation 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
- Inbound areas               121 130 164 186 208 197 204 
- Outbound areas           17 19 23 24 25 23 23 
Year of operation 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
- Inbound areas               210 215 214 213 214 214 214 
- Outbound areas           24 24 25 22 23 23 24 
Year of operation 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
- Inbound areas               214 214 214 214 214 214 214 
- Outbound areas           24 22 23 23 24 24 23 
Year of operation 25 26 27 28 29 30  
- Inbound areas               214 214 214 214 214 214  
- Outbound areas           23 24 24 24 24 24  
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*The maximum toll capacity is 214 million trips per year. 
Table A2: Traffic volumes of the SES project  
Source: The project feasibility study submitted by project consultant to the government 
agency (EXAT)  
 
A2.2 Toll rate (Baht per trip) 
Year of operation* 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
- Inbound areas               30 30 30 30 30 40 40 
- Outbound areas           10 10 10 10 10 15 15 
Year of operation 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
- Inbound areas               40 40 40 50 50 50 50 
- Outbound areas           15 15 15 20 20 20 20 
Year of operation 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
- Inbound areas               50 60 60 60 60 60 70 
- Outbound areas           20 25 25 25 25 25 30 
Year of operation 25 26 27 28 29 30  
- Inbound areas               70 70 70 70 80 80  
- Outbound areas           30 30 30 30 35 35  
* The first 3-year was the construction period. 
Table A3: Toll rates of the SES project 
Source: The project feasibility study submitted by project consultant to the government 
agency (EXAT)  
 
A3 Traffic growth volatility  
The traffic volatility is calculated as follow: 
 
A3.1 Traffic volatility (Monthly basis) 
The traffic volatility was estimated from the standard deviation of the traffic volume. Data 
was available on monthly basis (from year 2004-2015). 
Year Month Traffic Volume 
(1000 trip/day) 
Traffic Growth 
(%) 
2004 Jan. 816.73  
 Feb. 857.28 4.96% 
 Mar. 862.39 0.60% 
 Apr. 789.01 -8.51% 
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Year Month Traffic Volume 
(1000 trip/day) 
Traffic Growth 
(%) 
 May. 816.54 3.49% 
 Jun. 837.58 2.58% 
 Jul. 851.48 1.66% 
 Aug. 822.66 -3.38% 
 Sep. 851.75 3.54% 
 Oct. 842.61 -1.07% 
 Nov 883.22 4.82% 
 Dec. 879.73 -0.40% 
2005 Jan. 849.84 -3.40% 
 Feb. 879.81 3.53% 
 Mar. 897.04 1.96% 
 Apr. 801.13 -10.69% 
 May. 834.14 4.12% 
 Jun. 873.46 4.71% 
 Jul. 832.93 -4.64% 
 Aug. 867.8 4.19% 
 Sep. 873.63 0.67% 
 Oct. 858.87 -1.69% 
 Nov 903.26 5.17% 
 Dec. 894.5 -0.97% 
2006 Jan. 874.09 -2.28% 
 Feb. 897.56 2.69% 
 Mar. 925.08 3.07% 
 Apr. 819.19 -11.45% 
 May. 862.79 5.32% 
 Jun. 877.06 1.65% 
 Jul. 858.21 -2.15% 
 Aug. 895.43 4.34% 
 Sep. 891.56 -0.43% 
 Oct. 906.28 1.65% 
 Nov 958.48 5.76% 
 Dec. 927.2 -3.26% 
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Year Month Traffic Volume 
(1000 trip/day) 
Traffic Growth 
(%) 
2007 Jan. 913.04 -1.53% 
 Feb. 954.81 4.57% 
 Mar. 961.11 0.66% 
 Apr. 870.3 -9.45% 
 May. 906.2 4.13% 
 Jun. 944.81 4.26% 
 Jul. 922.55 -2.36% 
 Aug. 940.99 2.00% 
 Sep. 941.65 0.07% 
 Oct. 943.15 0.16% 
 Nov 959.82 1.77% 
 Dec. 875.96 -8.74% 
2008 Jan. 888.45 1.43% 
 Feb. 915.07 3.00% 
 Mar. 921.8 0.74% 
 Apr. 839.61 -8.92% 
 May. 855.38 1.88% 
 Jun. 865.59 1.19% 
 Jul. 854.69 -1.26% 
 Aug. 875.67 2.45% 
 Sep. 849 -3.05% 
 Oct. 871.9 2.70% 
 Nov 877.07 0.59% 
 Dec. 861.34 -1.79% 
2009 Jan. 865.83 0.52% 
 Feb. 909.43 5.04% 
 Mar. 930.37 2.30% 
 Apr. 824.25 -11.41% 
 May. 854.61 3.68% 
 Jun. 914.85 7.05% 
 Jul. 880.2 -3.79% 
 Aug. 904.94 2.81% 
232 
 
Year Month Traffic Volume 
(1000 trip/day) 
Traffic Growth 
(%) 
 Sep. 923.16 2.01% 
 Oct. 922.84 -0.03% 
 Nov 942.63 2.14% 
 Dec. 929.62 -1.38% 
2010 Jan. 905.35 -2.61% 
 Feb. 957.24 5.73% 
 Mar. 919.57 -3.94% 
 Apr. 821.87 -10.62% 
 May. 785.76 -4.39% 
 Jun. 950.89 21.02% 
 Jul. 953.78 0.30% 
 Aug. 925.02 -3.02% 
 Sep. 952.55 2.98% 
 Oct. 990.72 4.01% 
 Nov 1048.64 5.85% 
 Dec. 1023.95 -2.35% 
2011 Jan. 995.6 -2.77% 
 Feb. 1033.4 3.80% 
 Mar. 1065.36 3.09% 
 Apr. 960 -9.89% 
 May. 999.94 4.16% 
 Jun. 1053.24 5.33% 
 Jul. 1036.88 -1.55% 
 Aug. 1054.36 1.69% 
 Sep. 1077.17 2.16% 
 Oct. 903.29 -16.14% 
 Nov 1032.59 14.31% 
 Dec. 1088.16 5.38% 
2012 Jan. 1069.13 -1.75% 
 Feb. 1115.75 4.36% 
 Mar. 1116.6 0.08% 
 Apr. 1012.94 -9.28% 
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Year Month Traffic Volume 
(1000 trip/day) 
Traffic Growth 
(%) 
 May. 1065.71 5.21% 
 Jun. 1079.8 1.32% 
 Jul. 1089.18 0.87% 
 Aug. 1079.71 -0.87% 
 Sep. 1080.32 0.06% 
 Oct. 1080.88 0.05% 
 Nov 1136.63 5.16% 
 Dec. 1089.37 -4.16% 
2013 Jan. 1096.67 0.67% 
 Feb. 1118.06 1.95% 
 Mar. 1154.52 3.26% 
 Apr. 1040.52 -9.87% 
 May. 1093.29 5.07% 
 Jun. 1115.48 2.03% 
 Jul. 1102.26 -1.19% 
 Aug. 1124.83 2.05% 
 Sep. 1099.62 -2.24% 
 Oct. 1103.68 0.37% 
 Nov 1116.6 1.17% 
 Dec. 1032.07 -7.57% 
2014 Jan. 1031.7 -0.04% 
 Feb. 1087.94 5.45% 
 Mar. 1119.93 2.94% 
 Apr. 1042.91 -6.88% 
 May. 1065.67 2.18% 
 Jun. 1098.37 3.07% 
 Jul. 1099.77 0.13% 
 Aug. 1123.07 2.12% 
 Sep. 1137.47 1.28% 
 Oct. 1139.18 0.15% 
 Nov 1166.66 2.41% 
 Dec. 1130.11 -3.13% 
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Year Month Traffic Volume 
(1000 trip/day) 
Traffic Growth 
(%) 
2015 Jan. 1111.19 -1.67% 
 Feb. 1176 5.83% 
 Mar. 1176.01 0.00% 
 Apr. 1071.98 -8.85% 
Monthly Standard 
Deviation 
  4.94% 
Yearly Standard 
Deviation 
  17.10% 
Table A4: Traffic growth volatility (monthly data) 
Source: The traffic flow report: BEM company report at http://www.bemplc.co.th/ 
 
To avoid seasonality, the traffic volatility on annual basis was estimated as following table: 
Year Annual Traffic Volume 
(trip per year) 
Traffic Growth (%) 
2004 303329.4  
2005 310992.3 2.5% 
2006 320787.9 3.1% 
2007 334031.7 4.1% 
2008 314267.1 -5.9% 
2009 324081.9 3.1% 
2010 337060.2 4.0% 
2011 368999.7 9.5% 
2012 390480.6 5.8% 
2013 395928.0 1.4% 
2014 397283.4 0.3% 
2015 408166.2 2.7% 
Yearly Standard Deviation  3.76% 
Table A5: Traffic growth volatility (Annual data) 
Source: The traffic flow report: BEM company report at http://www.bemplc.co.th/  
 
A3.2 Traffic volume (Monthly basis) with seasonal adjustment 
Traffic of the SES project is typically affected by the seasons of the year with it being low 
during the month with long holidays i.e., April and May and high for the year ending 
235 
 
December. Seasonal adjustment is used for removing the seasonal component of time by 
using the data for each month i.e., log of January data to compute standard deviation (do for 
all months) and take average and then annualise. The traffic volatility with seasonal 
adjustment is estimated as following table: 
Year Month Traffic Volume 
(1000 trip/day) 
Log (Traffic)  
 
Δ Log (traffic)  
(Logt-Logt-1) 
2004 Jan. 816.73 2.912078508  
 Feb. 857.28 2.933122692 0.02104418 
 Mar. 862.39 2.935703712 0.00258102 
 Apr. 789.01 2.897082508 -0.03862120 
 May. 816.54 2.911977464 0.01489496 
 Jun. 837.58 2.923026299 0.01104883 
 Jul. 851.48 2.930174451 0.00714815 
 Aug. 822.66 2.915220381 -0.01495407 
 Sep. 851.75 2.930312142 0.01509176 
 Oct. 842.61 2.925626609 -0.00468553 
 Nov 883.22 2.946068895 0.02044229 
 Dec. 879.73 2.944349402 -0.00171949 
2005 Jan. 849.84 2.929337168 -0.01501223 
 Feb. 879.81 2.944388894 0.01505173 
 Mar. 897.04 2.952811809 0.00842292 
 Apr. 801.13 2.903702995 -0.04910881 
 May. 834.14 2.921238948 0.01753595 
 Jun. 873.46 2.941243021 0.02000407 
 Jul. 832.93 2.920608505 -0.02063452 
 Aug. 867.8 2.938419646 0.01781114 
 Sep. 873.63 2.941327539 0.00290789 
 Oct. 858.87 2.933927433 -0.00740011 
 Nov 903.26 2.955812778 0.02188535 
 Dec. 894.5 2.951580345 -0.00423243 
2006 Jan. 874.09 2.941556152 -0.01002419 
 Feb. 897.56 2.953063490 0.01150734 
 Mar. 925.08 2.966179292 0.01311580 
 Apr. 819.19 2.913384642 -0.05279465 
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Year Month Traffic Volume 
(1000 trip/day) 
Log (Traffic)  
 
Δ Log (traffic)  
(Logt-Logt-1) 
 May. 862.79 2.935905103 0.02252046 
 Jun. 877.06 2.943029305 0.00712420 
 Jul. 858.21 2.933593571 -0.00943573 
 Aug. 895.43 2.952031641 0.01843807 
 Sep. 891.56 2.950150576 -0.00188107 
 Oct. 906.28 2.957262396 0.00711182 
 Nov 958.48 2.981583055 0.02432066 
 Dec. 927.2 2.967173423 -0.01440963 
2007 Jan. 913.04 2.960489804 -0.00668362 
 Feb. 954.81 2.979916959 0.01942715 
 Mar. 961.11 2.982773096 0.00285614 
 Apr. 870.3 2.939668984 -0.04310411 
 May. 906.2 2.957224058 0.01755507 
 Jun. 944.81 2.975344481 0.01812042 
 Jul. 922.55 2.964989913 -0.01035457 
 Aug. 940.99 2.973585008 0.00859509 
 Sep. 941.65 2.973889511 0.00030450 
 Oct. 943.15 2.974580769 0.00069126 
 Nov 959.82 2.982189795 0.00760903 
 Dec. 875.96 2.942484275 -0.03970552 
2008 Jan. 888.45 2.948632992 0.00614872 
 Feb. 915.07 2.961454318 0.01282133 
 Mar. 921.8 2.964636704 0.00318239 
 Apr. 839.61 2.924077603 -0.04055910 
 May. 855.38 2.932159092 0.00808149 
 Jun. 865.59 2.937312230 0.00515314 
 Jul. 854.69 2.931808623 -0.00550361 
 Aug. 875.67 2.942340471 0.01053185 
 Sep. 849 2.928907690 -0.01343278 
 Oct. 871.9 2.940466678 0.01155899 
 Nov 877.07 2.943034256 0.00256758 
 Dec. 861.34 2.935174616 -0.00785964 
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Year Month Traffic Volume 
(1000 trip/day) 
Log (Traffic)  
 
Δ Log (traffic)  
(Logt-Logt-1) 
2009 Jan. 865.83 2.937432630 0.00225801 
 Feb. 909.43 2.958769276 0.02133665 
 Mar. 930.37 2.968655698 0.00988642 
 Apr. 824.25 2.916058956 -0.05259674 
 May. 854.61 2.931767970 0.01570901 
 Jun. 914.85 2.961349892 0.02958192 
 Jul. 880.2 2.944581364 -0.01676853 
 Aug. 904.94 2.956619785 0.01203842 
 Sep. 923.16 2.965276978 0.00865719 
 Oct. 922.84 2.965126411 -0.00015057 
 Nov 942.63 2.974341257 0.00921485 
 Dec. 929.62 2.968305459 -0.00603580 
2010 Jan. 905.35 2.956816506 -0.01148895 
 Feb. 957.24 2.981020838 0.02420433 
 Mar. 919.57 2.963584794 -0.01743604 
 Apr. 821.87 2.914803128 -0.04878167 
 May. 785.76 2.895289917 -0.01951321 
 Jun. 950.89 2.978130280 0.08284036 
 Jul. 953.78 2.979448211 0.00131793 
 Aug. 925.02 2.966151123 -0.01329709 
 Sep. 952.55 2.978887781 0.01273666 
 Oct. 990.72 2.995950930 0.01706315 
 Nov 1048.64 3.020626420 0.02467549 
 Dec. 1023.95 3.010278750 -0.01034767 
2011 Jan. 995.6 2.998084888 -0.01219386 
 Feb. 1033.4 3.014268457 0.01618357 
 Mar. 1065.36 3.027496387 0.01322793 
 Apr. 960 2.982271233 -0.04522515 
 May. 999.94 2.999973942 0.01770271 
 Jun. 1053.24 3.022527344 0.02255340 
 Jul. 1036.88 3.015728498 -0.00679885 
 Aug. 1054.36 3.022988921 0.00726042 
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Year Month Traffic Volume 
(1000 trip/day) 
Log (Traffic)  
 
Δ Log (traffic)  
(Logt-Logt-1) 
 Sep. 1077.17 3.032284249 0.00929533 
 Oct. 903.29 2.955827202 -0.07645705 
 Nov 1032.59 3.013927915 0.05810071 
 Dec. 1088.16 3.036692758 0.02276484 
2012 Jan. 1069.13 3.029030516 -0.00766224 
 Feb. 1115.75 3.047566896 0.01853638 
 Mar. 1116.6 3.047897624 0.00033073 
 Apr. 1012.94 3.005583721 -0.04231390 
 May. 1065.71 3.027639041 0.02205532 
 Jun. 1079.8 3.033343323 0.00570428 
 Jul. 1089.18 3.037099658 0.00375633 
 Aug. 1079.71 3.033307124 -0.00379253 
 Sep. 1080.32 3.033552416 0.00024529 
 Oct. 1080.88 3.033777481 0.00022506 
 Nov 1136.63 3.055619115 0.02184163 
 Dec. 1089.37 3.037175411 -0.01844370 
2013 Jan. 1096.67 3.040075963 0.00290055 
 Feb. 1118.06 3.048465110 0.00838915 
 Mar. 1154.52 3.062401461 0.01393635 
 Apr. 1040.52 3.017250432 -0.04515103 
 May. 1093.29 3.038735376 0.02148494 
 Jun. 1115.48 3.047461788 0.00872641 
 Jul. 1102.26 3.042284048 -0.00517774 
 Aug. 1124.83 3.051086891 0.00880284 
 Sep. 1099.62 3.041242630 -0.00984426 
 Oct. 1103.68 3.042843173 0.00160054 
 Nov 1116.6 3.047897624 0.00505445 
 Dec. 1032.07 3.013709154 -0.03418847 
2014 Jan. 1031.7 3.013553431 -0.00015572 
 Feb. 1087.94 3.036604945 0.02305151 
 Mar. 1119.93 3.049190878 0.01258593 
 Apr. 1042.91 3.018246832 -0.03094405 
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Year Month Traffic Volume 
(1000 trip/day) 
Log (Traffic)  
 
Δ Log (traffic)  
(Logt-Logt-1) 
 May. 1065.67 3.027622740 0.00937591 
 Jun. 1098.37 3.040748662 0.01312592 
 Jul. 1099.77 3.041301869 0.00055321 
 Aug. 1123.07 3.050406826 0.00910496 
 Sep. 1137.47 3.055939951 0.00553312 
 Oct. 1139.18 3.056592352 0.00065240 
 Nov 1166.66 3.066944308 0.01035196 
 Dec. 1130.11 3.053120718 -0.01382359 
2015 Jan. 1111.19 3.045788324 -0.00733239 
 Feb. 1176 3.070407322 0.02461900 
 Mar. 1176.01 3.070411015 0.00000369 
 Apr. 1071.98 3.030186683 -0.04022433 
Traffic volatility (Standard deviation of Δ log: Monthly) adjusted for seasonality 
Month Standard 
Deviation (SD) 
Detail Calculation 
January 0.006714483 SD of Δ log of January data 
February 0.005032217 SD of Δ log of February data 
March 0.008513966 SD of Δ log of March data 
April 0.006000008 SD of Δ log of April data 
May 0.011328458 SD of Δ log of May data 
June 0.021093705 SD of Δ log of June data 
July 0.008121153 SD of Δ log of July data 
August 0.010794199 SD of Δ log of August data 
September 0.008483787 SD of Δ log of September data 
October 0.023694851 SD of Δ log of October data 
November 0.014684184 SD of Δ log of November data 
December 0.015780270 SD of Δ log of December data 
Average Monthly Standard 
Deviation 
1.1687% Average SD (Jan, Feb…….,Dec) 
Yearly Standard Deviation 4.0484%  
Table A6 Seasonal adjustment for traffic volume (monthly data)  
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A4 Operating expense (Million baht) 
Year of operation 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Operating expense               262 254 319 347 322 338 344 
Year of operation 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
Operating expense               416 377 948 415 777 457 480 
Year of operation 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
Operating expense               647 611 625 581 610 1,687 673 
Year of operation 25 26 27 28 29 30  
Operating expense               1,197 741 900 817 858 3,498  
Table A7 Operating expense of the SES project 
Source: The project feasibility study submitted by project consultant to the government 
agency (EXAT)  
 
A5 Key financial parameters 
Parameter Unit Value Source 
Government bond 
yield (10 Y)  
% 6% Bank of Thailand  
(Year 1993) 
Cost of debt % 12% Bangkok of Thailand (Year 
1993) 
Beta (BECL) time 0.6 Router 
Risk premium % 5-12% The Stock Exchange of 
Thailand, Bank of Thailand  
Table A8 Key financial parameters of the SES project 
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Appendix B Lists of Transportation System Projects in Thailand 
 
B1 The Don Muang Tollway Project 
 
The Don Muang Tollway Project was developed from 1994 to 1998 under the National 
Intercity Motorway Network Master Plan, which was implemented by the Department of 
Highways. The Don Muang Tollway was granted concession by the Department of Highways, 
a government agent, in a build-transfer-operate (BTO) form. The project is 28 km in length 
with a 6-lane elevated road linked from central Bangkok to the Don Muang International 
Airport and North Bangkok. The total project cost was 12,000 million baht, of which 7,400 
million baht was funded from both local and foreign financial institutions. Forty-five percent 
of the total loan was funded by foreign currency denominations.  
 
The Department of Highways granted a 25-year concession to the Don Muang Tollway 
Company LTD., which was a joint between DYWIDAG (a German company), Delta 
Construction (a Thai construction company) and GMI (a French contracting company).  
Table B1 shows the risks and impacts of the Don Muang Tollway Project. 
 
Project’s specific risks Impacts on project Mitigation 
- Toll revenue was less than 
expectation by 30% because 
of new road competition 
and the opening of the 
Suvarnabhumi Airport, 
which redirected a lot of 
traffic from the Don Muang 
area.*  
- The project was unable to 
increase tolls due to 
government ordering. 
- The government has not 
abided by the project's 
concession terms, including 
rules limiting the 
- The project went 
bankrupt.  
- The project 
accumulated operating 
losses of approximately 
5.6 billion baht between 
1996 and 2006. 
- The funding cost was 
increased due to a Thai 
baht devaluation. 
- The Department of 
Highways extended the 
Don Muang Tollway 
Project‘s 25-year 
concession by 11 years to 
help the company make up 
for the lower revenue. 
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Project’s specific risks Impacts on project Mitigation 
construction of local roads 
competing with the tollway 
as well as delaying the 
construction of new 
flyovers allowing radial 
movements. 
- Foreign exchange risk 
* The Don Muang area was formerly the first Bangkok International Airport, but in 2005 all 
international services were moved to the new international airport, Suvarnabhumi 
International Airport, in the opposite direction.  
Table B1: Risk factors and their impacts on the Don Muang Tollway Project 
Sources: Bangkok Post (2009), Bangkok Post (2005), ADB (2000) 
 
B2 The Bangkok Mass Transit System (BTS) Project 
 
The Bangkok Mass Transit System (BTS) Project was Thailand‘s first mass transit system 
and was implemented through a public-private partnership (PPP) scheme. The BTS was 
awarded a 30-year build-operate-transfer concession by the Bangkok Metropolitan Authority 
(BMA). The project is solely, privately financed in Thailand and is operated by the Bangkok 
Mass Transit System Public Company LTD. The project initially had 25 stations with 25 km 
of operation track. The BTS line is connected with the underground rail system (the BMT 
project) at three stations (Asok, Sala Daeng and Mor-chit). Later, between 2009 and 2013, the 
line was extended by an additional 12.7 km under 13 stations. The ridership has increased 
from 200,000 passenger trips per day in 1999 to 650,000 passenger trips per day in 2013.  
 
The BTS has had financial difficulties since its first operation in December 1999. The revenue 
was lower than expected because ridership projections tend to be overestimated. The project 
faced foreign exchange risks after the Thai baht depreciated in 1997. The BTS entered its debt 
rehabilitation process in January 2007 after the court approved the plan. Table B2 provides a 
list of risk factors and their impacts regarding the BTS Project. 
 
Project’s specific risks Impacts on project Mitigation 
- The traffic was - The project was subject - Expanded the mass transit 
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Project’s specific risks Impacts on project Mitigation 
underestimated. 
- It initially had lower than 
predicted ridership, with 
200,000 passenger trips per 
day at the beginning. 
- There was a foreign 
exchange risk due to a 
devaluation of Thai baht. 
to operating losses.  
- The debt principal (in 
Thai baht notional) 
increases. 
network to attack new 
traffic.  
- The project restructured 
its capital by reducing its 
paid-up capital to par value 
and injected new issued 
share. 
- Converted debts to equity. 
Table B2: Risk factors and their impacts on the BTS Project 
Source: Credit News TRIS Rating (17 July 2009)      
 
B3 The MRT Project 
 
The MRT Project was Thailand‘s first underground mass transit project that was awarded a 
25-year acquire-operate-transfer (AOT) concession. The project was procured through a PPP 
scheme between Thailand‘s Mass Rapid Transit Authority (MRTA), a state-owned enterprise, 
and a private company named the Bangkok Metro Public Company LTD. (BMCL). BMCL 
operated a 20 km underground mass transit system that began commercial operation in 2004.  
 
The government supported the MRT Project by providing investments in land acquisition and 
infrastructure cost while the private company invested in mechanical and electrical systems, 
including trains and other equipment. The total construction cost was 115,812 million baht, 
91,249 million of which was infrastructure cost, and the rest involved mechanical and 
electrical (M&E) work. BMCL has a 25-year concession with a right to collect fares and 
undertake activities and commercial developments, including advertising and leasing spaces 
in the project area. BMCL has an obligation to make remuneration from fares and commercial 
developments to the MRTA at the agreed rates set forth in the concession agreement. The 
project‘s revenue is mainly from two sources: revenue from fares, which accounts for nearly 
90% of the total revenue, and revenue from commercial development. Under the concession 
agreement, BMCL can adjust the fare rate every 2 years based on actual changes in the 
Bangkok Non-Food Consumer Price Index. However, the adjustment should obtain prior 
approval from the MRTA before the toll level can be increased. There may be delays in 
adjustment. The project‘s revenue growth has expected to increase the volume of passengers 
by extending and offering new lines in the system. However, implementation delay 
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concerning the Mass Rapid Transit Master Plan in Bangkok Metropolitan has impacted the 
traffic flow to the project. Since its first operation year, the company has faced net losses far 
from expectation. Table B3 provides a list of risk factors and their impacts on the MRT 
Project. Ridership in 2014 was around 240,000 per day on weekdays, lower than projections 
of over 400,000. 
 
Project’s specific risks Impacts on project Mitigation 
- The ridership is far from 
the forecast.  
- The project‘s ability to 
repay debt has declined. 
- The project‘s revenue is 
underestimated.  
- The project may default. 
- The company tried to 
promote a marketing 
campaign to increase 
ridership.  
- The project company 
negotiated with the lender to 
extend the debt or require 
more capital injection from 
the shareholders. 
Table B3: Risk factors and their impacts on the MRT project  
Source: The Bangkok Metro Public Company Limited (BMCL) Annual Report (2009) 
 
B4 The Second Stage Expressway System (SES) Project 
 
The Second Stage Expressway System (SES) Project was the first expressway project to be 
developed through a PPP scheme. The project was awarded a 30-year build-transfer-operate 
(BTO) concession from the Expressway Authority of Thailand (EXAT). The concession was 
granted to the Bangkok Expressway Company LTD. (BECL), which carried out the 
construction and operated the project. The project was built as a 6-lane elevated expressway 
with 38.5 km in length. The total project cost was approximately $1.1 billion. The project has 
four sectors linked to the first stage expressway (FES), which was constructed and has been 
operated by the EXAT. BECL completed construction on schedule and started operation in 
1993.  
 
The 30-year concession was separated into a 3-year construction period and 27 years of 
BECL‘s operation of facility. Over that 27-year operating period, revenue collection is shared 
between FES and SES. SES received 60% of the revenue collected during the first 9 years of 
the operating period. FES and SES shared 50% of the revenue in the second 9-year period. 
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For the last 9 years of the concession period, FES receives 60% of the total revenue, and the 
remaining 40% belongs to SES.  
 
In the earlier years of operation, income flows from users were more than the initial 
projection. The project was profitable and self-sustaining after a certain period of operation. 
In 1995, BECL was successfully listed on the stock exchange of Thailand. However, with 
economic hits in 1997, traffic volume and toll revenue decreased, which impacted its ability 
to repay debt.  
 
In 1996, NECL was established to operate a new expressway, called the Udon Ratthaya 
Expressway (URE), under a 30-year BTO concession agreement awarded by the EXAT from 
1996 to 2026. BECL holds 53.33% of NECL. URE is the extension phase of SES. Table B4 
provides a list of risk factors and their impacts on the SES Project. 
 
Project’s specific risks Impacts on project Mitigation 
- SES‘s traffic volume and 
revenue were lower than 
expected due to the 
economic crisis in 1997. 
- Traffic declined due to 
the opening of toll-free 
roads and new expressways. 
- NECL‘s traffic volume 
was far below projections 
due to competition from 
alternate roads. 
- Traffic would not be 
able to generate enough 
revenue to provide an 
adequate return, or it was 
not sufficient to service 
the debt.  
- NECL faced operating 
losses. 
- The company has 
negotiated with syndicated 
lenders to reschedule its 
loans. 
- It has proposed a new 
revenue-sharing scheme 
between FES and SES (by 
combining the revenue 
collected from both 
projects) over the 27-year 
operating period of the 
concession. 
Table B4: Risk factors and their impacts on the SES Project 
Source: Credit News TRIS Rating (29 April 2009)      
 
B5 The Airport Rail Link Project 
 
The Airport Rail Link Project (ARL) is the mass transit system that links the new 
Suvarnabhumi Airport to city areas. The project was built as an elevated mass transit with 28 
km in length. The total project cost was approximately 20,000 million baht, including civil 
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and M&E work. The project cost was funded by a combination of government budget and 
loans from Thai banks. The State Railway of Thailand (SRT) is the owner of the line and the 
rolling stock. The project has two lines: the express line linked directly to the airport, and the 
city line. The government is still reviewing the PPP options for operation and management. 
Table B5 provides a list of risk factors and their impacts on the Airport Rail Link Project.  
 
Project’s specific risks Impacts on project Mitigation 
- Construction was delayed 
for 2 years because 
clearance of the 
construction land, under the 
responsibility of the SRT, 
was slower than planned.  
- The ridership was far 
from forecasted.  
- The project was delayed 
to generate revenue. 
- The project‘s cost was 
overrun due to an increase 
in raw material prices, such 
as steel and oil.  
- Operating losses have 
occurred since the first 
launch on 23 August 2010. 
- The project company 
negotiated with the 
government to 
compensate for higher 
construction costs.  
 
 
Table B5: Risk factors and their impacts on the Airport Rail Link Project 
Source: Bangkok Post (2010) 
 
B6 The Bangna Bangpi Bangpakong Expressway Project 
 
The Bangna Bangpi Bangpakong Expressway (BBBE) Project is an expressway connecting 
Bangkok, Bang Na and Bang Pakong by means of a 55 km, 6-lane elevated road. 
Construction work was award to a joint venture named BBCD with a turnkey contract. The 
project cost was initially estimated at 25,193 million baht, but was subject to cost overrun by 
6,300 million baht. The Expressway and Rapid Transit Authority of Thailand (ETA; currently 
changed to Expressway Authority of Thailand: EXAT) is the owner of the project and takes 
responsibility for collecting the toll. The private sector participated in the project‘s overall 
design, procurement and construction. No concession was provided in this project, and the 
ETA is still the operator. Table B6 provides the risk factors and their impacts on the BBBE 
Project. 
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Project’s specific risks Impacts on project Mitigation 
- The traffic was lower than 
the estimation due to local 
road competition. 
- Construction was delayed 
by about 11 months because 
of design change and a 
delay of land delivery by 
the owner. 
- The project was delayed, 
leading to lower revenues 
than projected. 
- Delays caused the 
project‘s cost to overrun by 
15-20%. 
- The contractor was 
claimed for the cost 
overrun. 
Table B6:  Risk factors and their impacts on the BBBE Project 
Source: Chritamara and Ogunlana (2001)  
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Appendix C Testing for Geometric Brownian Motion (GBM) process 
 
In this thesis, the methodology for the valuation of the large infrastructure project is based on 
the real option approach. This methodology is generally constructed on the assumption of the 
flow of traffic volume as a geometric Brownian motion (GBM) which is the hypothesis 
analysed in this section.      
 
C1 Testing for geometric Brownian motion (GBM) process fit  
In general, if a stochastic process of the traffic flow {x(t), t>0} follows a Brownian motion 
process, it presents the following two properties (Marathe and Ryan, 2005); 
 The change in the value of x, Δx, over a time interval of Δt is proportional to the 
square root of Δt {                 √  }, where ε is a standard normal 
random variable. Then value of Δx follows a normal distribution with mean 0 and 
variance equals to the change in time (Δt) over which Δx is measured.  
 The changes in the value of x(t) for any two non-overlapping in intervals of time are 
independent.    
Assuming traffic volume evolves according to a geometric Brownian motion process then it 
follows the random walk. In addition, the traffic volume should be tested for the properties of 
GBM which there are two assumptions to be satisfied; 1) Normality of the log ratios with 
constant mean and variance 2) Independence from the past data. This thesis does statistically 
validate the assumption of GBM from the historical monthly and yearly data. The following 
statistical tests will be done; 
i) Test for A random walk with drift using Augmented Dickey-Fuller t-statistic  
ii) Test for normality with Shapiro-Wilk Statistic and  
iii) Test for autocorrelation with Box-Ljung Statistic  
 
C1.1 Validating geometric Brownian motion (GBM) assumption with monthly traffic data 
 
1) Test for a random walk with drift: Using log traffic  
 
The Unit Root test (ADF test) is used for detecting a random walk with drift. It can specify 
the null and alternative hypothesis as: 
H0 : xt  (the natural log of traffic level) is a random walk with drift, against 
H1 : xt is trend stationary  
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The Eviews output for the Unit Root test is given below: 
 t-Statistic Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -2.942757 0.1527 
Test critical values 1% level  -4.028496  
 5% level  -3.443961  
 10% level  -3.146755  
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values. 
 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation 
   
Dependent Variable: D(LOG_TRAFFIC)    
Method: Least Square    
Include observations 133 after adjustment    
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
LOG_TRAFFIC(-1) -0.239832 0.081499 -2.942757 0.0039 
D(LOG_TRAFFIC(-1)) -0.279067 0.089562 -3.115912 0.0023 
D(LOG_TRAFFIC(-2) -0.424303 0.080939 -5.242274 0.0000 
C 0.698515 0.237024 2.947027 0.0038 
@TREND("2004") 0.000263 9.49E-05 2.775161 0.0063 
R-squared 0.362394  Mean dependent var 0.000710 
Adjusted R-squared 0.342469  S.D. dependent var 0.021803 
S.E. of regression 0.017679  Akaike info criterion -5.195955 
Sum squared resid 0.040008  Schwarz criterion -5.087295 
Log likelihood 350.5310  Hannan-Quinn criter. -5.151799 
F-statistic 18.18775  Durbin-Watson stat 1.964644 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.000000    
  
The ADF test statistic is -2.942757 which is greater than the 0.05 critical value of -3.443961 
and so the null hypothesis that the natural log of traffic is a random walk with drift is not 
rejected. Thus it cannot reject the hypothesis that traffic follows a geometric Brownian 
motion. 
 
2) Test for normality: Using the change of log (traffic)  
 
The Shapiro-Wilk test is the most widely used test of normality. It can specify the null and 
alternative hypothesis as: 
H0 : The distribution is normal, against 
H1 : The distribution is not normal 
SPSS generates the following output for the test of normality: 
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Case Processing Summary 
 Cases 
 Valid Missing Total 
 N Percent N Percent N Percent 
VAR00001: the 
change of log 
(traffic)-Monthly   
135 100.0% 0 .0% 135 100.0% 
  
Tests of Normality 
 Kolmogorov-Smirnov
a
 Shapiro-Wilk 
 Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
VAR00001: the 
change of log 
(traffic)-Monthly   
.133 135 .000 .914 135 .000 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction    
 
The calculated value of the test statistic is .914 which is greater than the 0.05 critical value. 
The series (the change of log (traffic)) is not normal. 
 
3) Test for autocorrelation: Using the change of log (traffic) 
 
The Box-Ljung Statistic is used to detect the autocorrelation. The null and alternative 
hypothesis can be expressed as: 
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H0 : There is no serial correlation (there is no association between the variables), against 
H1 : Some correlation does exist 
The output from the SPSS autocorrelation test is shown as follow. 
 
Case Processing Summary 
  VAR00001 (the 
change of log 
(traffic))-Monthly 
Series Length 135 
Number of Missing 
Values 
User-Missing 0 
System-Missing 0 
Number of Valid Values 135 
Number of Computable First Lags 134 
Autocorrelations 
Series:VAR00001: the change of log (traffic)-Monthly 
Lag Autocorrelation Std. Error
a
 
Box-Ljung Statistic 
Value df Sig.
b
 
1 -.270 .085 10.047 1 .002 
2 -.390 .085 31.178 2 .000 
3 .247 .084 39.753 3 .000 
4 .044 .084 40.021 4 .000 
5 -.137 .084 42.711 5 .000 
6 .141 .084 45.564 6 .000 
7 -.223 .083 52.750 7 .000 
8 .072 .083 53.502 8 .000 
9 .243 .083 62.171 9 .000 
10 -.331 .082 78.378 10 .000 
11 -.165 .082 82.446 11 .000 
12 .595 .082 135.731 12 .000 
13 -.179 .081 140.566 13 .000 
14 -.274 .081 152.079 14 .000 
15 .195 .081 157.968 15 .000 
16 -.043 .080 158.258 16 .000 
a. The underlying process assumed is independence (white noise). 
b. Based on the asymptotic chi-square approximation.  
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Box-Ljung test statistic is 10.047 which is greater than the critical value (0.05) and the null 
hypothesis that there is no serial correlation, is rejected. Then it means that some 
correlation does exist. 
 
C1.2 Validating geometric Brownian motion (GBM) assumption with yearly traffic data 
 
1) Test for a random walk with drift: Using log traffic  
 
The Unit Root test (ADF test) is used for detecting a random walk with drift. It can specify 
the null and alternative hypothesis as: 
H0 : xt  (the natural log of traffic level) is a random walk with drift, against 
H1 : xt is trend stationary  
The Eviews output for the Unit Root test is given below: 
 t-Statistic Prob.* 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test statistic -2.128623 0.4720 
Test critical values 1% level  -5.295384  
 5% level  -4.008157  
 10% level  3.460791  
*MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values. 
 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Equation 
   
 
Dependent Variable: 
 
D(LOG_TRAFFIC_YEAR_) 
  
Method: Least Square    
Include observations 10 after adjustment   
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
LOG_TRAFFIC_YEAR(-1) -0.759736 0.356914 -2.128623 
 
0.0774 
D(LOG_TRAFFIC_YEAR(-1)) 0.438321 0.351879 
 
1.245658 
 
0.2593 
 
C 4.150109 1.946104 
 
2.132522 
 
0.0769 
 
@TREND("2004") 0.010238 0.004888 2.094456 0.0811 
R-squared 0.438806 
 
 Mean dependent var 0.011809 
 
Adjusted R-squared 0.158209 
 
 S.D. dependent var 0.016972 
 
S.E. of regression 0.015572 
 
 Akaike info criterion -5.197564 
 
Sum squared resid 0.001455 
 
 Schwarz criterion -5.076530 
Log likelihood 29.98782 
 
 Hannan-Quinn criter. -5.330338 
 
F-statistic 1.563831 
 
 Durbin-Watson stat 2.374166 
 
Prob (F-statistic) 0.292989 
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The ADF test statistic is -2.128623which is greater than the 0.05 critical value of -4.008157 
and so the null hypothesis that the natural log of traffic is a random walk with drift is not 
rejected. Thus, it cannot reject the hypothesis that traffic follows a geometric Brownian 
motion. 
 
2) Test for normality: Using the change of log (traffic) on annual basis  
 
The Shapiro-Wilk statistic is used to detect normality. The null and alternative hypothesis can 
be expressed as: 
H0 : The distribution is normal, against 
H1 : The distribution is not normal 
 
SPSS generates the following output for the test of normality: 
 
Case Processing Summary 
 Cases 
 Valid Missing Total 
 N Percent N Percent N Percent 
VAR00002: the 
change of log 
(traffic)-Yearly 
11 8.1% 124 91.9% 135 100.0% 
 
Tests of Normality 
 
 Kolmogorov-Smirnov
a
 Shapiro-Wilk 
 Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig. 
VAR00002: the 
change of log 
(traffic)-Yearly   
.205 11 .200
*
 .893 11 .153 
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction    
*. This is a lower bound of the true significance.   
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The calculated value of the test statistic is .893 which is less than the critical value at the 0.05 
level. The series (the change of log (traffic)-yearly) is normal. 
 
3) Test for autocorrelation: Using the change of log (traffic) on annual data 
 
Since annual data is applied, it is reasonable to assume that if any autocorrelation is present, it 
is generated by a first autoregressive process. The null and alternative hypothesis can be 
expressed as: 
H0 : There is no serial correlation (there is no association between the variables), against 
H1 : Some correlation does exist  
 
The output from the SPSS autocorrelation test is shown as follow. 
 
Case Processing Summary 
  VAR00002: the 
change of log 
(traffic)-Yearly 
Series Length 135 
Number of Missing 
Values 
User-Missing 0 
System-Missing 124
a
 
Number of Valid Values 11 
Number of Computable First Lags 10 
a. Some of the missing values are imbedded within the series. 
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Autocorrelations 
Series:VAR00002: the change of log (traffic)-Yearly 
Lag Autocorrelation Std. Error
a
 
Box-Ljung Statistic 
Value df Sig.
b
 
1 .084 .264 .101 1 .750 
2 -.170 .251 .562 2 .755 
3 -.493 .237 4.905 3 .179 
4 -.149 .221 5.356 4 .253 
5 .123 .205 5.719 5 .335 
6 .137 .187 6.257 6 .395 
7 -.032 .167 6.293 7 .506 
8 -.005 .145 6.294 8 .614 
9 .004 .118 6.295 9 .710 
a. The underlying process assumed is independence (white noise). 
b. Based on the asymptotic chi-square approximation.  
 
Box-Ljung test statistic is .101which is less than the 0.05 critical value and so the null 
hypothesis that there is no serial correlation is not rejected. Then, it means that there is no 
serial correlation. 
 
In summary, based on the test for a random walk with drift, traffic volumes on monthly and 
yearly basis, follow a geometric Brownian motion process.  
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Appendix D Validating the Option-Values for the SES Project Using the 
Black-Scholes Model  
 
The binomial model which is used to calculate a call and a put option in the SES project is 
checked against the equivalent values from a Black-Scholes (BS) model to check the accuracy 
of the binomial model approximation against a BS continuous time estimation. The results are 
provided in the table D1. The results show that the two models produce nearly the same 
values. 
Option list Option type  Value of option 
using the binomial 
model (Million 
baht) 
Value of option using 
the Black-Scholes 
model (Million baht) 
Deferral option-FI* Call option 589 620 
Abandon option-FI** Put option 2,960 2,473 
Debt guarantee 
option-
Government** 
Put option 814 764 
Equity guarantee 
option –
Government*** 
Put option 14 34 
* values at beginning year, ** values at year 5th, *** values at year 7th 
Table D1: A comparison of the binomial and Black-Scholes models. 
  
Table D2 shows key inputs (the SES project) of the Black-Scholes option pricing model. 
There are 5 basic inputs (parameters) which are S= present value of the project operating 
asset, X= expenditure required to acquire the project asset, t= time duration, rf = risk-free 
interest rate (6%), ζ= standard deviation of traffic flow (20%). 
 
Option List Inputs of the Black-Scholes 
option pricing model (the SES 
project) 
Deferral option-FI S =25,147 million baht 
 X =31,532.18 million baht 
 T =1 
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Option List Inputs of the Black-Scholes 
option pricing model (the SES 
project) 
 rf =6% 
 ζ =20% 
Abandon option-FI S =15,982.68 million baht 
 X =18,942.84 million baht 
 T =1 
 rf =6% 
 ζ =20% 
Debt guarantee option-Government S =2,574.68 million baht 
 X =3,514.95 million baht 
 T =1 
 rf =6% 
 ζ =20% 
Equity guarantee option –Government  S =537.04 million baht 
 X =551.04 million baht 
 T =1 
 rf =6% 
 ζ =20% 
Table D2: Inputs of the Black-Scholes option pricing model (the SES project) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
258 
 
Reference 
 
ADB. (1997) Guideline for the Economic Analysis of Project. Manila: Economics and 
Development Resource Center. 
 
ADB. (2000) Developing Best Practices for Promoting Private Sector Investment in 
Infrastructure: Roads. Manila: The Asian Development Bank.   
 
ADB. (2002) Handbook for Integrating Risk Analysis in the Economic Analysis of Projects. 
Manila: The Asian Development Bank.   
 
ADB. (2007) ERD Working Paper Series Number 94, Theory and Practice in the Choice of 
Social Discount Rate for Cost-Benefit Analysis. Manila: The Asian Development Bank. 
 
Akintoye, A. et al. (2001) Framework for Risk Assessment and Management of Private 
Initiative Projects. Glasgow: School of the Built and National Environment, Glasgow 
Caledonian University.  
 
Allan, J. R. (1999) Public –Private Partnerships: A Review of Literature and Practice Public 
Policy paper no.4. Canada: Saskatchewan Institute of Public Policy. 
 
Ameyaw, E. E. and Chan Albert, P.C (2015) ‗Evaluation and ranking of risk factors in public-
private partnership water supply projects in developing countries using fuzzy synthetic 
evaluation approach‘, Expert Systems with Application, 42, pp. 5102-5116.  
 
Bangkok Post (2005) ‗Conflict over Don Muang Tollway intensifies‘, 7 November [Online]. 
Available at: http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-138454992.html.    
 
Bangkok Post (2009) ‗Tollway fee rise allowed to avoid suit‘ 11 November. 
 
Bangkok Post (2010) ‗Airport Rail Link begins full commercial operations‘ 23 August. 
 
The Bangkok Metro Public Company Limited (BMCL), Annual Report (2009) 
 
Barraquand, J. and Martineau, D. (1995) ‗Numerical valuation of high dimensional 
multivariate American securities‘, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 30(3), pp. 
383-405. 
 
Belli, P. et al. (1998) Handbook on Economic Analysis of Investment Operations. World 
Bank.   
259 
 
Benaroch, M. and Kauffman, R.J. (1999) ‗A case for using real options pricing analysis to 
evaluate information technology project investment’ Information System Research, 10 (1), pp. 
70-86.  
 
Benes, M. and Stary, O. (2009) ‗Economic risk in PPP energy project‘, 10th IAEE European 
Conference: Energy Policies and Technologies for Sustainable Economies. Vienna, 7 - 10 
September, Austrian Association for Energy Economics, Available at: 
http://www.aaee.at/2009-IAEE (Accessed: 5 February 2011) 
 
Bettignies, J.E and Ross, T.W. (2004). ‗The economics of public-private partnerships‘, 
Canadian Public Policy-Analyse DE Politiques, 30 (2), pp. 135-154. 
 
Bhasin, A. (2003) ‗Appraisal framework for transport objective‘ Logistics & Transport 
Focus, 5(10), pp. 36-39. 
 
Bjerksund, P. and Ekern, S. (1990) ‗Managing investment opportunities under price 
uncertainty: from ―Last chance to‖ Wait and see‖ strategies‘, Financial Management, 19 (3), 
pp. 65-83.   
 
Black, F and Scholes, M. (1973) ‗The pricing of options and corporate liabilities‘,  
The Journal of Political Economy, 81(3), pp. 637-654. 
 
Blank, F.F. et al. (2009) ‗Private infrastructure investment through public private partnership: 
An application to a toll road highway concession in Brazil‘, 13th Annual International 
Conference. Braga Portugal and Santiago Spain, June 17-20, Real Options Group 
 
Boardman, A. E. et al (2001) Cost-Benefit Analysis: Concepts and Practice. 2nd edn. New 
Jersey: Prentice Hall.  
 
Boardman, A. E. et al (2006). Cost-Benefit Analysis: Concepts and Practice.3nd edn. New 
Jersey: Prentice Hall. 
 
Boyle, P. (1977) ‗Options: a Monte Carlo approach‘, Journal of Financial Economics, 4(3), 
pp. 323-338. 
 
Brach, M. (2003). Real option in Practice. Wiley& Son 
 
260 
 
Brandao, L. and Dyer, J (2005) ‗Decision analysis and real options: A discrete time approach 
to real option valuation‘, Annals of Operation Research, 135(1), March, pp. 21-39.  
 
Brandao, L. and  Saraiva, E (2008) ‗The option value of government guarantees in 
infrastructure projects‘, Construction Management and Economics, 26 (11), pp. 1171-1180.  
 
Brennan, M. and Schwartz, E. (1985) ‗Evaluating natural resource investment‘, Journal of 
Business, April, pp.135-157.  
 
Brzozowska, K. (2007) ‗Cost-benefit analysis in public project appraisal‘, Engineering 
Economics, 3(53), pp. 78-83. 
 
Buchen, P. et al. (2009) ‗Images and barriers on the road to real options valuation‘, 18th 
World IMACS / MODSIM Congress, Cairns Australia, 13-17 July. Modeling and Simulation 
Society of Australia and New Zealand and International Association for Mathematics and 
Computers in Simulation, pp. 1486-1492 
 
Burke, R. (1999) Project Management; Planning & Control Techniques. 3rd edn. Cape 
Town: Promatic International. 
 
Caplin, A. and Leahy, J (2004) ‗The social discount rate‘, Journal of Political Economy, 
112(6), pp. 1257-1268. 
 
Carr, P. (1988) ‗The valuation of sequential exchange opportunities‘, The Journal of Finance, 
43(5), pp. 1235-1256.  
 
Casassus, J. and Cortazar, G (1999) ‗A Compound option model for evaluating multistage 
natural resource investments in M. J. Brennan and L. Trigeorgis (eds)‘, Project Flexibility, 
Agency, and Product Market Competition: New Developments in the Theory and Application 
of Real Options Analysis, Oxford University Press. 
 
Charles, Y.J. Cheah and Liu, J. (2006) ‗Valuing governmental support in infrastructure 
projects as real options using Monte Carlo simulation‘, Construction Management and 
Economics, 24, pp. 545–554. 
 
Charnes, J. M. (2000) ‗Using simulation for option pricing‘. In Proceedings of the 2000 
Winter Simulation Conference, ed. Joines, J. A., Burton, R. R., Kang, K., and Fishwick, P. A., 
261 
 
151–157. Piscataway, New Jersey: Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc. 
pp.173-182 
 
Charoenpornpattana et al (2003). ‗Government supports as bundle of real options in build- 
operate-transfer highways projects‘, 7thAnnual International Conference on Real Options. 
Washington D.C., 10-12 July, Real Options Group, Georgetown University, University of 
California Los Angeles and Northwestern University. 
 
Chege, L.W. and Rwelamila, P.D. (2001) ‗Private financing construction projects and 
procurement system: an integrated approach‘. CIB World Building Congress. Wellington, 
New Zealand, 2-6 April, International Council for Research and Innovation in Building and 
Construction, Paper: NOV 33. 
 
Chiara N. et.al (2007) ―Valuing simple multiple exercise real options in infrastructure 
projects‖, Journal of Infrastructure Systems, June, pp. 97-104.  
 
Chritamara, S and Ogunlana, S O (2001) ‗Problems experienced on design and build projects 
in Thailand‘, Journal of Construction Procurement, 7(1), pp.73–93. 
 
Circular A-94 (1992, 2009 revised). Guidelines and Discount Rates for Benefit-Cost Analysis 
of Federal Program. Washington, DC: Office of Management and Budget. 
 
Cobb, B.R. and Charnes, J.M. (2004) ‗Real options volatility estimation with correlated 
inputs‘, the Engineering Economist, 49, pp.119–137. 
 
Cobb, B.R. and Charnes, J.M. (2007) ‗Real option valuation‘, Proceedings of the 2007 Winter 
Simulation Conference. Piscataway, New Jersey, 9-12 Dec: Institute of Electrical and 
Electronics Engineering, Inc. pp. 173-182.         
 
Cortazar, G. (2000) Simulation and Numerical Methods in Real Option Valuation. Working 
Paper:  EFMA 2000.  
 
Cortazar, G. (2001) Simulation and Numerical Methods in Real Options Valuation, in Real 
Options and Investment under Uncertainty: Classical Readings and Recent Contributions 
Schwartz and Trigeorgis (Eds).Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press. 
 
262 
 
Cortazar, G. and Schwartz E., S. (1997) ‘Implementing a real option model for valuing an 
undeveloped oil Field‘, International Transactions of Operational Research, 4(2), pp. 125–
137 
 
Copeland, T. and Vladimir A. (2001) Real Options: A Practitioner’s Guide. New York: 
Texere LLC. 
 
Copeland, T and Tufano, P. (2004) ‗A real-world way to manage real options‘, Harvard 
Business Review, 84(3), pp. 90–99 
 
Cox, J.C.,  Ross, S., Rubinstein, M.  (1979) ‗Option pricing: A simplified approach‘, Journal 
of Financial Economics, 7, pp. 229-263. 
 
Deng, S.J. and Xia, Z. (2006) ‗A real options approach for pricing electricity tolling 
agreements‘, International Journal of Information Technology & Decision Making, 5(3), pp. 
421-436.   
 
Devapriya, K.A.K. and Alfen, H.W. (2003) ‘Role of institutional arrangements in financing 
project company in Asia’. 2 October [Online]. Available at: http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/.  
 
Dixit, A. and Pindyck, R. (1994) Investment under Uncertainty. Princeton NJ: Princeton 
University Press. 
 
Duong, M. and Morel, B. (2003) ‗The real option with absorbing barrier‘, HAL in its series 
Post-Print, Available at: https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00003976/.  
 
EL-Amm, L.A. (2003) Risk Management in Toll Road Concession. Master of Science Thesis. 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 
 
Emmanuel et al (2014). ‗Performance measure of binomial model for pricing American and 
European options‘, Applied and Computational Mathematics, 3(6-1), pp. 18-30.  
 
Eschenbach, T. and Cohen, R. (2006). ‗Which interest rate for evaluating projects?‘, 
Engineering Management Journal, 18(3), pp. 11-19. 
 
European Commission (2003) Guidelines for Successful Public-Private-Partnership, 
Coordinated by Roberto Ridolfi, Directorate -General for Regional policy.  
263 
 
 
European Commission (2008) Guide to Cost-Benefit Analysis of Investment Projects, 
European Union Regional Policy, Directorate -General for Regional policy.  
 
Evans, D. and Sezer, H. (2002) ‗A time preference measure of the social discount rate for the 
UK‘, Applied Economics, 34, pp. 1925-1934. 
 
Evans, D. and Sezer, H., (2004) ‗Social discount rates for six major countries‘, Applied 
Economics Letters, 11, pp. 557–560. 
 
Evans, D. (2008) ‗Social project appraisal and discounting for the very long term‘, Economic 
Issues, 13 (Part I), pp.61-70. 
 
Fan, M. et. al (2008) ‗Choosing a project risk-handling strategy: An analytical model‘, 
International of Production Economics,112(2), pp. 700-713. 
 
Feng, C.M. and Wang, S.M. (2005) ‗The fully economic evaluation for transport 
infrastructure project‘, Proceedings of the Eastern Asia Society for Transportation Studies, 5, 
pp. 1778 – 1791.  
 
Finnerty J.D. (1996). Project Financing: Asset-Based Financial Engineering. 3rd edn. New 
York: John Wiley& Sons Inc. 
 
Fishbein, G. and Babbar, S. (1996) Private Financing of Toll Roads. RMC Discussion Paper 
Series 117, Washington D C.: the World Bank.  
 
Flanagan, R. (2002) ‗Managing risk for an uncertain future – A project management 
perspective‘, Project Management - Impresario of the Construction Industry Symposium. 
Hong Kong, 22-23 March: Research Center for Construction and Real Estate Economics, pp. 
22-32.   
 
Flyvbjerg B. et al. (2003) ‗How common and how large are cost overruns in transport 
infrastructure projects?‘, Transport Review, 23(1), pp. 71-88.     
 
Ford, D. N. et al. (2002) ‗A real options approach to valuing strategic flexibility in uncertain 
construction projects‘, Construction Management and Economics, 20(4), pp. 343–351. 
 
264 
 
Fu, M.C. et al. (2001) ‗Pricing American options: A comparison of Monte Carlo simulation 
approaches‘, Journal of Computational Finance, 4 (3), pp. 39-88.  
 
Gamba, A. (2002) Real Options Valuation: a Monte Carlo Approach. Working Paper Series 
2002/03. Faculty of Management, University of Calgary. 
 
Garvin, M.J. and Cheah, C.Y.J. (2004) ‗Valuation techniques for infrastructure investment 
decisions‘, Construction Management and Economics, 22, pp. 373-383. 
 
Garvin M.J. and Ford D.N. (2012) ‗Real options in Infrastructure project: Theory, practice 
and prospects‘, The Engineering Project Organization Journal, March-June, 2, pp. 97-108 
 
Geurs, K. et al. (2006) ‗Option value of public transport: Methodology for measurement and 
case study for regional rail links in the Netherlands‘, Transport Reviews, September, 26(5), 
pp. 613-643.  
 
Ghosh, S. and Jintanapakanont, J. (2004) ‗Identifying and assessing the critical risk factors in 
an underground rail project in Thailand: a factor analysis approach‘, International Journal of 
Project Management, 22, 633–643. 
 
Grant-Muller, S.M. et al. (2001) ‗Economic appraisal of European transport projects: the 
State-of-the-art revisited‘, Transport Reviews, 21(2), pp. 237-261. 
 
Grout, P.A. (2002) ‗Public and private sector discount rate in public-private partnerships‘, 
CIMPO Working Paper Series No. 03/059. 
 
Guma, A.C. (2008)  A Real Options Analysis of a Vertically Expandable Real Estate 
Development, Master of Science in Real Estate Development Thesis, Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology. 
 
Hasselgren B (2013) Government’s Role for Transport Infrastructure Theoretical Approaches 
and Historical Development, Doctoral thesis, School of Architecture and the Built 
Environment, KTH Royal Institute of Technology.  
 
Haahtela, T. (2012). ‗Differences between financial options and real options‘, Lecture notes in 
Management sciences 4, pp. 169-178 
 
265 
 
Hainz, C., and Kleimeier, S. (2001) ‗Project finance as a risk-management tool in 
international syndicated lending‘, Discussion Paper No. 183, Governance and the efficiency 
of economics system. 
 
Han, H.J. and Park, C.S. (2008) ‗A study on estimating investment timing of real options‘, 
The Engineering Economist, 53, pp.197-229. 
 
Hahn, W.J. (2005) A Discrete-Time Approach for Valuing Real Options with Underlying 
Mean-Reverting Stochastic Process, PhD Dissertation, Texas University of Austin. 
 
He, K. (2007) ‗Real options application in project evaluation practice‘. Cost Engineering, 
49(8), pp. 16-19. 
 
Hoffman, S.L. (1998) The Law and Business of international project finance- A resource for 
governments, sponsors, lenders, lawyers and project participants. the Hague: Kluwer Law 
International.  
 
Howell, S. et al. (2001) Real Option: Evaluating Corporate Investment Opportunities in 
Dynamic World. Great Britain: Prentice Hall.  
 
Ho, S., and Liu, L. Y. (2002) ‗An option pricing-based model for evaluating the financial 
viability of privatized infrastructure projects‘, Construction Management and Economics, 
20(2), pp. 143–156. 
 
Huang, Y.L. and Chou, S.P. (2006) ‗Valuation of the minimum revenue guarantee and the 
option to abandon in BOT infrastructure projects‘, Construction Management and Economics, 
April, 24, pp. 379–389. 
 
Hull, J.C. (2009) Options, Futures and other Derivatives, 7th edn, Prentice Hall, New Jersey: 
seventh edition.   
 
Jin, X.H. and Doloi, H. (2008) ‗Interpreting risk allocation mechanism in public– 
private partnership projects: an empirical study in a transaction cost economics perspective‘, 
Construction Management and Economics, July, 26, pp. 707–721 
 
Kerali, H. (2003) ‗Economic appraisal of road projects in countries with developing and 
transition economies‘, Transport Reviews, 23 (23), pp. 249-262. 
266 
 
 
Kester, W.C. (1984) ‗Today's options for tomorrow's growth‘, Harvard Business Review, 
March, pp. 153-160. 
 
Khan, M and Parra, R. (2003) Financing Large Projects; Using Project Finance Techniques 
and Practise. Singapore: Prentice Hall. 
 
Kodukula, P. and Papudeso, C. (2006) Project Evaluation Using Real Option: a Practitioner 
Guide: J. Ross Publishing Inc.    
 
Kogut, B. (1991). ‗Joint ventures and option to expand and acquire‘, Management Science, 
37(1), January, pp.19-33.     
 
Kong, D. et al. (2008) ‗Assessment of credit risk in project finance‘, Journal of Construction 
Engineering and Management, November, pp. 876- 884. 
 
Kreydieh A. (1996) Risk Management in BOT Project Financing. Master of Science in Civil 
Engineering and Environmental Thesis. Massachusetts Institute of Technology.  
 
Leviakangas, P. (2007) ‗Private finance of transport infrastructure projects; Value and risk 
analysis of a Finnish shadow toll road project‘, VTT publication number 624, VTT Technical 
Research Centre of Finland. 
 
Lewis et al (2004) ‗Valuation for the strategic management of research and development 
projects: the deferral option‘. Engineering Management Journal, 16 (4), December, pp.36-48.  
 
Loke A.F.H. (1998) ‗Risk management and credit support in project finance‘. Singapore 
Journal of International & Comparative Law, pp. 37-75.   
 
Longstaff, F., and Schwartz, E. (2001) ‗Valuing American options by simulation: A simple 
least-squares approach‘. The Review of Financial Studies, 14(1), pp.113-147. 
 
Luehrman, T.A. (1998) ‗Investment opportunities as real options: getting started on the 
number‘, Harvard Business Review, 76(4) July-August, pp. 51-67.   
 
Majd, S and Pindyck, R (1987) ‗Time to build, option value and investment decisions‘ 
Journal of Financial Economics, 18, pp. 7-27. 
267 
 
 
M.A.G. Dias et.al (2004) ‗The optimal investment scale and timing: A real option approach to 
oilfield development‘ Real options theory and practice, Proc. 8th annual International 
Conference, Montreal, Canada   
 
Malini, E. (1999) ‗Build operate transfer municipal bridge projects in India‘ Journal of 
Management in Engineering, ASCE, 15(4), pp.51-58 
 
Marathe, R.R and Ryan, S.M (2005) ‗On the validity of the geometric Brownian motion 
assumption‘ Engineering Economist, 50(2), pp.159-192 
 
Mathews, S. (2009) ‗Valuing risky projects with real options‘ Research-Technology 
Management, 52(5), pp. 32-41. 
 
Mayer, Z. and Kazakidis, V. (2007) ‗Decision making in flexible mine production system 
design using real options‘, Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, February, 
pp. 169-180.  
 
Mendelsohn, R., (1983) ‗The choice of discount rate for public project; reply‘, The American 
Economic Review, June, pp. 499-500. 
 
Merna, T. and Njiru, C. (2002) Financing Infrastructure Projects. London:  Thomas Telford.       
 
Mun, J. (2006) Real Options Analysis: Tools and Techniques for Valuing Strategies 
Investments and Decisions. 2rd edn. New Jersey: John Wiley & Son Inc.  
 
Myers, S.C. (1987) ‗Finance theory and financial strategy‘, Midland Corporate Finance 
Journal, 5, pp. 6-13.   
 
Myers, S.C. (1984) ‗Finance theory and financial strategy‘, Interfaces 14, 1, January-
February, pp. 126-137.   
 
National Treasury/ PPP Manual (2001). Introductory Manual on Project Finance for 
Managers of PPP Project, Version 1, January.  
 
268 
 
Neely, J.E. and Neufville, R.D. (2003) ‗Hybrid real options valuation of risky product 
development projects‘, International Journal of Technology, Policy and Management, 1(1), 
pp. 29-46. 
 
Ng, A. and Loosemore, M. (2007) ‗Risk allocation in the private provision of public 
infrastructure‘, International Journal of Project Management, 25(1), pp. 66–76.  
 
Nevitt, P.K. and Fabozzi, F.J. (2000). Project Financing. London: Euromoney Books.  
 
Nwozo, C.R. and Fadugba, S.E. (2014) ‗On the accuracy of binomial model for the valuation 
of standard options with dividend yield in the context of Black-Scholes model‘, IAENG 
International Journal of Applied Mathematics, 44(1), pp.33-44. 
 
Obeng, F.A. and Mokgohiwa, J.P. (2002) ‗Entrepreneurial risk allocation in public-private 
infrastructure provision in South Africa‘, South Africa Journal of Business Management, 
33(4), pp. 29-39.  
 
Panayi, S. and Trigeorgis, L. (1998) ‗Multi-stage real option: the case of information 
technology infrastructure and international bank expansion‘, The Quarterly Review of 
Economics and Finance, 38, Special Issue, pp. 675-692.  
 
Partnerships Victoria (2001) Risk Allocation and Contractual Issues, Department of Treasury 
and Finance, State of Victoria, June.  
 
Partnerships Victoria (2003b) Use of Discount Rates in the Partnerships Victoria Process, 
Technical Note, Department of Treasury and Finance, July.   
 
Perlitz, M. et al. (1999) ‗Real options valuation: the new frontier in R&D project evaluation‘, 
R&D Management, 29(3), pp. 255-269. 
 
Pichayapan et al (2003) ‗Real option analysis (ROA) in evaluation of expressway projects 
under uncertainties‘, Journal of the Eastern Asia Society for Transportation Studies,5, pp. 
3015-3030. 
 
Pollio, G. (1998). ‗Project finance and international energy development‘. Energy Policy, 
November, 26(9), pp.687-697. 
 
269 
 
Podhraski, D. (2014). ‗Real options in public-privates partnerships’ European Procurement & 
Public Private Partnership Law Review, 9(3), pp164-173 
 
Preez, M. (2004) ‗The discount rate for public sector conservation projects in South Africa‘, 
African Development Review, Dec, 16(3), pp. 456-471. 
 
Price, C. and Nair, C.T.S (1985) ‗Social discounting and the distribution of project benefits‘, 
Journal of Development Studies, 21(4), pp. 525 – 532. 
 
Public Debt Management Office (2013) Private Investments in State Undertakings Act 
(Draft).   
 
Rayner, T (2004) ‗Sustainability and transport appraisal: the case of the ―access to hasting‖ 
multi-modal study‘, Journal of Environmental Assessment Policy and Management, 6 (4), pp. 
465–491.  
 
Razgaitis, R. (2003) Dealmaking Using Real Options and Monte Carlo Analysis. John Wiley 
& Sons, Hoboken, NJ. 
 
Rodrigues, A and Armada M.J.R (2006) ‗The valuation of real options with the Least squares 
Monte Carlo simulation method‘ the 4th Portuguese Finance Network Conference, Porto, 6th 
-8th July. 
 
Rose, S. (1998) ‗Valuation of interacting real options in a tollroad infrastructure project‘, The 
Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 38, Special Issue, pp. 711-723 
 
Rossella A. (2007) ‗A mathematical analysis of real options interactions‘ Proceedings of the 
8th WSEAS Int. Conference on Mathematics and Computers in Business and Economics, 
Vancouver, Canada, June 19-21. 
 
Roumboutsos, A. and Anagnostopoulos, K.P. (2008) ‗Public-private partnership project in 
Greece: risk ranking and preferred risk allocation‘, Construction Management and 
Economics, 26, pp. 751-763. 
 
Ruster, J. (1996) ‗Mitigating commercial risks in project finance‘, Public Policy for the 
Private Sector, the World Bank note no. 69, February. 
 
270 
 
Samis, M. and Davis, G.A. (2014) ‗Using Monte Carlo simulation with DCF and real options 
risk pricing techniques to analyse a mine financing proposal‘, Int. J. Financial Engineering 
and Risk Management, 1(3), pp.264-281. 
 
Schaufelberger, J. and Wipadapisul, I. (2003) ‗Alternative financing strategies for build-
operate-transfer projects‘, Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 
March/April, pp. 205-213.    
 
Scaramozzino, P. (2010) Study Material for Derivatives Course. London: The Centre for 
Financial & Management Studies, University of London.  
  
Schall, L.D., (1972) ‗Asset valuation, firm investment, and firm diversification‘, Journal of 
Business, 45, pp. 11-28. 
 
Schwartz, E. (1997) ‗The Stochastic behavior of commodity prices: implications for valuation 
and hedging‘, The Journal of Finance, 52(3), pp. 923-973. 
 
Shaoul, J. (2002) ‗A financial Appraisal of the London underground public-private 
partnership‘, Public Money & Management, April-June, pp.  53-60. 
 
Shaw, N. et al. (1996) Concession in transport TWU paper-27. Washington D.C: World 
Bank.   
 
Shen, Y.L. (1997) ‗Project risk management in Hong Kong‘. International Journal Project 
Management, 15(2), pp.101–5. 
 
Shil, P and Allada, V (2007) ‗Evaluating product plans using real option‘ the Engineering 
Economist, 52: pp. 215-253.    
 
Sing T.F.(2002) ‗Time to build options in construction processes‘, Construction Management 
and Economics, 20, pp. 119-130. 
 
SOAS (2009) Project Appraisal and Impact Analysis” Course Material for Master of 
Quantitative Finance, London: University of London.   
 
Songer, A.D. et al. (1997) ‗Risk analysis for revenue dependent infrastructure projects‘, 
Construction Management and Economics, 15, pp. 377-382.  
271 
 
 
Sorge M. (2004) ‗The nature of credit risk in project finance‘, BIS Quarterly Review, 
December, pp. 91-101. 
 
Stout D.E. (2008) ‗Improving capital budgeting decisions with real options‘, Management 
Accounting Quarterly Summer, 9(4), pp. 1-10.  
 
Susanggarn, C. (2007) ‗Public private partnership in Thailand: past experiences and future 
prospects‘, the Asia-Pacific Ministerial Conference on PPPs in Infrastructure. Republic of 
Korea, October.  
 
Tanaka, D.F. et al. (2005) ‗Private finance for road project in developing countries: Improving 
transparency through VFM risk assessment‘, Journal of the Eastern Asia Society for 
Transportation Studies, 6, pp. 3899 – 3914. 
 
Tánczos, K. and Kong, G.S. (2001) ‗A review of appraisal methodologies of feasibility 
studies done by public private partnership in road project development‘, Periodica 
Polytechnica Ser. Transp. Eng, 29 (1-2), pp. 71-81.   
 
Tallon, P.P et al. (2002) ‗Using real options analysis for evaluating uncertainty investments in 
information technology: insights from ICIS 2001 debate', Communications of the Association 
for Information Systems, 9, pp. 136-167.   
 
The Green book (2003) Appraisal and Evaluation in Central Government. London: HM 
Treasury. 
 
Tong, T. et.al. (2005). International joint ventures and the value of growth options (October 
2005). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=827269  
 
Triantis, A. (2005). ‗Realizing the potential of real options: Does theory meet practice?‘ 
Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 17(2), pp. 8-16.  
 
Trigeorgis, L. (1993a). ‗The nature of option interactions and the valuation of investments 
with multiple real options‘, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 28(1), pp. 1-20.  
 
Trigeorgis, L. (1993b) ‗Real options and interactions with financial flexibility‘, Financial 
Management, Autumn, pp. 202-224.  
272 
 
 
Trigeorgis, L. (1996) Real options: Managerial Flexibility and Strategy in Resource 
allocation, Cambridge: MIT Press. 
 
TRIS Rating (2009) ‗Credit News Bangkok Mass Transit System Public Company Limited‘, 
Announcement no 639, 17 July.  
 
TRIS Rating (2009) ‗Credit News Bangkok Express Public Company Limited‘April 
Announcement no. 621, 29 April. 
       
Tsamboulas, D. et al. (1999). ‗Use of multicriteria  methods for assessment of transport 
projects‘, Journal of Transportation Engineering, September/October, pp. 407-414. 
 
Tsui, M. (2005) Valuing Innovative Technology R&D as a Real Option: Application to Fuel 
Cell Vehicles. Master of Science Thesis in Civil and Environmental Engineering. 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology.  
  
Tuominena, P et.al (2015) ‗Economic appraisal of energy efficiency in buildings using cost- 
effectiveness assessment‘, Procedia Economics and Finance, 21, pp. 422 – 430. 
 
Turner, JR (1993) The Handbook of Project-Base Management: Improving the Processes for 
Achieving Strategic Objectives. England: McGraw-Hill. 
 
Vandoros, N. and Pantouvakis, J.P. (2006) ‗Using real options in evaluating PPP/PFI 
projects‘, CIB W92 Construction Symposium on "Sustainability and Value through 
Construction Procurement". Manchester UK, 29 Nov. - 2 Dec. 
 
Vega, AO. (1997) ‗Risk allocation in infrastructure financing‘, Journal Project Finance, 3(2), 
pp. 38-42.  
 
US department of transportation, Federal Highway Administration (1998). Procedural 
Guidelines for Highway Feasibility Studies. September. Available at: 
http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/planning/border_planning/corbor/feastudy.cfm  
 
Wang, T. (2003) Analysis of Real Options in Hydropower Construction Projects: A Case 
Study in China. Master of Science Thesis in Technology and Policy. Massachusetts Institute 
of Technology. 
273 
 
 
Wibowo, A. and Kochendorfer, B. (2005) ‗Financial risk analysis of project finance in 
Indonesian toll roads‘, Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, 131(9), pp. 
963- 972. 
 
Williams, J. (1938) The Theory of Investment Value. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press. 
 
Ye, S and Tiong, R.L.K. (2000) ‗NPV-at- risk method in infrastructure project investment 
evaluation‘, Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, ASCE, 126(3), pp. 227-
33.     
 
Yongjian et al (2010) ‗Preferred risk allocation in China‘s public–private partnership (PPP) 
projects‘, International Journal of Project Management, 28(5), pp. 482–492.  
 
Zhang, X., Kumaraswamy, M. (2001) ‗Procurement protocols for public private partnered 
projects‘, Journal of construction Engineering and management, ASCE, 127(5), pp. 351-358. 
 
Zhang, X. (2005) ‗Financial viability analysis and capital structure optimization in privatized 
public infrastructure projects‘, Journal of Construction Engineering and Management, June, 
pp. 656-668.   
 
Zhao et al (2004) ‗Highway development decision-making under uncertainty: A real options 
approach‘, Journal of Infrastructure Systems, 10(1), pp.23-32.  
   
Zhao, T. and Tseng, C.L. (2003) ‗Valuing flexibility in infrastructure expansion‘, Journal of 
Infrastructure Systems, September, pp. 89-97 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
